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Poem written by George Shaker, MP South Shields, c. 1830, criticizing the Newcastle 
Corporation for their lack of action in improving the River Tyne. Clearly the author 
saw that the town was favoured over the River and it was obvious that the River 
needed improving. I have entered further explanatory information in brackets where 
Come all you good folks, attend to my song, 
It's the fame of our Corporation I wish to prolong, 
For improving of rivers and giving good dinners, 
They cannot be equaled by ages or sinners... 
If deepening of rivers like widening of streets 
Required paper and parchment in numberless sheets 
You would soon have the Tyne - I've a confident notion 
If not as deep as Hell's pond quite as deep as the ocean. 
To keep our good Town up, in intellectual march 
Call to your aid clever J -y Bold Arch (James Archibold, Newcastle MP) 
So honest is he, he ne'er alters his note 
Or e'er give a chirp till the Alderman vote. 
It was thought Buddle & Johnson, & Nicholas Wood, 
When they survey'd the river they would do it some good 
But you might as well dance to the tune of a fiddle 
For it's all to be done by Master Mine-viewer Liddle. (Matthew Liddle) 
All people, no matter whether they're thick or they are thin, 
May walk down the river without being up to the chin 
And they also may cross it whenever they please 
And the water shall scarcely come up to their knees. 
All you that are frugal and take care of your groats 
And instead of an Omnibus go in the Steam Boats, 
Be patient and calm, don't get in a fury, 
But trust to our Solomon's - the six river jury. 
No more shall the Steam Boats sit fast like a dish, 
Nor break all the backs of the poor little fish 
And for fear you should think this all nothing but fudge 
They'll deepen the river with a dredge or a drudge. 
That this was promised before we all very well ken, 
And that quizzical Mitchell put in the word when 
Now I'll tell you when, without meaning any degradation, 
When Parliament thinks proper to reform the Corporation. 
Our municipal body have found out a plan 
Which was known and been practices since the world began, 
To increase the water is simply this 
In future they all in the river will 
Tyne Improvement Commission Papers, [L627 T987T, Cr 961066A]. 
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ACCOUNTING FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF THE RIVER TYNE IN THE 
19TH CENTURY 
Abstract 
The relationship between accounting and central government, together with the 
increasing statutory regulation of companies during the 190' century, have attracted a 
great deal of attention from accounting historians. Conversely, accounting change 
within local authorities, more specifically river authorities, in this period has attracted 
far less. The study considers the management of the River from the perspectives of 
who controlled it, how its development was funded, the stakeholders to which Tyne 
Improvement Commission [TIC] was accountable, and investment in capital projects. 
The study reveals that accounting data played an important role, in recording 
operational activities and informing strategic decisions, and also in fighting the 
political battles as competing stakeholders vied for hegemony. Those who prepared 
the accounts were aware of the merits of doing accounting well as a means of 
reducing borrowing costs and forestalling costly political inquiries. The major 
stakeholders in the River Tyne included local and national government, the TIC, 
traders and ship-owners, and groups of professionals such as bookkeepers and 
engineers who were involved in the accounting process. In many cases the interests of 
these parties conflicted, and accounting was deployed as a political device `to act as 
both mediator and contester' in resolving disputes [Francis, 1990, p. 10]. The thesis 
also shows that accounts were used as a communication medium, informing and 
ultimately aiding radical, democratic forces in challenging the existing social 
iii 
structure. The thesis adds to a growing body of critical researchers who have 
developed the idea that accounting can be used as an emancipatory tool in society as a 
counterfoil to the majority of their number who see it as a tool of oppression by social 
elites. The study illustrates how accounting impinged on the development of the 
River, sometimes as a retarder and sometimes as a facilitator, but always vital to its 
progress. 
IV 
ACCOUNTING FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF THE 
RIVER TYNE IN THE 19TH CENTURY 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
This thesis examines the function and development of accounting data for the River 
Tyne in the 1911 century against a backdrop of major economic, technological, 
political, social, and organisational change. The thesis focuses on the River Tyne 
because of its significance to the economic development of the region and country as 
a whole. In this respect, the sea-sale Tyne coal-trade was especially vital to the 
progress of the United Kingdom in the 191h century in the key role it played in 
servicing the energy needs of a growing population and industry alike. However, 
despite its importance the River Tyne has been almost totally omitted from 
accounting research, leaving a vacuum to be filled which this study aims to 
accomplish. The study employs various technical accounting and industrial terms 
throughout, which are explained in the footnotes. 
The importance of the River Tyne as a major outlet for both internal and 
export trade endured throughout the period despite the rise of the railways. As the 
main artery of trade in the region, water carriage on the River was essential for 
business success. Prior to the advent of railways, water carriage methods, such as 
rivers and canals, were the only practicable way in Britain to transport a majority of 
industrial raw materials and products nationally as well as internationally: 
By means of water carriage a more extensive market is opened to 
every sort of industry than what land carriage alone can afford it, so it 
is upon the sea coast and along the banks of navigable rivers that 
industry of every kind naturally begins to subdivide and improve itself 
[Smith, 1776, p. 54]. 
Later, with the advent of the railways, canals lost some of their importance. Rail was 
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a much faster means of transportation and tracks could be built much closer to the 
source of production. As Guthrie [ 1880, p. 40] proclaimed, 
the competing merits of rail and canal communication were for many 
years discussed, ending in the victory of the rail. 
Indeed, with its long history of colliery waggonways, the potential of rail 
transportation was recognised early on in Tyneside, and one of the first steam 
railways to be built in Britain was the Newcastle to Carlisle Railway. Construction 
started on the project in 1829, the railway opening nine years later. However, as will 
be seen, transportation by river and sea did not lose its importance. The rail system 
was far from complete, and water-borne transportation offered the potential of 
carrying greater quantities of bulk materials internally, as well as being the only 
means of exporting goods. 
The Tyne was Britain's second largest port at the start of the 19th century with 
a long industrial history stretching as far back as the 16th century. The rapid expansion 
of the sea-sale coal-trade to London began in the 1600s, and by the 1811 century the 
port was well established with a range of industries located on the banks of the River. 
The population of the area was also on the increase: 
During the period 1760-1850 North East England saw increasingly 
rapid change in its economic, political and social organisation, though 
these were to be far outstripped in scale in the succeeding period... By 
1850 what had previously been a society of small scattered largely 
agricultural communities was already advanced in the transformation 
into an industrialized and urbanised society [McCord, 1979, p. 35]. 
Newcastle was the major coal-port supplying London and many other ports both at 
home and abroad, thus exerting a powerful influence on their economic development. 
Indeed, Gladstone described it as 
a district with extraordinary and multifarious combination of the 
various great brands of mining, manufacturing, trading and 
shipbuilding industry, and I greatly doubt whether the like can be 
shown, not only within the limits of this land, but upon the whole 
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surface of the globe [extract of a speech by W. Gladstone, 1862]. 
Previous histories 
The history of the development of the Tyne in the 1911 century has not been examined 
previously from an accounting perspective. Moreover, aside from the scientific or 
hydrographical aspects of the River, ' most work has concentrated on the industrial 
development of the region serviced by the River. There are very few studies relating 
to the development of the River itself. Thus, coalmining, the coal-trade, railways and 
ship building have already been chronicled and analysed in detail. For example, 
Finch's [1973] book tells the story of the North-East coal-trade in the days of sail 
from a non-accounting perspective. The 17th and 18th century exploitation of the 
northern coalfield, sailing collier design, their owners, builders and crews, their 
cargoes and navigations, are the main topics of focus. Coalmining studies involving 
accounting include Fordyce [1860, p. ii], who in his detailed book described the 
progress of coalmining, winning and working of collieries, the 
duration of the northern coalfield, mine surveying, estimate of the 
capital required to embark in the coal, coke or iron trades, the probable 
amount of profit to be realised, amount of capital invested in collieries 
and ironworks and the history of the coal and iron trade. 
Brackenborough et al [2001] examined the reasons for the sudden adoption of 
discounted cash flow (herein DCF) 2 in the Tyneside coal industry around 1801, 
concluding that the prime motivation was a combination of economic factors. 
Improved pumping technology towards the end of the 18th century permitted mining 
at increased depths and under more difficult conditions. The heightened risks resulted 
1 Black [1957], for example, examined the flood conditions of the River Tyne in her thesis. Swain and 
Newman [1962] investigated the survival of fish in different levels of polluted waters of the Tyne 
while Allen [1962, p. 5], looked at the `practical use of the generation, control and transmission of 
water' of the Tyne. Brierley [1983] investigated the Tyne from a morphological angle focussing on 
the similarities and differences in the anatomy of organisms with the influence of the Kielder Reservoir 
that regulates part of the River Tyne, and more recently, Marshall's [1992] report investigated salmon 
conservation on the Tyne. 
2A method of evaluating an investment by estimating future cashflows and taking into consideration 
the time value of money 
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in a sub-division of ownership into smaller parts, and a concomitant increase in the 
numbers of colliery valuations involving DCF carried out. Indeed, without DCF 
which evaluated the marginal rate of return given the risks involved, it is doubtful 
whether the investors would have had the confidence to commit resources. Hence, 
the adoption of DCF is a clear case of accounting and engineering 
technologies combining to facilitate the exploitation of deep coal 
reserves, where accounting acted as a determinant of industrial 
expansion... [without which] deep mining could not have commenced 
in the Newcastle region at this time [ibid, p. 152]. 
The significance of the railway system in the region has also been very well 
documented. Whittle [1979] has written a general history of the railways of 
Newcastle. In a book written by the renowned Gateshead historian Ken Groundwater 
[ 1998] the history of railways in and around Newcastle are reflected upon, forming a 
pictorial view of the development of railways. In another book, Guy [2003] looks at 
the story of rail in the North from the earliest wooden waggonways to modern times 
focussing on `the pioneers, the workers, locomotives and the revolutionary engineers 
who changed the face of the world' [p. 4]. However, all of these studies failed to show 
how, if at all, the railways influenced the use and value of the Tyne as a trading 
outlet. 
Shipbuilding too was a significant industry in the North-East region at this 
time. Again, this area of study has been examined exhaustively by authors such as 
Clarke [ 1997], who has written a comprehensive account of shipbuilding on the Tyne, 
based on regional archives and printed sources from Berwick to Whitby. Key 
chapters provide an in depth history of shipbuilding on the North-East coast of 
England from 1640-1980, and the yards, men and material, ships' output and the rise 
and decline of industry are examined in great detail. Keys [1998] produced a 
reference book listing merchant sailing vessels of 50 or more net registered tons, 
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owned, registered, or built in the Tyneside area between the years 1830-1930. 
Groundwater [ 1998] produced a mainly pictorial view of the shipyards and docks in 
their prime when ocean-going vessels were often seen along the river. 
The British shipping trade in general is also well documented. Kirkaldy 
[1914], for example, produced a succinct and lucid summary of the history, 
organisation and importance of the British shipping trade up to 1914 focussing on the 
development of ship-design, ownership, management and regulations in shipping, as 
well as trade routes, ports and docks in England. Harley [1988] looked at the effects 
of technology on freight rates. Napier's [1990,1991] work on accounting for 
shipping primarily relates to the P&O company. The main purpose of his 1990 paper 
was to provide `an exposition of P&O's changing approach to fixed asset accounting' 
[1990, p. 24]. His second paper examined `the accounting practices of P&O during the 
inter-war years' [1991, p. 303]. Ville's [1981,1986,1988,1989,1990] work does 
reflect on the situation in the North-East. However, it must be stressed that his work 
does not specifically examine the River Tyne in detail, but takes a general look at the 
shipping trade in the region; and much of it relates to an earlier period. Boyce [1995a] 
too considered different aspects of the shipping trade. He explored `patterns of 
corporate growth, organisational change and entrepreneurial succession within the 
British shipping industry 1870-1914' [p. ii]. He showed that British shipowners 
`successfully manipulated private information flows to sustain a rapid pace of growth 
using decentralised, network-based, administrative frameworks, ' [p. ix]. Boyce's 
[1995b] paper explored cost-accounting methods employed by British shipowners 
during the period in which large-scale enterprise initially emerged in the industry. 
Contemporary studies specific to the development of the River Tyne in the 
191 century exist, including various engineering reports produced annually by local 
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authorities on the Tyne. Most were published in minutes in the Newcastle Town 
Council Proceedings (herein the NTCP) and postdate 1835. The majority of these 
reports are of a technical nature with some accounting detail added, rather than 
wholly accounting in orientation. Examples include reports from the Newcastle City 
Library archives such as the River Tyne Improvement Report of the River, 1880 
[D. NCP/5/8], and papers relating to the dredging of the River in 1870 [GU. TH/254]. 
The engineering aspects have also been considered by modern authors. Rennison 
[1987], for example, looked at the North-Eastern coal ports in the 191 century from 
the perspective of the engineering, construction and design. Manders and Potts [2001] 
examined the history of the various methods and ways of crossing the River Tyne, 
such as bridges, tunnels and ferries. 
Kenwood [1985] focussed on capital formation in the North-East in the 19' 
century concentrating on the economic conditions of the region with a view to seeing 
how savings, investments and capital were employed. A study by Savage [1970] did 
look at the river Tyne from 1800-1850. However, his focus was more on the life and 
work of the River, the trades unions and commerce, producing maps and illustrations, 
but with no accounting detail. 
Central issues of the study 
To sum up, there exists a large peripheral literature relating to this study that will be 
used to elaborate key issues. Recent work by authors such as Boyce [1992,1995a, 
1995b] and Ville [1981,1986,1988,1989,19901 relating to the business affairs of 
traders and ship-owners is especially useful. However, the central questions raised by 
the study concerning the development of the Tyne rather than the associated industry, 
and the role played by accounting in that development are largely unresearched. In 
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order to address this shortfall the thesis explores four main subject areas: the control 
of the River; its funding arrangements; public accounting and accountability; and 
accounting for capital projects. 
The thesis demonstrates in a multitude of ways the central role of accounting in the 
dynamics and conduct of the River's development and affairs pre and post 1850. A 
recurrent key theme in the thesis is the role of accounting in challenging viewpoints 
and resolving disputes, as a mediator or as a contester. Francis, [1990, p. 5 ] adds that 
accounting is both a moral and discursive practice.. involving human 
agency... a transformative practice that has the capacity to change 
things in the world. 
Accounting is a social practice of informing and communicating. It will be shown in 
Chapter 3 that opposition fuelled by the increasing availability of accounting data put 
greater pressure on the Corporation to improve the state of the River Tyne. It did so 
through the mediums of public meetings, petitioning, and, most importantly, voicing 
claims through the press. The Newcastle Corporation, on the other hand, reciprocated 
by using the accounting data to justify the lack of investment in the Tyne. Thus it 
will be shown the importance of accounting information as a lobbying tool to 
promote the interests of particular user groups. The major stakeholders in the River 
included local and national government, the TIC, the traders and ship-owners, and 
groups of professionals such as the bookkeepers and engineers who were involved in 
the accounting process. In many cases the interests of these parties conflicted, and 
accounting was deployed as a political device `at the boundary between co-operation 
and conflict ... to act as 
both mediator and contester' in resolving disputes [Francis, 
1990, p. 10]. Cooper and Shearer add that 
Not only is accounting essentially political in that it derives from the 
political struggle as a whole but also the outcomes of accounting 
policy are essentially political in that they operate for the benefit of 
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some groups in society and to the detriment of others [1984, p. 204]. 
According to Francis [ibid, p. 7], 'its ability to be used in this way is one of the 
inherent virtues of accounting practice, ' which is a theme that we shall return to in 
Chapter 3 when we examine its emancipatory potential. 
Although accounting can be seen as repressive it also has emancipatory 
effects. This issue is related to the wider question of accounting's potential as an aid 
to emancipation. Gallhofer and Haslam (herein G&H) are perhaps the most 
influential commentators in this field. Producing many articles [1991,1993,1994a, 
1994b, 1995,1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 1997a, 1997b, 2000a, 2001] and more recently a 
book [2003], they aim to create an awareness of the potential significance and 
benefits of an emancipatory accounting amongst the accountants of the future: 
Critical research into accounting has the potential to build upon and go 
further beyond its current state in order to mobilise a more enabling 
and emancipatory accounting that can play its part in shaping and 
reflecting a better world ... For us, an important characteristic of an 
enabling accounting is its ability to act as a force for radical 
emancipatory social change through making things visible and 
comprehensible and helping engender dialogue and action towards 
emancipatory change [Ibid, 1993, pp. 82,87]. 
With the motive of improving the world, some critical researchers have developed the 
idea of accounting as an emancipatory tool as a counterfoil to the majority of their 
number who see it as a tool of oppression [see Haslam, 1991; Roberts, 1991, Tinker, 
1991, Arrington and Francis, 1993, Schweiker, 1993]. As G&H observed: 
The perspective that accounting functions repressively in society has 
for some time been a key and predominant theme in a critical 
academic disclosure on accounting... Accounting can function 
repressively overall but through social interaction it can come to 
function in accordance with an emancipatory role.. . with their vision of 
accounting's emancipatory possibilities, critical researchers indicate 
the case for the capture of accounting by the repressed through social 
struggle... critical researchers thus envisage accounting as functioning 
to help overcome repressive obstacles so that a better state is realised 
[2006, pp. 6-7] 
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Thus by mobilising a counter information system, the 'repressed' can potentially use 
accounting 'so that its emancipatory effects come to constitute the greater force, ' [ibid, 
2001, p. 21]. 
Both this thesis and G&H have used historical analysis, by exploring 
accounting's role and development in a historical context, indicating the emancipatory 
potential of accounting, and also to facilitate a deeper appreciation of both repressive 
and emancipatory dimensions of accounting today. These issues are looked at in 
further detail in Chapter 3. 
On the Tyne, one could argue that the 'repressed' groups, such as the traders 
and those with interests in the River were faced with a Corporation that was not 
willing to expend any significant amount on River improvement, instead leaving it to 
deteriorate, even though the Corporation clearly received a large proportion of 
income from the River. These groups suffered because of the poor state of the River 
and port facilities. However, with the disclosure of accounting data, opposition 
parties mobilised the information to enable change, first in the change of who 
controlled the Tyne and secondly in the way future revenue was to be spent. By using 
accounts, `emancipation' was achieved by the neighbouring towns which defeated the 
old Newcastle Corporation's monopoly and gained a new voice and stronghold in the 
management of their own affairs relating to the Tyne. Accounting had played a highly 
political role in these developments. 
G&H [2001, p. 29] showed how in the late 19' century `radical political 
activists' used accounting data through the medium of the press as an `emancipatory' 
force in relation to the campaign for better conditions of employment at Bryant and 
May. The pressures brought to bear on Bryant and May on behalf of the `Match 
Girls' proved successful with the company making a number of concessions 
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improving their working conditions, such as withdrawing the system of fines, 
increasing wages by a small amount, the possible provision of a canteen and the 
acceptance of the formation of a match-maker's union. 
The current study adds to this brand of research, showing that accounting 
information can be used as a tool to enable parties to achieve social goals. Whether 
the outcome of the battle for control of the Tyne could be regarded as social progress 
would depend on the perspective of the interests concerned, but it does illustrate 
accounting being deployed effectively by interest groups to engineer social change. 
As an illustration of this social change, the result of the battle of the control of the 
Tyne achieved wider representation in the management of the River for the towns, 
regions and interest groups dependent on it for their prosperity. Thus, the newly 
formed TIC was to be made up of members from all interested regions. Accounts had 
been used as a communication medium, informing and ultimately aiding radical, 
democratic forces to challenge and change the existing situation. Therefore, it can be 
stated that the thesis adds to a growing body of critical researchers who have 
developed the idea that accounting can be used as an emancipatory tool in society as a 
counterfoil to the majority of their number who see it as a tool of oppression. This 
also raises the question of whether the events described in Chapter 3 and by G&H are 
of isolated significance, or whether there are wider inferences that can be drawn. In 
their study of the role of accounting in the abolition of slavery Oldroyd [2007 et all 
took the view that there are general issues involved: 
Exposing organisations to greater public scrutiny by obliging them to 
be more open in their disclosures about the effects of their activities 
increases the likelihood that the status quo will be challenged by 
pressure groups. 
However, there is also the question of accounting information's ability to mislead, 
which becomes more critical as the disclosures become more elaborate, requiring 
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accounting competencies to be able to understand them. These issues are explored 
further in Chapter 3. 
After achieving their original goal of breaking the Newcastle Corporation's 
monopoly over the Tyne, the activists who were campaigning for improved port 
facilities did not fade into the background, but were spurred on to greater efforts to 
promote their cause. Subsequent chapters will describe how they exploited the more 
detailed levels of disclosure and accountability imposed on the TIC as the second half 
of the 19t1 century progressed. The main areas involving the role of accounting as a 
contester / mediator and where the idea of accounting's emancipatory potential are 
examined follow in brief summary here. As an extension to the issue of the control of 
the Tyne, in Chapter 3 it will be shown that when the Shields people used the 
available accounting data to prove that they merited independence from Newcastle, 
so too did the Newcastle Corporation in its subsequent campaign for the combined 
presentation of the Tyne's statistics. Again this demonstrates the efficacy of 
accounting data as a political tool. When looking at the issues of funding the Tyne in 
Chapter 4, in-particular when the TIC applied successfully for Government funds to 
build a Harbour of Refuge but later resolved not to give any grants but instead to 
offer loans at a lower value and with interest charged. The TIC used accounting 
information initially to show that they could raise the required funds to be successful 
in obtaining the grant. However, when they did not receive any free grant, they used 
their accounts to show their commitment to the project and that they had expended 
more than what was required to contest the Government's decision. In this example, 
they were unsuccessful and never received any free grant or an increase in the 
amount loaned at lower interest rates despite clearly expending a large sum. Also, 
within this chapter, another area involving the role of accounting as a contester and 
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mediator can be seen in the evidence surrounding the control of the 5/8ths dues. As a 
result of the 1850 Tyne Improvement Act, Newcastle Corporation were given 
possession of 5/8ths of the coal dues. However, as trade increased on the Tyne so to 
did the amount of dues and therefore value of the 5/8ths received by Newcastle 
Corporation who were not obliged to spend any of the income on the river and indded 
spent the majority of the income on the town. The TIC contested this situation by 
using their accounts to show that they barely had enough income to carry out basic 
works on the Tyne and yet the Newcastle Corporation were receiving a large amount 
from the River, which was increasing each year and being improved at the expense of 
the TIC. In a bid to possess the 5/8ths the TIC used accounting information at first to 
mediate by trying to reach a mutual agreement with the Newcastle Corporation. 
However, the offers were seen as unreasonable and well beneath the value they were 
receiving and so it was obvious that the Newcastle Corporation were not going to part 
that easily with income. This led to the TIC contesting the situation, basing their 
arguments to resolve the matter on their accounting information, taking the matter to 
Parliament. By 1870, the TIC were finally handed the dues upon the payment of an 
agreed sum. Chapter 5 explores the idea of accountability and the development of 
accounts of the TIC. The TIC faced several internal and external inquiries within it's 
first 50 years, most of which were not welcomed by the TIC. In many cases the 
inquiries involved the accountability of the TIC and the position of their accounts 
were questioned. Significantly the TIC used their accounts to contest any critical 
inquiry. In other cases accounting information was improved and new techniques 
adopted, it could be argued in an emancipatory way, to benefit the functioning of the 
TIC and those who were involved in River matters such as the traders. Finally, in 
Chapter 6. it will be demonstrated that pressure groups mobilised the more 
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sophisticated accounts either to challenge and block proposed capital works or to 
push through alternative schemes, here accounting information played a role of both a 
facilitator and retarder of progress. The chapter focusses on a particular case study, 
that of the building of the Coble Dene Dock. This project was criticised from start to 
finish. Both those in favour of the Docks and those who saw them as unnecessary 
charged their arguments with accounting information, justifying the need for 
increased borrowing powers to continue the works and on the other side showing that 
the dock was not needed and funds were plenty if managed correctly. In 1876 the TIC 
were faced with little available funds to carry out the improvement works and so 
went to Parliament to increase their borrowing powers. This was opposed by 
opposition who argued that the increase in funds was needed to fund the continuing 
construction of the CDD that they argued was not needed. Given the poor economic 
conditions which led to a fall off in trade at the port and the voice of the opposition, 
the application was rejected by Parliament and in response for the first time works 
were suspended on the Tyne by the TIC. The TIC argued that by taking this action 
they were protecting the public creditor given the lack of available funds. The 
opposition contested this action by using accounting information to show that the TIC 
had ample funds if they managed their affairs better. In response the TIC contested 
these comments showing that they had not mismanged their funds. Ultimately a 
process of mediation was entered into as both parties wanted works to resume on the 
River and the TIC had argued a strong case. Minor changes were made to a revised 
application for increased borrowing powers which was not so strongly opposed and 
this time was successful enabling works to continue once more. 
The chapter now moves on the explain the content of chapters 3-6. 
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Control: Taking each of these issues in turn, the control of the River was hotly 
contested in the first half of the 19th century. This is the subject of Chapter 3. It will 
be seen that the introduction of the 1835 Municipal Corporations Act (herein the 
MCA) exposed the neglect of the Tyne to public scrutiny by obliging local authorities 
to publish accounts. This gave the opposition to the Newcastle Corporation's 
monopoly over the River a clear argument to press for the much needed improvement 
works. Indeed, ultimately it led to the Corporation surrendering its power over the 
River to the Tyne Improvement Commission (herein TIC). The TIC was a body of 
commissioners created for the conservancy and improvement of the River Tyne by 
the River Tyne Improvement Act 1850. It was subsequently incorporated by the Tyne 
Improvement Act 1857, and enlarged by the Tyne Improvement Acts of 1875 and 
1886, and the Tyne Improvement [Constitution and Works] Act 1898. 
There is one study that has looked specifically at the accounting arrangements 
of the Newcastle Corporation. Halcrow [1953] wrote two papers in the `Mr. 
Treasurer' series in the Local Government Finance Journal that provide a descriptive 
outline of the development of the accounting and administrative role of the Common 
Council from the earliest extant records to 1835. She clearly shows that it was the 
Common Council who controlled the administration of the town's finance by issuing 
orders `no less than royal charters' [p. 151]. However, the study did not go beyond the 
183 5 MCA into what Coombs and Edwards [ 1993,1996], Edwards [ 1992] and Jones 
[1989,1992] would describe as the `watershed' years of change in the way that 
accounting was approached by local authorities. 
The enhanced disclosure requirements of the 19' century municipal reform 
gave the opposition to the Newcastle Corporation a lobbying tool with which to 
promote their aims. This resulted in an increased intensity in the battle for the control 
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of the Tyne between the conflicting interests. On the one side, accounts were used to 
demonstrate the need for river improvement, whereas on the other, the Newcastle 
Corporation tried to use them to justify their inaction. However, the Corporation's 
mismanagement and misappropriations were made clear by the accounting data, and 
ultimately led to an independent investigation and transfer of control to the TIC. Who 
controlled the Tyne was not challenged again after 1850, but the way the TIC 
managed the River was. Again, accounting data proved to be a significant factor in 
`contesting and mediating' this key issue [Francis, 1990, p. 10]. 
The final `control' issue is the way in which the Newcastle ports were 
combined. The port of Newcastle initially included the ports of neighbouring North 
and South Shields, Newcastle being the port of registry. There was growing dissent 
from the two Shields ports which lay further downstream that Newcastle should 
receive all the customs dues even though a substantial amount of the trade occurred at 
their ports. Both Shields ports pushed for independence and in 1848 two distinct ports 
of Newcastle and Shields were created. This had serious knock on affects for 
Newcastle. Aside from the loss of revenue, the ports' trade figures now got published 
independently in official reports and as a consequence Newcastle fell in the rankings 
of British port statistics, making it harder to raise funds for improvement works. 
Accounting data was thus used to demonstrate the situation to the Board of Trade in 
an effort to `unite' the three ports once more for statistical purposes on paper at least, 
as they knew that physically they would never be united in the short run. Newcastle 
finally got its way: 
This separation of what is really one port causes considerable 
confusion and misapprehension as to the magnitude and importance of 
the trade of the Tyne, and it has been frequently proposed that there 
should be a union of the three ports under the name of the 'Port of 
Tyne' Under such a union each of the existing ports would retain all 
the facilities from the transaction of business which it at present 
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possesses; but the aggregate figures of the united port would correctly 
exhibit to the nations and abroad the business transacted and official 
status of the Tyne. In the Annual Shipping Returns of the Board of 
Trade the three Tyne Ports are now [c. 1870] grouped to show the 
aggregate commerce of the River Tyne Guthrie, [1880, p. 34]. 
Again, this demonstrates the efficacy of accounting data as a political tool. 
Funding: The freeing of the River from the Newcastle Corporation laid the seeds for 
its extensive development during the second half of the 1911' century, which is the 
focus of the remainder of the study. Raising the necessary funds to pay for the dock 
and harbour improvements that were needed to enable the Tyne to function was a key 
area involving accounts, and is the subject of Chapter 4. 
After the TIC was given control of the River Tyne by Parliamentary Act in 
1850, great and necessary changes were needed to be made. Generating sufficient 
income to service a large debt and thereby enable the harbour authorities to borrow 
money to carry out much needed improvements was only part of the problem. Of 
equal importance was the availability of loanable funds at low enough rates of 
interest. Taxes were raised to help fund improvements, but were never enough. 
Funding was sought from private and public sources, always aiming to get the best 
loan at the lowest rate of interest. In fact, much of the money expended in port 
improvement either came directly from the river dues generated from the port's 
increasing trade or, more significantly, was borrowed from the Government, the Bank 
of England or private investors on the strength of the port's growing revenue. It will 
be shown that the TIC placed public advertisements for loans, and that most of the 
investment in docks came from joint stock companies, reflecting the increasing 
depersonalisation of business activities, and the growing importance of the railway 
interest in the general economic life of the community. For its part, accounting data 
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played a big part in investment decisions, and was deployed by the TIC to generate 
vital funding, determine the acceptability of loans and to obtain them at the best rates 
possible. 
Applications for loans or extensions to borrowing powers were made directly 
to Parliament and the Public Works Loan Commission (herein PWLC). These 
applications were always justified by accounting data at the forefront of any 
argument, and illustrative examples are described in the thesis. Applications were not 
always successful. In one case, the Government's promise of financial assistance was 
later reduced to the promise of lending funds at a preferential interest rate, only then 
to be withdrawn without any offer of help at all, which unsurprisingly provoked much 
argument and debate. The scheme in question was the 'Harbours of Refuge' project, 
whereby coastal towns put in applications for financial assistance for a new harbour 
to be built on their particular area of coastline. These harbours of refuge were 
intended to aid passing ships that could shelter there in times of storms. It was 
recommended by the Government that a Royal Commission should be appointed to 
decide the particular sites on which the harbours of refuge should be constructed 
[Select Committee Report on Harbours of Refuge, Parliamentary Papers, 1858, 
Vol. 17, pp. 211-4]. This was the first time that the Government showed a financial 
interest in harbour development. However, the Government's U-turn left the TIC with 
a large expenditure bill. The TIC used their accounts to contest the Government's 
decisions, clearly showing their commitment to the project, spending in excess of 
what the Government required. However, they never received a penny. From the 
table below it can be seen that even though gross revenue increased, surplus revenue 
decreased. This suggests that there was an increase in expenditure in the years 1858- 
1861 which was indeed the case when the TIC committed themselves and expenditure 
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to building the HOR. 
Year Gross Revenue Receipts on 
TIC Funds 
Surplus Revenue 
1858 546511 35881 
1859 
1860 
1861 
63398 24899 
ü 
-- ---ý 
ýI 
66651 
74920 
23283 
20047 
It can perhaps be concluded from this episode that the importance of State 
intervention in this matter during these years lay not so much in the funds disbursed 
to harbour undertakings, but in the promise of help that it held out to harbour 
authorities. Indeed, from the 1880's onwards public loans played an insignificant role 
in the financing of harbour construction on the Tyne. The TIC had little problems in 
raising capital, ten times as much of it coming from private lenders as from 
Government sources. For example, the total expenditure on works undertaken by the 
TIC to December 31 1882 amounted to £4.1 million, of which £0.4million had been 
expended out of income and £3.7million raised in loans. Of the borrowings, the 
Commissioners received £3.3 million from private lenders compared to £350,000 
from the PWLC. 
The TIC received large amounts of revenue by collecting dues on articles 
traded through the port. There were so many different types of dues that reform was 
needed to simplify the system. These changes were made in part to aid accounting for 
the dues. As coal was the main article traded on the Tyne in the 1911 century, the 
thesis concentrates on the dues imposed on the coal-trade. From the year of its 
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formation, the TIC engaged in much discussion, and dissent, amongst its members 
regarding the revenue paid to Newcastle Corporation on account of the coal dues. 
Under the terms of the 1850 Act, the Corporation retained 5/8ths of coal dues. 
According to Guthrie [1880, p. 81], this was `compensation' for the loss of revenue 
resulting from the Corporation losing control of the River. The argument was that the 
river dues were in part public funds held for public purposes. Thus, the town should 
still benefit from the River, especially given that all the other river dues had been 
handed over to the TIC. With the 5/8ths value increasing each year due to the increase 
in trade that was stimulated by the improvement works of the TIC, the TIC felt that 
the 5/8ths should belong to them as they barely had sufficient funds of their own. It 
took almost 20 years of petitioning for the ownership of the dues to be theirs. 
Throughout the campaign the TIC used accounting data to contest the position of the 
Corporation, and various independent parties were involved to try and mediate. It was 
only with the aid of accounting information that finally some form of agreement was 
reached. The Tyne Improvement Act, 1870, authorised the transfer of the river dues 
from Newcastle Corporation to the TIC for a compensation of £130,000. 
The thesis identifies one case where the work was suspended due to shortage 
of funds, attracting heavy criticism. The TIC justified their actions by stating that they 
had to `protect the public creditor' [NTCP, 1876, p. 411 ]. This was a case where both 
the TIC and its opponents utilised accounting information at the forefront of their 
arguments. It can be seen from the following table that during these years, there was a 
falling off of surplus revenue, indicating a shortage of funds, which led to the TIC to 
suspend works when an application for increased borrowing powers failed. These 
issues will be developed further in Chapters 4 and 6. 
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Year Surplus Revenue 
1874 15564 
1875 6754 
1876 7387 
1877 11208 
Accounting and accountability: As the funds for harbour improvements were 
substantial and came from various sources, the river authorities found themselves 
accountable to the providers of finance as well as the traders who used the River and 
the facilities that the funds were applied to. Indeed, this issue is related to the third 
main area of the thesis concerning the increase in public accountability of local 
authorities in England and Wales during the 191 century, which Chapter 5 examines 
in the context of the Newcastle Corporation. The Newcastle Corporation was the 
body responsible for collecting and distributing the town's wealth, as well 
maintaining and improving the River Tyne prior to 1850. After that date the focus of 
the chapter shifts to the TIC. 
Without accounting, the story of the functioning of the Tyne would have 
probably been very different. It was through the use of accounting data that the 
Corporation was heavily criticised for neglecting the necessary improvement of the 
River. Hence, the publication of accounts rendered it accountable not just to the 
city's ratepayers, but to the other constituents who depended on the River for their 
livelihood. For its part, the TIC was no longer just there to raise revenue for the 
council coffers, as had been the case in the past when very little was spent on the port 
by the Newcastle Corporation. It was now accountable to the investors who provided 
the funds for improvement. The level of accountability increased as the century 
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progressed, and the degree of detailed accounting information and disclosure 
multiplied. 
The changing pattern of accountability can also be seen from the angle of the 
changing nature of the membership of the TIC. The composition of the Commission 
had been the subject of much controversy from its inception, and sporadic outbursts 
on this matter occurred throughout its existence in the 19th century. Ultimately, this 
showed the growing importance of trade and traders, whose representation on the TIC 
increased, compared to declining influence of corporate monopoly power whose 
majority influence soon diminished. 
According to Edwards [ 1991, p. 113], `the process of change in accounting is a 
topic of both interest and importance ... a neglected area. 
' In the case of the TIC, 
accountancy reform often resulted from the accountability checks and inquiries that 
took place, in contrast to what Toms [2005, p. 627] observed about the importance of 
decision-making as an imperative in other 19th century studies: 
Some researchers have suggested that the introduction of new 
accounting techniques were a rational response reflecting the decision 
making needs of entrepreneurs [Boyns & Edwards, 2000; Chandler, 
1977; Johnson & Kaplan, 1987]. 
With the increased accountability of the TIC went the need to enhance efficiency. 
Special committees were formed by the TIC for the purpose of improving efficiency, 
often resulting in revisions in accounting methods/techniques. For example, with the 
death of Guthrie, the Secretary of the TIC and an accounting reformist himself, new 
accounting controls were brought in, and strict credentials required of the accountant 
who was to replace him. It will be seen that James Mather, Newcastle Councillor and 
Tyne Improvement Commissioner, was more often than not the instigator of change 
from within the TIC. Welford includes a brief biography of Mather in his series Men 
of Twixt Tyne and Tweed. According to Welford [ 1894, p. 178], Mather's background 
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was in medicine and philosophy. He was in his early 30's when he became involved 
in politics, and was seen by contemporaries as a `radical reformer': 
In the Gateshead Observer, Shields Gazette, and other local journals, 
Mr. Mather frequently wrote upon the improvement of the river Tyne, 
so as to render it a harbour of refuge ... When the control of the river 
passed into the hands of a Commission he was elected one of the 
members to represent South Shields. For many years he advocated at 
the river board the liberal course of improvements which has 
converted the Tyne into one of the noblest river estuaries in the United 
Kingdom [ibid, pp. 183-4]. 
Many of Mather's reforms involved highlighting deficiencies, simplifying, modifying 
and creating new cost systems and accounting methods for the purpose of economy 
and ease. In many cases it was through analysing accounting data that Mather based 
his arguments, using it to contest the current position. Examples are given of his work 
in Chapter 5. 
The reforms of public accounting in Newcastle were not carried out in 
isolation, but took place against a backdrop of national municipal reform. By the 
Municipal Corporations Act (MCA), corporations were obliged to produce each year 
an annual return of receipts and expenditure and `a full abstract of his [the 
Treasurer's] accounts' to be available for inspection and purchase by the ratepayers 
6 on payment of a reasonable price for each copy' [MCA, 1835, S. 93]. The statute did 
not mention the form the abstract should take but did state that it `should show all 
monies received ... and 
disbursed' [ibid, S. 60]. Furthering the accountability of 
corporations, ratepayers could also inspect the corporation's books, accounts, and 
minutes. However, Edwards [1992, p. 68] tells us that `the amount of financial 
information these contained varied considerably from one authority to another. ' Thus, 
there was neither standardisation in the format of the accounts nor in the level of 
detail required. How Newcastle Corporation responded to this Act will be shown in 
more detail in Chapter 3. Prior to the 1830s the accounts appeared with no breakdown 
22 
of the amounts actually spent on the River. By the accounting year end 1829/30, 
alphabetic letters started to appear next to figures in the abstracts indicating that 
further information relating to these figures was available in the format of notes to the 
accounts. The level of detail was still limited at the start with sums still being lumped 
together and only limited information shown. Moreover, it wasn't until the 1835 
accounting year end before there was a significant increase in the level of detail 
attached to the accounts. Instead of brief notes to the accounts, there were now 
several pages being attached to the abstract and it could be seen now how almost 
every pound was accounted for, [L352 N536, Newcastle City Libraries]. 
The TIC is of particular interest to the accounting historian because it 
provides an early example of the use of consolidation. The technique was first 
adopted by the TIC in 1872. Consolidation of accounts within public bodies was 
hardly heard of at the time and, understandably, the adoption of this novel accounting 
technique created a lot of debate in Newcastle. Clear and careful explanations of this 
accounting method were needed to try and dispel any confusion and doubts, 
especially where accounting information was being deployed to mediate disputes. 
James Guthrie, who became the TIC accountant in 1851 - he was later given 
the title of Secretary as his role expanded - was the engineer of the system. It is worth 
noting that the TIC used the North East Railway Company (NERC) as a comparative 
several times when adopting new accounting techniques and the NERC had just 
consolidated their accounts a few years earlier. Further examples are the issues of 
depreciation and accounting for capital and revenue expenditure, both of which are 
looked at in Chapter 6. Given the fact that the study has not detected more than one 
reference to any other local authority or organisation in any document relating to 
accounting issues, it might be inferred that railway accounts played a part in how and 
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when techniques were adopted by the TIC. 4 
The TIC tried to extend the use of consolidation, later described as the `fusion 
of funds', but they were `thwarted by an opposition', who according to Guthrie 
[ 1880, p. 261 ],, 'lacked real understanding of the merits of consolidation'. However, as 
the century drew to a close these plans were successful, maybe due to a better 
understanding of the technique and also because it was more acceptable to use now 
that the improvement works were coming to an end. This particular example of 
accounting change adds to previous studies, in particular the research of Coombs and 
Edwards whose work on local authorities dominates the area [1993,1996]. 
As well as accounting reform, auditing reform also took place. The scope of 
the audit expanded, and increased in detail. The use of the non-independent auditors 
was also criticised, and there was a move for auditors to be qualified. 
Accountability issues can be split between internal and external focal points. 
The TIC was constantly under the microscope from internal bodies, such as the 
Newcastle Corporation and the River Committees - these were bodies that consisted 
of elected members from the Newcastle Corporation and the TIC - and external 
bodies such as ship-owners, traders and various Government and Admiralty 
appointed Commissions. The TIC was held responsible and accountable for bad 
decisions and poor management by opposition groups, which utilised accounting data 
published by the TIC to make their case in the generally long and cumbersome 
inquiries that the TIC did not welcome. 
Perhaps the biggest internal inquiry occurred in 1880 after the death of the 
TIC secretary, James Guthrie. A significant member of the TIC, he wrote a book 
about his time as a commissioner, and his influential role as secretary and accounts 
The same pattern emerges from my research into Newcastle Corporation in the 19'h century 
[Brackenborough, 2008], where the NERC is mentioned as a comparative on several occasions, 
especially in reference to accounting and auditing reform 
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"ideas man" for the TIC. His book, published in 1880, the year of his death, is an 
important primary source used in the thesis. Clearly, the catalyst for this inquiry was 
Guthrie's death, as it was not pending beforehand. This practice was not new as the 
death of a senior officer within the Newcastle Corporation, the bookkeeper, had 
stimulated an investigation into the accounting practices in 1859 [Brackenborough 
[2008]. The 1880 inquiry was set up to 'investigate into the general office 
arrangements of the Commission'. The report of this investigation, totalling over 100 
pages in length, stated in detail the names of the different officers, their salaries and 
duties, and incorporated a digest of the method of bookkeeping in operation and the 
principles adopted in dealing with the fmances of the Commission. What can be seen 
from this and other inquiries is that the function and development of accounting data, 
promoted through bodies becoming more accountable, resulted in changes in the way 
they operated. Significant ramifications included organisational restructuring and 
accounting changes, including the revision of accounting methods and tighter and 
new internal controls being put into place. As a consequence of the inquiries, 
members were rebuked, allocated less or increased responsibility, and in some cases 
even were removed from their posts. Those who remained came under closer 
scrutiny, finding themselves ever under the watchful eye of somebody significantly 
interested in the accounting data that demonstrated their work. 
To sum up, much accounting reform occurred within these bodies - new 
techniques were tried and tested; there was greater detail in the accounting 
information produced; presentational changes were made; as well as tighter controls 
on specific departments. Changes too were made in the types of individual who drew 
up and audited the accounts, moving away from unqualified local men who perhaps 
lacked the depth of accounting know-how, to professionals being employed towards 
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the close of the century. 
Accountingfor capital projects: Chapter 6 looks at accounting for the capital projects 
of the River Tyne. All trading rivers needed ongoing improvement and the aim here is 
to consider how these were accounted for, and what role accounting played in capital 
investment decisions. 
There was a rather haphazard approach taken to many construction works, 
some only having their foundation stone laid before they were later abandoned, 
usually due to lack of funds. As will be shown in further chapters, accounting data 
could play a big part in holding up progression, as a retarder, showing that the costs 
were too great and no funds were available. In other cases it facilitated progression of 
works. Conversely, the TIC were often accused of mismanaging funds, the charge 
being laid that if only they were to manage their finances properly, 'there would be 
ample amount for the improvement works' [NTCP, 1875, p. 276]. What actually 
happened is that the costs, calculated using projections, were defrayed either by loan 
or out of income. Generally speaking, the cost of structural works was covered by 
loans, and works of maintenance paid for out of income. Therefore, the manner in 
which projects were costed, and income was separated from capital, had a major 
bearing on investment/funding decisions. 
In this chapter, by using a significant capital project managed by the TIC, that 
of Coble Dene Dock (herein CDD), it will be shown how various parties manipulated 
accounting data to their advantage, either to promote or to criticise the project. Some 
felt that the CDD was necessary as the Tyne lacked dock space, and when completed 
would ultimately increase revenue for the TIC as more ships would use the Tyne. 
Others argued that the project cost too much, and that trade to the Tyne would 
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increase if the existing docks were improved. The TIC was accused of creative 
accounting in hiding the true cost of the capital works for this dock. Ultimately, due 
to the delay brought about by these conflicts in carrying out the construction of CDD, 
the original purpose of the dock no longer had the sarne significance, and, with 
hindsight, the expenditure could be seen as excessive and misplaced. 
The issue of using river funds for river purposes and dock funds for docks 
only was also contentious, especially when there were excess funds on some accounts 
and desperate shortages on others. It was argued that the docks were feeders of the 
River, and so transferring funds from one to the other should be allowed as they were 
interrelated. 
The use of depreciation by the two main users of the Tyne, the TIC and the 
traders is examined, as it was a relatively new concept and one without any real 
guidance or regulation at the time. Some industries adopted it more quickly than 
others: 
After 1800 the use of depreciation in industrial accounting seems to 
have become more common. The practice was taken up in the textile 
industries, while between 1830 and 1850 significant developments in 
the treatment of depreciation occurred in the railway industry 
[Edwards and Newell, 1990, p. 52]. 
The fmdings relating to the River Tyne therefore provide a useful supplement to 
previous studies in helping to build up an overall picture of the spread of the concept. 
Notwithstanding the importance of calculating income to the TIC's 
funding/investment decisions, the study found that depreciation was not provided 
throughout the 191 century, even though a depreciation deduction was aflowed by the 
Income Tax Authorities from the 1880's. Again, there is reference made to the NERC 
in the TIC documents whereby it was shown that rather than using depreciation 
dividend paying railway companies often wrote amounts off to their capital account 
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for their own advantage, for example to debit revenue with expenditure on works and 
additions to works and plant instead of charging to the capital account, a procedure 
that was not a secret. It is clearly shown that categorising depreciation was subjective 
and problematic for the TIC. It was the same for traders as there was no real guidance 
on the issue. However, by the end of the century, there is evidence of a move towards 
greater uniformity in the way depreciation was accounted for. 
As far as capital investment decisions were concerned, it was the 
responsibility of the engineer to manage these works and to provide the initial 
accounting data such as estimations and costing data. Where possible, the background 
and role of the River Tyne's engineers is examined. For the larger rivers in the 19t' 
century, undertaking important projects often meant that a consultant engineer was 
involved, such as the eminent Messrs. Rennie, ' Stephenson, ' Armstrong, ' Brunel I 
and Walker. ' In some cases, the river-authorities - generally town corporations at the 
start of the 19" century and harbour authorities towards the end - employed their own 
full-time resident engineers. The Tyne was no exception, and some of the resident 
engineer's responsibilities can be found by looking at NTCP and TIC minutes. Others 
can be inferred from the types of report they prepared. It was often the case that the 
engineer was the originator of many accounting reports, producing costing and 
estimate accounting data that was then used by the TIC's accountant in his reports. 
Original estimates by the engineers were often significantly different from the actual 
results, and so were heavily criticised. However, it was also found that the works 
executed under the immediate direction of the TIC's own engineers to be 'better, 
5 Sir John Rennie, 1794-1874, civil and railway engineer 
Robert Stephenson, 1803-1859, civil engineer, son of George Stephenson, railway and locomotive 
engineer 
William Armstrong, 1810-1900, industrialist and engineer, invented the hydraulic engine and crane. 
Isambard Kingdom Brunei, 1806-1859, design engineer of rail and bridges 
James Walker, 1781-1862, civil engineer and chief engineer of Trinity House, hence a considerable 
involvement with coastal engineering 
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cheaper, and more expeditiously done than when let to contractors' [NTCP, 1875, 
p. 349], enabling the authority to secure the greatest efficiency at the least expenditure 
of public money. 
Source material 
The field research consists primarily of an examination of the archival records and 
minutes relating to the River Tyne, Newcastle Corporation and the TIC. The NTCP 
minutes from 1835-1900, housed in the local studies section of Newcastle upon Tyne 
Central Library, were examined alongside a wealth of various archives relating to the 
River Tyne. From an accounting perspective, the types of archives used were ledgers, 
cash books, journals, coal-shipment books, export analyses and shipping registers 
showing the arrivals, tonnes, cargoes and destinations. All extant records relating to 
the TIC were reviewed. The following have been used in this study: Abstract of 
accounts, 3 vols., 1851-1939, [L627.22, Cr D2141-5]; Financial Reports 1884-1936 
[L627 T987T, Cr 629062A]; Albums of public notices 1879-1929, [L627 T987T, Cr 
D1439]; Engineer Reports 1865-1891, [L627 T987T, Cr 628796A]; Misc 
reports/memos 1849-1905 4 vols. [L627 T987T, CR 953595A-953598A]; Secretary's 
Reports/Minutes to Committees, 1871-1933 [L627 T987T, Cr 629058A]; Various 
TIC papers 1840-1900, [1,042, Cr 961104A]; General Scrap Books 2 vols., [1,627 
T987T, Cr 961066A]. At the Tyne and Wear Archives Service, records relating to the 
Tyne Steam Shipping Company, herein TSSCo were reviewed. The majority of the 
deposited records for this company relate to 201 century activities. However, there 
were some documents available from 1864; Proceedings of annual meetings 1879- 
1911,1 volume, [DT. TT/4/11; Minutes of shareholders general meetings, 1865-1919, 
1 volume, [DT-TT/10]; Scrapbook containing newspaper articles, company 
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prospectus and wmual reports 1864-1888,1 volume, [DT. TT/63]; and, Scrapbook 
containing newspaper articles, company prospectus and annual reports 1889-1904 
[DT. TT/65]. The Bell and Clarke collections at the University of Newcastle upon 
Tyne Library gave an insight into socio-economic and loco-political issues in 
Newcastle in the 19" century. Finally, James Guthrie's [1880] book gave an eye- 
witness account into the issues faced by the TIC in the second half of the 19t' century. 
The study proceeds by establishing the economic, technological, political, 
social and organisational context, before going on to consider the four main subject 
areas identified above of the control of the River; its funding arrangements; public 
accounting and accountability; and accounting for capital projects. It concludes by 
surnmarising the fmdings of the study, and by identifying future research avenues. 
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Chapter 2: Bacjýground to Events 
Chapter 2 describes the changing patterns of trade, technology, legislation, regulation, 
ownership and investment on the River Tyne in the 19' century to enable the reader 
to grasp an understanding of the environmental context influencing the events 
explained in the study. 
The coal-trade 
There were many different articles traded on the Tyne such as wood, rope, iron and 
animals, but none of these could match the importance of the coal-trade. From an 
economic perspective, coal was the biggest driving force in the region. Ship-owners 
depended heavily upon the coal-trade. The developing pattern of waggonways fed 
growing volumes of eoal to the 'staiths', or shipping-points, on the river. Coal in its 
turn fuelled the rising industrialisation of the banks, with their heavy inorganic 
chemicals, pottery and glass manufactures. Although there was little physical 
improvement to the River, coal output increased dramaticaRy after 1830. This was 
due to colliery owners and their viewers, opening new pits, the Richmond shiffing' 
I Some taxes were imposed centrally by Government but were steeped in tradition and age and 
soon were abolished perhaps as the nature of trade changed. Merrett and Sykes, [1973 p. 289] relates 
how JIn 1831] at a general meeting of the coal-owners, ship owners, merchants, and other persons 
interested in the trade of the port of Newcastle ... it was resolved to petition 
both houses of parliament 
for the abolition of the duty on coals exported coastways from the river Tyne, called the Duke of 
Richmond's shilling. ' This duty had been in the family of the Duke of Richmond until 1799, when the 
government purchased it for c1400,000. Up until the 1830s the government had received the proceeds 
on the increasing value of the coal-trade, enabling them to in fact make a profit since the purchase was 
made: JA] profit of upwards of half a million sterling had been actually realized by government, ' 
[ibid]. Newcastle paid the tax as that is where the majority of coal was shipped from and the port 
benefited from certain privileges which now no longer existed. Thus, the tax became burdensome on 
the coal traders on the Tyne. This specific tax also placed them at a disadvantage with competitors, 
especially their close rival the port of Sunderland, whose coals were worth more than that of the Tyne 
in London, and with the shilling charge per chaldron on Tyne coals, handed the trade to the coal- 
owners on the River Wear at the expense of the trade of the River Tyne. After immense pressure from 
the local MP's, this tax was finally repealed in March 183 1. The coal merchants had opposed this 
'Richmond Shilling' started by Queen Elizabeth, and were at last seeing some radical changes in their 
favour. Moreover, all existing custom duties were ended and a new duty was created on each ton of a 
shilling for London and a penny to defray the expenses of the coal market. 
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being abolished in 1831 and the limitation of the vend ending in 1834 : 
Of all the industrial activities in the region the growth of coal-mining 
was far and away the most significant ... [with] the existence of a ready 
market, especially in the sea route to London which facilitated the sale 
of coal ... [and] from the 1830s 
demand abroad became increasingly 
significant [McCord, 1979, pp. 36-7] 
The importance of coal to the local maritime economy is illustrated by Dunn [ 1849, 
p. 233], who recorded that out of the total of 4,138 ships employed in the British trade 
in the North of England in 1849,4,031 of them were coal vessels. In foreign trade the 
figures were 2,842 colliers out of a total of 2,932. 
The usual procedure before the 1830s was for ship-owners to buy the coal, as 
well as to carry it. They naturally resented the traditional control exercised by the 
Newcastle coal-owners in 'limiting the vend' and keeping prices up, especially since 
the London factors were also very powerful in restricting the market at the London 
end: 
The effectiveness of the monopoly is shown by the increase in price of 
nine shillings per chaldron in a single day, when the coal-owners 
resumed their combination in 1829 Rt had temporarily been suspended 
while the trade was under the scrutiny of the House of Lords] [Dunn, 
1849, p. 18]. 
The vend was therefore ended in 1834. However, although the vend had inflated the 
cost of coal to the ship-owners, it had also helped ensure a market for their coals. The 
break up of the vend brought about an unregulated coal-trade in which margins 
suffered as a result of the heightened competition. Thus, 1833-4 witnessed lower coal 
prices and lower profits for ship-owners. 
The ship-owners had the option of acting as carriers only in order to save 
themselves from financial loss. However, the competition for cargoes was fierce. 
Kirkaldy [1914, p-67] states: 
2 Coal-owners used to work in collusion and limit the amount of coal for sale in the market, 
thus increasing the price. 
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When shipping firms begin to fall behind in the race, the result is 
usually fatal. There is no neutral state in the sphere, a shipping firm 
either progresses or degenerates; the former maybe a slow process, the 
latter is apt to be rapid. 
All shipping companies were in some way affected. In many cases shipping became 
unprofitable and many companies consequently dissolved. For example, an 
extraordinary meeting of the shareholders of the Port of Newcastle General Shipping 
Company was held in March 1844 to consider the possibility of dissolving the 
Company, whose operations were failing. A week earlier the Borough of Sunderland 
Shipping Company had been dissolved. During an inquiry looking at the state of trade 
in 1845, Mr Tanner [ship-owner] was asked the question [6614]: 'Is there great 
distress among the ship-owners at SunderlandT Answer, "Very great. ' Question 
6615!, 'Many insolvenciesT Answer, 'I am afraid there are. ' According to Mr 
Tanner's evidence, small ship-owners, in bad times, with nothing else to depend 
upon, were gradually going to ruin: 
Even in good times, shipowners with borrowed capital could rarely 
make it pay; and in after years, when the vicious system became more 
general, ruin almost invariable followed. The borrower had little or no 
chance; he had to pay 8 or 10 per cent per annum for the loan, and 
taking into account the depreciation of the vessel at 71/2per cent, and 
the insurance at 10 per cent, in effect 20 per cent per annum on the 
value of the vessel had to be paid, without taking into account the 
depreciation of the vessel's value, before any profit was left for the 
owner. Thus the small owners, whose vessels were mortgaged, and 
whose whole living depended upon the profits of the voyage, could 
hardly be expected to weather the times Dunn [ 1849, p. 192]. 
As will be demonstrated by the following example, accounting could be used 
in making a case about the going concern of a business. Dunn, [ 1844, pp. 204-8] tells 
us that early in the 19' century, shipping interests were 
unable to purchase the coals and dispose of them to advantage as 
heretofore, they have uniformly become the carriers only but so great 
has been the competition in that department, that the prices obtained 
have gradually declined for several years, until at length they have 
arrived at a status below any profit whatever. In order to illustrate this 
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assertion., I give the facts, as stated in a pamphlet, by a gentlemen well 
acquainted with the trade Mr Robert Anderson of Westoe in the year 
1839 wrote a pamphlet entitled 'The Present State of the Coal Trade' 
and I also give the facts of 1841 and 1844, up to the present moment. 
Amongst other objects of the speculative mania of 1835, was the 
formation of shipping companies in which capital to an enormous 
amount was involved the result of which had been almost a universal 
failure. Not only have their hopes of profit proved visionary, but in 
many cases the whole of the capital has been lost, and the companies 
dissolved 
... No 
better fate attended the public coal companies whose 
large paid up capitals have been entirely lost, and the share in many 
instances given away to those who were willing to become responsible 
partners ... Much of this state of things 
is attributable to the times, and 
much also may be set down to jobbing, 3 and to the general 
mismanagement which has almost invariably attended joint stock 
companies. 
Dunn then went on to demonstrate the unprofitable nature of shipping coal to London 
based on the calculation of unit cost and unit selling price. Such calculations were 
typical of colliery viewers on Tyneside [Oldroyd, 1996; Brackenborough et al., 20011: 
MT Anderson shews that the average prices of best North Country 
coals in London were as follows: 
Newcastle 1836 21s 7 1/4d 1837 22s 4 1/2d 1838 22s 7 
1/2d 
Sunderland 1836 22s 4 1/2d 1837 23s 8 3/4d 1838 24s 0 
1/2d 
Freight at this period were 8s 6d per ton. The principal object of this 
pamphlet was to shew that under the state of things the ship-owner 
could not make profit, viz: 
That he paid for the Newcastle coals 
City of London dues 
Newcastle dues, lights, factorage' and 
Expenses in London 
Average freight paid in Newcastle 
Average price at market 
lOs 9d 
is Id 
is 111/2d 
3s 0 1/2d 
13s 9 1/2d 
8s 10 d 
22s 7 1/2d 
' Someone who does not work regularly for one person or organisation but does small pieces of work 
for different people 
'The allowance given to a factor, as a compensation for his services; called also a commission 
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The cost of sailing a vessel with 320 tons of coals, to London and back 
again, including ballast, provisions &c., which he makes at 
E129 2s 8d 
And freight 320 tons at 8s 10d f 141 6s 8d 
Balance left for wear and tear, capital &c. f 12 4s Od 
Charges upon a Cargo of Delavel Wallsend Coal taken to the London 
Market, in March, 1841: 
Newcastle Charges 158 chals = 418 V2purchase of coal 7s 9d 
£162 4slld 
CUSTOM HOUSE CHARGES 
Low Lights 0 27 
Tynemouth 0 128 
Bridlington and Scarbro 0 76 
Ballast Ticket and Towns Hose, & c. 6 10 9 
Muster Roll 1 108 
VA-iitby Pier 0 64 
Stamp &c. 5s 0 96 
Night Office 0 17 
Life Boat 0 20 
Freight on 408 tons at 7s 3d 
Carried forward 
LONDON CHARGES 
Night Office, Entry, and Foy 0 50 
Trinity Dues &c., 4186 
Tonnage Dues and Entry 
City Dues 
Metage' 
One per cent tret' allowed buyers 
Discount and Expenses 
Note and Receipt Stamps 
Commission and Guarantee 
408 tons sold at from 16s to 18s 6d 
Loss 
'Fee paid for an official measurement 
'Wastage 
0140 
2118 0 
5 20 
3 12 6 
7 16 
0186 
6170 
£10 3s 7d 
£172 8s 6d 
£147 18s Od 
£320 6s 6d 
51 7 Od 
348 16 Od 
£22 17 6d 
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In 1844 the result upon the sailing of the same vessel may be stated as 
follows: 
To cost of 408 tons of coals at 7s 3d. 
Custom House charges 
Freight of 408 tons at 6s 
London Charges, the sarne 
by 408 tons sold at 15s per ton 
Loss 
51 70d 
331167d 
30600d 
£25167d 
These examples clearly show accounting being used to determine whether a profit 
was going to be made, with a good appreciation of the costs involved. In such 
situations, a forecast loss was likely to provoke questions by the owners as to whether 
the company should dissolve. The economic climate at the time meant that the supply 
of coal was greater than demand and competition at home and abroad led to the price 
of coal reducing. Ultimately, through these calculations it could be seen that carrying 
coal was unprofitable. The purpose of this pamphlet is unclear, but given it was 
written by a colliery viewer, it was probably intended to publicise the parlous state of 
the coal-trade and to perhaps seek government assistance of some kind. One 
possibility that was being put forward was to reduce the prevailing dues on home- 
produced coals, whilst increasing them on coals from overseas. 
The coasting trade became less important as the 19' century progressed with a 
greater emphasis on the overseas trade, with implications for the way the trade was 
organised and accounted for. Generally speaking, the major overseas markets for coal 
shipped from the North-East were the Baltic and Northern European countries such as 
Germany, Belgium and France for fuel usage in manufacturing and the development 
of the railway system. As the century progressed, so did the growth in coal exports 
mainly due to the demand for quality coals that were found on Tyneside compared to 
the Rhur. Continuous growth was seen in the output of coal, aided by the advent of 
147180 
1037 
1581 7 
12280 
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the railway and the steamship, the latter involving a rapid development of the coal 
bunkering trade, which became a distinctive feature. Coal bunkering involved 
stocking up coal at the River's edge to act as passing ships' fuelling stations. To 
increase trade, speed of loading and ultimately revenue, the Tyne Improvement 
Commission (TIC) wisely reduced their dues on vessels in 1884 calling only for 
bunker coals. The Tyne gained the reputation as a cheap bunkering port, with vessels 
able to get away quickly without having to enter a dock, making the Tyne the 
'premier bunkering port of the United Kingdom and perhaps of the world' [Manders 
and Potts, 2001, p. 99]. The ability to sustain such growth was due to technological, 
river and harbour improvements; significant factors examined in this thesis. 
Technological progress 
Technological advancement was as vital in the 19' century as it is today. The 
progression of the coal-trade, advances in technology and, perhaps more importantly, 
the decision to adopt this technology greatly influenced the success or failure of many 
shipping interests and ports. The increase in coal production was itself facilitated by 
technological innovation. Coal-cutting machinery made getting coal easier and more 
efficient, which led to an increase in the output of coal and thus the trade increased. 
The first practical mechanised system of coal-cutting was introduced in 1862 with 
improvements following in 1864 and 1868 [Hill, 1991]. The key to accessing this 
coal was the: 'systematic introduction of Watt's improved double-powered or double- 
acting engine, which allowed penetration to much greater depths' [Galloway, 1898, 
p. 309]. The introduction of this improved pumping technology allowed a large 
number of deep sinkings to take place on Tyneside from the 1790s onwards at 
Wallsend, Biggs Main, Willington, Percy Main, Jarrow, North Shields and South 
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Shields, for example. Additionally, the capacity to mine deeper permitted the 
penetration of the Low Main seam in areas closer to Newcastle, such as at Byker or 
Felling, where the High Main seam had been worked out some years previously [ibid, 
pp. 290,294,3 89-91 ]. 
Steam and ship-design: If the invention and increasing efficient use of steam power 
was perhaps the most significant technological advancement affecting coalmining 
during the 19' century, with knock on effects for trade on the River Tyne, the same 
was true of the shipping industry. According to Boyce [1995b, p. 360], large-scale 
enterprise in the shipping industry initially emerged from 1870 to the early 20th 
century, and was linked to the adoption of steam: 
The shift from sail to steam was primarily the result of technological 
changes occurring gradually in the period from 1850 to 1890 [Harley, 
1970, p. 266]. 
Technological development had long-term effects on efficiency and 
economy, which in turn transformed productivity [Craig, 1985, p. 9]. 
Accelerating technical change, intensifying competition and growing 
firm size after 1880 increased the level of managerial complexity 
[Boyce, 1995b, p. 362]. 
The Ultimate effect was that steam power became 'King' as technology improved and 
steamers became more efficient and less costly [ibid, p. 358]. 
According to Armstrong [1864, p. 48], 'steam had been applied to the 
propulsion of ships in 1812. ' However, the use of steam at this early stage was 
experimental and only on a very small scale. The decision to adopt stearn in place of 
sail was a major strategic decision for many traders. These experiments of trying out 
steam ships as coal carriers were not sufficiently successful to lead to immediate 
adoption by ship-owners generally, who searched for other means of reducing the 
working expenses of the sailing collier. Ships were transforming from slower, smaller 
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wooden vessels to much faster, larger and capacious iron carriers that were capable of 
trading to and from all parts of the world. As further technological progress was made 
with steamers, they became more acceptable to shipping firms. In 1842 the 
Bedlington was launched by the Bedlington Coal Company for shipping coal in the 
Tyne. This ship was a screw steamer, specifically constructed for the purpose of 
carrying coal. It was not a success and suffered many problems such as engine failure. 
We see the growing use of accounting information in assessing the viability of 
adopting stearn in place of sail as the 19' century progressed. It was not just poor 
design in the early stages that retarded progress, accounting calculations may also 
have resulted in the wrong decisions. Clearly there was uncertainty about the 
continuing viability of the coastal coal-trade. Armstrong [1864, p. 205] wrote that by 
the start of the 1850s, 
some high authorities in the shipping world were by no means satisfied 
that, even with this economy, sea carriage would be able to compete 
with land carriage in the coal trade 
Writing in the Times on June 24,1851, Mr W. S. Lindsay, a highly respected ship- 
owner, likewise stated that 'inland transit by railway will have all but supplanted 
those steam vessels'. He then went on to compare the cost of carriage by colliers 
unfavourably to rail: 
Freight 6s; transit from pit to staith, ship dues, and charges, Is 6d; 
barge, landing charges etc, 2s. total 9s 6d. per ton. Add cartage dues 
and loss by screening, the cost of conveying coal from the Tyne to 
London, was 13s 6d. per ton, exclusive of Is Id for coal dues, to 
which inland coals were not subject. The London and North-Western 
Railway Company could afford to carry a ton of coals 100 miles for 
Is. on which basis the coal-owners of the North of England would be 
able to convey their produce from the pit's mouth, all ready for 
consumption, to a station in the very centre of London for about 3s. 
per ton. 
What the early experiments, including the Bedlington, achieved was to 
demonstrate the possibility of using such a vessel for cargo-carrying purposes; and 
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this did not go unnoticed. Other attempts were made, but the John Bowes was the first 
totally successful steam collier. Lindsay [18511 comments that the John Bowes was 
built expressly 
for the transport of coal from the North of England to the London 
market, to meet the competition which had been created by the 
formation of the railway. 
With steam power, journeys could be made much more quickly, and certainty could 
be added in that the timing of vessels could be better predicted. These factors resulted 
in steamers carrying out proportionafly more work as the century progressed. 
However, one of the main problems of the early steamships was that they 
needed to carry a considerable quantity of coal for their own propulsion, making it 
uneconomical to travel long distances. Writing from London to the Shields Gazette, 
just after the John Bowes had completed her first voyage [ 1852], Mr Hugh Taylor, a 
significant coal and ship owner compared the return on investment in steamships 
unfavourably with the sailing collier [a sail boat that carried coal]: 
The shipowner will shortly have more serious competition in the shape 
of screw colliers, and he must turn his attention to every possible way 
to reduce disbursements of his ship. The great evil the shipowner has 
to encounter is the detention in the harbours ... 
if our ships could meet 
with greater facilities in loading and unloading, the proposed screw 
colliers could not possibly compete with us ... [A week 
later] With 
respect to screw colliers, and I think it may be fairly assumed that one 
intended to carry 600 tons of coal cannot at present be sent to sea 
under E8500; assuming the average number of voyages at 25 per 
annum, the expenses per voyage may be estimated nearly as follows: 
Wear and tear, 12 per cent; interest, 4 per cent; 
insurance 7 per cent 78 00 
Portage Bill -I captain, I mate, 2 engineers, 2 stokers, 
I trimmer, 5 sailors, 2 boys 30 00 
Delivery - 7d per ton on 600 tons 17100 
Trimming 0; lights 0 12s; pilotage, fI 10s; 
coals for engines f 5, Provisions f 5, despatch f, 9 28 20 
153 120 
Freight of 600 tons, at 5s 6d 165 00 
Profit for voyage 11 80 
Let us look at the cost and expense of a collier, very few vessels are 
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employed in the coasting trade, and the value of those purchased to 
carry coals range from L1000 to f, 1400 say f 1200 for one delivering 
380tons. Assuming that such a vessel makes 12 voyages per annum, 
her expenses per voyage will be : wear and tear and insurance at 10 
percent, interest at 4 per cent, f24; disbursements 05; total f99. 
Freight of 380 tons at 5s 6d, f. 104 10s. Profit f5 10s. It would appear 
that the percentage returns of the sailing collier is very considerable 
over that of the steamer, and it may be asserted that the margin for 
saving in the cost of navigation is still more in favour of the former. 
It was later questioned whether Taylor's estimate of the number of voyages for the 
John Bowes was too low. The Earl of Durham obtained an estimate for a screw 
collier based on a cargo capacity of 600 tons, and an estimated number of voyages of 
26 per annum to London. But instead the Lady Alice Lambton made 70 trips between 
the Tyne and Thames in the first 72 weeks she was running. Taylor [ibid] was thus 
forced to concede: 'Now of course seventy London voyages is a very ordinary year's 
work for the Tyne collier'. 
It was thought that if a vessel could be developed that used coal on the 
outward voyage, and water as ballast on the return, this would economise the 
conveyance of coal to the distant coasting ports and to London, enabling better 
competition with the improving and powerful locomotive engines on the railways. 
What was therefore required was better technological advancement in ship-design. 
This was recognised by the newly formed shipping companies. The prospectus of the 
General Iron Screw Company, 1852, makes interesting reading: 
The object of this company is to secure an economical and expeditious 
mode of transport of Coal by sea. The great advantages recently 
attained in Navigation by the use of Iron in the construction of vessels, 
combined with the power and efficiency of the Screw Propeller, 
suggest special facilities for carrying out this object. The Vessels now 
engaged in the Coal Trade are of inferior sailing qualities, and are 
otherwise ill-adapted to the purpose. There is, therefore, great 
uncertainly as to the duration of the voyage and as to the arrival at the 
Ports of loading and discharge, while the prevalence of advance winds 
frequently occasions great irregularity in the supply of coal and 
fluctuations in the price. 
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At the time, steam vessels were a relatively new method of carrying coal and so a 
niche market existed. This company could see the potential advantages of steam and 
was promoting its usage to investors in their prospectus. 
Others too began to see the advantages of the new design of steamers: 
The utility of the screw was quickly demonstrated. Indeed, Mr Taylor 
himself was one of the earliest converts, after witnessing the practical 
result of the change, he took the radical step of selling the whole of his 
sailing fleet and placing an extensive order for iron screw colliers 
[Hodgson, 1903, p. 315]. 
Furthermore, steam cofliers were rapidly becoming more efficient: 
1856 had seen the General Codrington deliver 600 tons of coal to 
London in the course of a round voyage from the Tyne which was 
made in the unprecedented time of 4 days 7 hours. No commercial 
sailing ship could beat that [Keys, 1998, p. 28]. 
Bagwell [1974, p. 62] describes how 
the James Dixon made 57 voyages to London in one year and 
delivered 62,842 tons of coals, with a crew of only 21. To accomplish 
this work on the old system with sailing colliers would have required 
sixteen ships, and 144 hands to man them. 
Steam started to dominate as cost advantages were beginning to show, and companies 
started to use their published accounts to demonstrate the benefits to potential 
investors. Hughes and Retter [1958, p. 375] called the invention of iron screw 
steamers 'an outstanding example of the force of innovation in the record of British 
economic growth ... 
innovation giving rise to innovation on a grand scale. ' 
As metal steamships came to dominate ocean shipping, productivity gains 
accelerated. As Ville [1986, p. 356] explained, the last days of sail also witnessed an 
improvement: 
Several maritime historians have alluded, in general terms, to 
improvements in the productivity and efficiency of the shipping 
industry ... Davis 
[1978] carrying goods by sea fell continuously 
throughout the last three centuries of sail as a consequence of 
productivity gains. He showed that the reduced threat from piracy 
meant that vessels required fewer hands and less armaments and that 
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speed at the expense of capacity was no longer essential. Improved 
shore organisation, especially with the construction of docks and 
harbours facilitated quicker turn-around times, whilst improvement in 
ship design also boosted the efficiency of the industry ... 
North too 
refers to a secular decline in ocean freight rates as a result of increased 
productivity in the shipping industry. In particular he draws attention 
to falling construction costs in ship-building, improved information 
concerning winds and currents, and the effects of technological 
change. Moreover, North cites better ship utilization as a result of 
trade expansion, the end of the Navigation Laws, improved harbour 
facilities and the growing use of agents. 
However,, the difference now was in the economies of scale which steamships 
aflowed: 
The fall in freight rates between 1869-1913 was driven by technical 
change which steadily reduced costs ... Perhaps the most 
important 
technical improvement was in the efficiency of steam engines ... The 
economic advantage of steam ships was compounded by economies of 
scale [Stopford, 1997, pp. 48-50]. 
As shipping capacities and capabilities increased, greater econornic advantage could 
thus be attained. 
The new technology had a significant effect on freight rates: 
Around 1850 the adoption of metal hulls and steam propulsion 
signified technological departure from the shipping technology of the 
preceding three centuries. The new vessels saved factor inputs and 
competition resulted in steadily declining freight rates [Harley, 1988, 
p. 869]. 
Harley [ibid, p. 862] demonstrated that the new industrial technology caused a 
'revolutionary' decline in 19' century British freight rates, only modestly prior to the 
middle of the century, and then with more speed as metal steamships with steam 
propulsion were used in the latter half of the century. By the end of the century steam 
was the most cost efficient option. Industrial technology reduced shipping costs by 
rapidly lowering the price of metal steamships, which in turn lowered freight rates. 
However, owing to the competitive nature of the industry, these were passed on to the 
customer: 
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Since shipping is a highly competitive industry, productivity 
improvements frequently led to reductions in freight rates rather than 
increased profits [Ville, 1986, p. 355]. 
Because ships had to compete, they couldn't reap the benefits of increased profits, as 
a competitor might offer a lower freight rate and ultimately gam the trade. 
Sailing vessels continued to operate until the end of the 1870s, mainly due to 
the fact that the early designs of steam vessels required that extensive capacity be 
given over to coal on board to power them. Therefore, the further the vessel had to 
go, the more coal would be needed and so costs would increase. Sailing ships, on the 
other hand, were largely unaffected by the length of the voyage, and remained the 
lower cost alternative for a little while longer until better design of steamships. Thus, 
the ship-owners, Glover Brothers, stated in their annual circular [ 1864] that 
in shorter trades all valuable goods are now carried by steam. The 
saving in insurance and in interest of money, and the facility of being 
able to depend on a given number of days passage, secure for 
steamships a preference that sailing ships will never recover ... In the long voyage trades steamers cannot compete with sailing vessels. 
However, with further technological improvements, steamers became more 
cost efficient and performed better than sailing vessels on all routes in the later stages 
of the 19' century: 
The argument by Graham and North is that advances in sail 
productivity kept pace with those of steam on the long-hauls and the 
average cost curve of steam did not fall below those of sail until the 
mid- 1880s [Walton, 1970, p. 439]. 
The timing of the change is supported by the evidence available from this study. 
Indeed, by the 1880s steel boilers were being fitted which increased the speed of 
ships, and consumption of fuel and space were economised: 
Ultimately the far-seeing forward thinking ship-owners saw that the 
steamer had to displace the sailing ship as the new carrier of cargo. 
The most notable example of this change occurs on the Tyne, when in 
1863 the sailing vessels clearing with cargoes, were 17,694 in number, 
but only 6,349 in 1883, having been reduced to nearly a third in a 
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period of twenty years; whilst the steamers with cargoes increased in 
the same interval from 1,410 to 8,680 [Keys, 1998, p. 37]. 
This important change that was driven by advances in technology can also be 
illustrated clearly by analysing statistics produced at the time. Guthrie [ 18 80, pp. 190- 
191] noted that 
the proportion of tonnage of sailing vessels and steam vessels using 
the port in the year 1862 was as follows: Sailing vessels 88 per cent 
Steam vessels 12 ... These proportions went on gradually altering year 
after year till steam took the lead of the sail, and stood in 1875 thus: 
Steam vessels 60 per cent Sailing vessels 40 per cent. 
Using statistics from Hodgson [1903, p. 318], the dominance of steam as the century 
closed can clearly be seen. In 1849 there were registered 1,443 sailing vessels with a 
tonnage of 326,824 on the Tyne, compared to only 187 steam vessels with a tonnage 
of 4,784. The dominance of sail did not change until the decade to 1879, when sailing 
vessels now totalled 484 with a tonnage of 150,562, and steam 603 with a tonnage of 
232,157. By 1899 the situation fifty years early had been transformed. Registered 
sailing ships now counted for only 95 with a tonnage of 13,269, whereas there were 
726 registered steam vessels with tomage of 501,976. 
The story is the same for ships entering and clearing the Tyne. However, it is 
not until the decade to 1889 that the dominance of steam is apparent in terms of the 
numbers of vesseis entering or leaving the port, perhaps suggesting that Newcastle 
was one of the first ports to react to the new technology given the higher proportion 
01 - steam vessets reiaistere(i at the port ten years earfier. The figures are as f6flows: 
Enterinia the Tvne: 
Sail Tons Steam Tons 
1859 7,518 1,259,744 1,975 648,652 
1879 8,611 1,548,021 7,556 -w 35,762,009 
1899 3,233 702,888 10,912 7,394,318 
ýLeý Clearipp thej 
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Sail Tons Steam Tons 
1859 19,650 21.984ý729 975 2831,204 
1879 8,977 13,649,817 7,966 4,062,793 
1899 3,220 6935913 10,981 7,319,101 
What is perhaps most striking about these statistics is the decline in the number of 
vessels involved in the trade as their tonnage increased. Thus, advancements in the 
design of the ships meant that increasing capacities could be carried and economies of 
scale became advantageous for many entrepreneurs. 
Port and docbide improvement: Besides the advancement of steam and ship design, 
big strides were being made with other technological inventions affecting the coal and 
shipping trade. Specifically related to the Tyne, port and dockside equipment 
development affected the progress of shipping as did dock improvements. These 
issues clearly require systematic investigation, which this study aims to do, since time 
in port was, for the ship-owner, time wasted. Prior to the advent of iron screw 
colliers, the need for dock accommodation was most important, especially the 
enlargement of dock area to cope with the volume of trade, and to protect the smaller 
vessels. As ships dimensions increased, protection became less important as there was 
less congestion in the docks. Better coal and cargo handling machines were 
developed, also reducing the number of vessels in port. The new and deeper docks 
were constructed and loading equipment developed to cope with the changes. 
According to Ville [ 1989, p. 4631, 'in the first quarter of the nineteenth century direct 
loading became more efficient'. Rowe, [ 1969, p. II I] describes what it was like in the 
early years of the 19' century: 
rArrý'kllte Wq4 gradually coming into use to load coal 
direct into the holds of the smaller colliers, which could proceed up the 
river Tyne. 
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A few years later the spout was enhanced by a 'drop'. 7 This method saved much of 
the previous breakage of the coal, large coals being the most valuable. Finally, 
William Armstrong, a Newcastle man, built a hydraulic crane for Newcastle which 
meant ships could be unloaded more quickly and cheaply: 
By 1815, port engineering was no longer a completely new technique. 
What was new, however, was the scale on which river improvement 
and pier construction came to be adopted. What was new, too, was the 
development of coal-handling equipment and the automation of dock 
plant and equipment. From simple staiths developed more efficient 
drops and spouts, leading later to hydraulic hoists and electrically- 
driven belt conveyors, [Rennison, 1990, p. 13 7]. 
Coal Turn Act: The adoption of this new technology, however, was not without 
problems - politically as well as economically. Building a successful iron, steam 
collier was one thing, battling against the entrusted interests, practices and legislation 
of a coal-carrying trade moulded around the small wooden sailing ship was another. 
A significant archaic rule affecting the trade on the Tyne was the 'Coal Turn Act' 
(herein CTA). The Act was introduced so that preference was not given to any 
particular vessel. Each ship had to wait its turn, giving merchants more certainty 
about when their ships would sail. 
This Act came about due to 'long agitation on the part of the ship- 
owners of Newcastle who obtained in 1766 an Act 'for the better 
regulation of the loading of ships with coals in the Port of Newcastle' ,5 LL JL 
which entrusted to the Fitters and Hostmen, who controlled the whole 
coal trade, the regulation of the loading turn of all vessels in the Port 
[Hodgson, 1903, p. 2941. 
However, with the advancement of steam to power ships and better coal handling 
equipment and port development, waiting in turn after the much slower sailing ships 
was not an economic o ion. 
7A mechanism by which a loaded coal-waggon could be lowered over the hold of the waiting 
keel or collier, and unloaded by the 'dropping' of a hinged flap at the bottom of the wagon. hence 
its name. 
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Sailing ship-owners relied upon the Coal Turn Act for protection, as 
steam ships would be able to load and return from their journey within 
the time it took a sailing vessel to set sail with a load ... 
[It was a] case 
of steamers versus sailing ships ... 
[The coal-owners could] not 
compete in the London market with the inland trade unless they had 
steamers [NTCP, 1864, p. lxxx]. 
No other port had this type of act and it was thought that there was little point 
in having a fast expensive ship that had to wait its turn in the Tyne. Sailing vessels 
took longer to dock and were dependent on the weather and tide as to when they 
could enter or leave, culminating in the 'turn' slowing down the faster steam vessels 
which did not have to rely on any factors to dock in and out. It was not long before 
steam colliery owners took matters into their own hands. To begin with, 'practical' 
measures were used to try and overcome the archaic rule. For example, the act was 
deliberately abused by some ship-owners as ships were loaded ahead of others who 
had been waiting longer - maybe due to the influence of particular ship-owners, or 
the use of bribes - the evidence is not clear. Thus the CTA became increasingly 
contentious, and sail ship-owners were not going to allow such abuse to pass 
unnoticed. One ship-owner complained that a ship called the Morning Star had been 
entered in the coal turn book before his ship even though his ship had arrived in the 
port three days earlier: 
It seemed that the 'Morning Star' had been entered on the turn when 
she was somewhere about London, and six days before her arrival here 
[NTCP, 1864, p. lxix]. 
In another complaint, it was recorded that 
the fitters almost invariably loaded the steamers before the sailing 
vessels. The John Bowes was loaded with a cargo for Grimsby and set 
sail. While it was gone another ship William started to be loaded. 
However, this ship had only taken part of her cargo on board when the 
John Bowes returned for another load. The Coal fitter moved the 
William and started loading the John Bowes again! The owners of the 
William complained at this treatment and the coal fitter was fined 
under the terms of the Coal Turn Act [ibid, p. lxx]. 
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Unfortunately for the steamship owners, these abuses of the Act worked in 
antithesis and led to a tightening of the law surrounding its operation. As Guthrie 
[1880, p. 316] tells us: 
The Coal Turn Commissioners decided to enforce strictly the law that 
vessels should not be entered 'on turn' till they were within two miles 
of the Tyne Bar, and should be loaded in rotation as entered when for 
the same class of coal. 
When these 'practical' measures failed, opponents of the Act turned to accounting 
information to engineer its repeal. The accounts of the TIC provided a vehicle for 
demonstrating the detrimental effects of the CTA on the Commission's own financial 
position. Thus, interested parties on the Newcastle Council pointed out that the TIC 
suffer considerably in revenue by the Coal Turn Act trade turning 
away to faster cheaper ports... Large quantities are in consequence of 
this shipped at Sunderland which would legitimately and by preference 
come to the Tyne. The dues are thereby diverted into the pockets of 
the River Wear Commissioners [NTCP, 1864, p. lxxix]. 
The pressure for repeal mounted with the introduction of a special new staith for 
screw colliers. Complaints were made and cases put forward: 
The Chairman said the Act was got for a state of things which did not 
exist now... It was quite unworthy of the present day... A very great 
change indeed had taken place in the trade since the Act was passed... 
The coal trade had not increased at that time to the extent it had now 
[NTCP, 1864, p. lxxx]. 
Steam colliery owners lobbied for the act to be repealed and in 1865 they got their 
way. 
Ultimately, the circumstances of the trade, and the expense and inconvenience 
attending the delaying of steamships, induced the Tyne Commissioners, to take steps 
for the repeal of the CTA: 
Thereafter screw steamers were loaded as they aff ived, sailing vessels 
in their turn as entered, and this practice led to the adoption of the 
system by which shippers guaranteed to load within so many days 
instead of the very uncertain 'regular turn' without any obligation as to 
time, which had previously been the rule [Guthrie, 1880, p. 3161. 
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It was vital for the steamship owners that this act was repealed as they still had to 
compete with sailing ships; and the advantages of the newly developing rail system 
were becoming more apparent. The repeal of the Act increased both the certainty and 
efficiency of the operations with consequences for accounting. Less time spent in the 
port meant more shipments could be carried out. From a costing point of view, the 
costs of the operations could be more easily predicted. With this new information, the 
companies could use the information in their accounts to attract investors by showing 
that estimated costs of operations were much more accurate and a predicted profitable 
outcome more likely than before. 
Railways: An increase in the use of steam and rapid development of railways 
increased demand for coal. However, the railways also posed a threat to the sea-sale 
coal-trade, the seriousness of which rested upon the relative quantities of coals that 
could be transported by the locomotive engines, and the attendant costs. Early on in 
the 19' century the new rail system wasn't even at a comparative advantage over the 
old rail incline system: 
We may suppose that probably still more powerful engines may be 
used on the railways; so that the competition between the two modes 
of conveyance may be said to be very close, if the charges for each 
description of motive power rests upon the actual cost of each 
[Armstrong, 1864, p. 48]. 
In comparing the locomotive system with that of fixed engines and inclines, using 
costing data, Armstrong found that 
the locomotive system, although capable of carrying a much greater 
mineral traffic, is not on the whole, more economic than that of fixed 
engines and inclines as used now in this district [ibid, p. 283] 
However, railways did increase in efficiency. According to Keys [1988, p. 12], 
the development of the railway system made it possible for coal, 
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mined in the Midlands, to be brought to London ... There was even 
talk of bringing coal from Tyne to the Thames by rail. 
The potential advantages of rail transport were obvious. Even if it proved more 
expensive, supplies could be guaranteed, something the sailing collier could never 
achieve, dependent as it was on the vagaries of wind and weather. Change in the 
mode and organisation of the trade was inevitable if the carriage of coal to London by 
sea was to continue. As we saw above, Taylor [1852] was not at first convinced by 
the carriage of coal by steamships but later converted. Moreover, with the progress of 
steamship inventions carriage by sea continued successfully, despite the development 
of a rail network: 
In terms of the work done, measured in ton-miles of freight carried, 
coasters did a larger job than the railways. They achieved this by 
responding to railway competition most effectively... Steam, iron and 
later steel hulls, screw propulsion, more efficient rigs to allow lower 
manning, all improved the coastal ship's cost profile [Freeman and 
Aldcroft, 1988, p. 209]. 
Thus, shipping remained an important form of transportation throughout the 19'h 
century and took precedence over rail in the transportation of coal internally even 
towards the end of the period. As Rowe [ 1973, p. I I] observed, 
Even towards the second half of the century, when the basic rail 
systems had been completed, the importance of the rivers was such 
that urban and industrial development clung to the rivers. 
Indeed, a symbiotic relationship developed between the railways and the 
ports. In the early years, the railways were concerned almost exclusively with 
promoting the local carriage of coal. The difficulty of transporting coal to the point of 
outlet, particularly for those collieries located farther away, made the coal-owners of 
the district very anxious to have access to the Tyne by railway. Kenwood [1962, p. 65] 
tells us that by the middle of 1828, 'roughly 44 per cent of the coal passing along the 
railway was for shipment. ' Hence, in many cases rather than being a detrimental force 
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to the shipping trade, rail indeed complemented shipping: 
The North-East ports were saved by the economics of transport. 
Although rail transport has ousted road, the carriage of coal by sea 
remained economical in comparison with rail and as a result the 
railways continued to act as feeders to the ports in spite of forming an 
outlet in themselves. The railways opened out districts of the coalfield 
previously inaccessible to the coal-shipping trade [Rennison, 1987, 
p. 174]. 
These improvements in the region's transport facilities led to a rapid expansion of the 
carriage of coal for shipment coastwise and overseas. Moreover, despite the 
improvement of land transport facilities, coastal shipping remained as it was to do for 
a long time afterwards, a major artery of commerce, carrying huge quantities of coals. 
There does not appear to be any evidence to suggest that the surge of 
investment in ports that occurred from the 1850s and 1860s was restricted by the fear 
of railway competition in the carriage of coal and other commodities. Rather, 
investment was successfully sought to pay for the advancement in improvements to 
rivers and docks demanded by the increase in seaborne trade. In fact, railway 
competition became less important as the coastwise trade declined in importance with 
the rapid growth of coal exports. Thus, the threat of railway competition never fully 
materialised for two main reasons: first, because of the advancement in shipping 
design and use of steam which speeded up shipping schedules; and second because of 
the growth of the coal export trade, which eclipsed the coastwise trade after 1850. 
The greater demand for Tyneside coal from abroad was fuelled by its relative quality 
and cheapness. Also with the opening of new pits closer to London, the Tyne was no 
longer the metropolis' sole supplier. The transformed situation was described by 
Shaw [1911, p. 33]: 
In 1859 the foreign shipments from the Tyne were practically the same 
as those sent coastwise... But in 1866 they rose to the extent of over 
177,000 tons upon the previous year, and in 1867 were 178,000 tons 
more. in both years outstripping the coastwise shipments by 138,000 
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and 317,000 tons respectively. 
Costing systems: In revolutionising the shipping industry, the new technology created 
a new range of factors with potential cost accounting implications. For instance, 
from an operating point of view, steam enabled ship-owners to predict 
voyage time with much greater accuracy than had been possible in the 
days of sail [Boyce, 1995b, p. 366]. 
Spraakman and Davidson [1998, pp. 69-74] observed similar changes in relation to the 
Hudson's Bay Company in Canada that had a direct bearing on the development of 
control systems in the same period: 
Between 1860 to 1914 the [Hudson Bay] Company experienced a 
decrease in uncertainty as communications and transportation 
modernised ... With improved communications and transportation 
accompanying decreased asset specificity and uncertainty, the cost of 
monitoring decreases which would lead to the increased use of 
management accounting monitoring. 
The competitiveness of the market is another factor that has had a bearing on costing 
systems in other arenas. Hence, Solomons [1952, p. 19] regarded the falling profit 
margins resulting from increased competition as an impetus to better costing systems 
in late 19' century America. Finally, there is the key question of the role played by 
accounting in technological innovation which has been hotly debated by many 
authors in relation to the industrial revolution as a whole [e. g. Edwards and Newell, 
1991, Fleischman and Parker., 1991,1997, Fleischman and Tyson, 1993, Boyns and 
Edwards, 1995,1997, Boyns, et al, 1996, Hoskin and Macve, 2000]. 
Fleischman and Parker [1997] emphasised the effects of technology on 
management accounting in the Industrial Revolution stating that: 
Technological innovations were a matter of deep concern to 
entrepreneurs, because of the effect on profitability and they used cost 
accounting to aid them in decisions involving the procuring, tracking 
and comparing of their technological investments [p. 69] ... Motivation 
for cost management was both a function of a perceived need for 
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securing greater efficiencies from existing methods, as well as for 
investigating the possible advantages accruing from the adoption of 
new technology ... Indeed cost accounting almost certainly contributed in a positive fashion to the decision making processes that determined 
the entrepreneurs choice of technology [p. 222]. 
Fleischman and Parker [ibid] cite numerous examples of this in relation to iron, coal 
and textile companies. 
The effects on accounting techniques were potentiaRy just as great in respect 
of shipping, although there is a relative lack of research in this area. The main author 
in this field is McLean [1995,1996,2006a, 2006b] who concluded that the major 
advances in management accounting practice in the shipping industry occurred 
relatively late. By using the examples of two dominant shipbuilders in the North-East 
in the 19' century, McLean [2006a, p. I] examined the role of 
accounting information in shipbuilders' decisions to replace wood by 
iron as the primary material of hull construction and thus bring about 
technological and organisational transformations of the industry. 
He maintained that whilst it was true that by accounting calculations, 
cost advantages made iron rather than wood ships increasingly 
attractive to ship-owners and iron shipyards were developed to meet 
the changing demand (Clarke, 1966,1981,1986,1988) [ibid, p. 3], 
it was unlikely that the availability of this infonnation was 'significant in explaining 
the different entry dates into iron shipbuilding' [ibid, p. 6]. He argued that other 
factors influenced the decision of these companies to adopt the new technology as 
they entered the market at different times. McLean concluded that in the case of the 
two shipbuilding firms examined, personal factors such as 'working experience and 
skills, age, personality and business outlook are probable causal factors' [ibid]. In 
summary, when looking at the initial adoption of new technology in shipbuilding, 
accounting information does not appear to be the root cause in the early to mid 191 
century. 
54 
Conversely, accounting information does seem to play a more of a part from 
the late 19" century when the pace of technological progression was at its height: 
During this period of rapid expansion, the shipbuilding industry 
underwent fundamental technological and organisational transitions ... 
The ship as a product underwent a process of technological 
transformation in which sail power was replaced by steam power, and 
wood was replaced by iron, and then steel, as the main hull 
construction material (Clarke, n. d., p. 33, Slaven, 1980, p. 113) ... Changing technology led directly to significant changes in the 
structures of the workforce, management and ownership of shipyards 
[McLean, 1996b, pp. 119-120]. 
In this period, McLean found that the 'practical men', the apprentice engineers who 
had learned on the job, were replaced by ' professionally trained engineers' [ibid, 
p. 120]. The developing technology also drove improvements in accounting 
information. Thus, the pattern of development in the Sunderland shipbuilding 
industry 
shows an evolution from systems based on integrated accounting, 
through to the production of memorandum cost data and to systems of 
contract accounting and costing incorporating financial and costing 
sub-systems ... (and) it is highly likely that a ma or factor (in this i 
evolution) was the need for more extensive cost analysis in order to 
provide information for pricing decisions [McLean, 1995,142]. 
Technology also produced an impetus to management accounting innovation in the 
first half of the 20th century: 
Based on evidence from company and industry archives together with 
the industry and technical literature, our fundamental conclusion is 
that Doxford [shipbuilders] employed scientific management in 
conjunction with modernisation programmes, including the 
implementation of new welding technologies ... The coincidence of 
advances in welding technologies with the use of standard costs points 
to the importance of technology change and, continuing from the work 
of Fleischman and Parker (1990), lends support to the argument of 
Boyns and Edwards (1995: 48) that, 'accounting innovations were 
often the product of perceptive businessmen struggling with real 
problems'. 
if the role of management accounting in the early shipbuilding industry is 
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uncertain, the extent to which managers developed their own costing systems to suit 
their own companies and environments in pursuit of efficiency and competitive 
advantage has also been questioned by some researchers in relation to the Industrial 
D 
, R-evolution as whole. As Oldroyd [2001, p. 22] relates: 
The question of whether accounting encouraged or assisted mangers 
and entrepreneurs in exploiting the new opportunities arising from the 
technological, demographic and market changes of the British 
Industrial Revolution, for example, has generated much debate. 
Despite a tendency over the last fifteen years to question its perceived 
shortcomings [e. g. Edwards, 1989; Fleischman and Parker, 1990; 
Boyns, 1993], most researchers still take the view that accounting 
proved an ineffective management aid to 18' and 19' century 
industrialists [Fleischman and Parker, 1997, p. 8]. Miller and Napier 
[1993], for instance, argue that the concept of economic decision- 
making is far more recent. Bryer [2000] criticises the Economic- 
rationalist school for erroneously imputing decision-making as a 
motive when the true purpose of the accounts remained to promote 
accountability. 
On a similar note, Hoskin and Macve, [2000, p. 32] observed: 
As argued recently by Boyns and Edwards [1997], the conventional 
wisdom in UK business history persists in concluding that there was 
little in the development of cost and management accounting 
techniques in UK businesses that has been shown to be significant to 
the development of those businesses before the end of the 19' century, 
despite increasing in recent years of the work of economic rationalist 
accounting historians. 
Miller and Napier, [1993, p. 638] looking at Wedgwood, state that 'the costing 
exercise convinced Wedgwood that his double entry ledgers were simply wrong, and 
revealed to him that his office staff were cheating him. ' The main point of the 
costings, therefore, was in holding his staff accountable rather than in aiding 
decisions as they maintained other authors had suggested. 
Legislative/regulatory environment 
The development of society in the North-East of England during the 19' century 
owed much to economic and technological change, with the improvements of 
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shipping methods and port development being critical elements. However, political 
factors also had a part to play. Moreover, the differing levels of government 
involvement and reform were major factors in how societY in 19" centurY Britain was 
to develop. According to Davis, [1986, p. 69], 
the 19' century was a turbulent period of expansion, of changes and 
problems for which local administration had to be developed and 
tailored to cater for the needs of the new communities. 
As described below, a debate has developed between historians about the manner in 
which the forces of 'collectivism' - government assuming responsibility for social 
and economic policy - and laissez-faire'- allowing the market to decide - interacted 
in British society in the 19' century. 
These issues have been aired by Jones and Aiken (herein J&A), with Walker 
adding a critique of their study. 
J&A [1995, pp. 62-5] noted that 
as Parker [ 1990] observes, most historians have treated the 19' century 
as an extended era of laissez-faire, noting relatively insignificant 
developments occurring in company accounting legislation. 
However, they maintained that the reality was not so straightforward. These authors 
complimented and extended Parker's work by using the works of AN. Dicey, an 
eminent legal and constitutional historian of the 19' century. Dicey [ 1905] stated that 
British legislative history can be split into three distinct time periods. The first period 
from 1800-1825 was characterised as 'Old Toryism', in which there was not much 
change, where the emphasis was on 'maintaining the status quo of the British 
Constitution. ' This was followed by a period of 'Benthamism or Individualism) 
(1825-1870) in which 'the political and social policy of laissezfaire was the basis for 
legislation'. Finally, the years 1870-1900 were marked by a policy of 'collectivism'. 
This 'period distinguished itself by a marked increase in government intervention in 
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or the railway social and economic affairs in Britain, ' such as disclosure regulation f 
industry and later insurance. 
While Walker [1996, pp. 306-7,320] acknowledges along with many British 
historians, 'the existence of distinctive periods of laissez-faire and collectivism 
during the 19" century, ' he believes that the picture portrayed by J&A is too 
simplistic: 
It is however, quite incorrect to state that most historians have 
affirmed the Diceyan model ... Harris [1992, p. 118; 
1994, p. 12] has 
recently asserted that from both a theoretical and an empirical 
perspective 'historians have almost unanimously concurred in finding 
Dicey's model misleading and unsatisfactory' ... The mere act of 
government interference in unlimited liability, disclosure and audit 
was, collectivist [but so too were earlier companies acts during the 
laissez-faire era] ... [These 
findings] throw doubt on J&A's assertion 
that Dicey's [1995, pp. 62-63] thesis 'provides a highly plausible 
explanation of the development of 19' century companies legislation'. 
In response to Walker's critique Jones [1999, pp. 85-90] reaffirmed that 
contrary to Walker's assertions, we argue that laissez-faire was, on 
balance of historical evidence, a domineering influence on public 
policy in the mid-Victorian age. 
Moreover, Jones [ibid] argue that discreet periods of laissez-faire and collectivism did 
exist, in contrast to Walker who sees it more in terms of mutual influences at work: 
Our paper evidently did not endorse or employ the full Diceyan 
framework [advocating a tripartite split rather than one between 
laissez-faire and collectivism] ... Walker's view 
is consistent with the 
revisionists view that laissez-faire and collectivism were not separate 
opposing forces or periods, but influenced public policy 
simultaneouslv throuiihout the 19' centurv ... There 
is no doubt 
amongst all historians that the 
fcollectivism' qualified in this 
intervention into the economy. ' 
last 30 years was a period of 
instance to mean 'enhanced State 
Jones [ibid, p. 921 went on to criticise Walker by saying: 
Ultimately, we believe the laissez-fairelcoflectivist argument needs to 
be evaluated in the broader context of British culture and history, not 
just in terms of legislative developments and anomalies, 
as they claimed Walker had done. 
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As far as the thesis is concerned, it tends to support Walker's findings that 
there were no really separate periods of laissezfaire and collectivism, but of a drift in 
favour of the latter as the century progressed, with interventionist and non- 
interventiorast forces working simultaneously. Interestingly enough, the progress of 
technology, the management of the Tyne and the increase in trade followed a similar 
pattern, with a slow and steady start moving to greater activity towards the end of the 
19' century. All these elements of change involved accounting, perhaps suggesting an 
evolutionary link between the study's focal points! 
The increasing statutory regulation of company accounts by central 
govermuent in the 19' century is an area that has spawned many studies. Most 
historians concur with Edwards et al [ 1997, p. 4] that 'the emergence of the joint stock 
company gave rise to the need for published accounting information'. An early study 
by Hein [ 1978] and a more recent study by Maltby [ 1999] looked at regulation in the 
context of the development of the accounting profession. Hein stated that it was 
through statutory regulation that accounting control has more often than not been 
achieved [p. 75]. Maltby [1999, p. 33] examined the 'factors in the emergence of a new 
jurisdiction' in relation to the establishment of a statutory framework through the 
1844 Joint Stock Companies Act, which provided the first steps to accountability 
within companies, and the subsequent climb down in 1856. ' Storrar and Pratt [2000, 
p. 259] enhanced the study of statutory regulation by considering 
Better technology drove a greater output in trade. With this tighter regulation and control was 
needed, prompting better accounting information and management from those involved in 
promoting the trade. 
The 1844 Joint Stock Companies Act required companies to present an audited balance sheet at 
every general meeting of shareholders. In addition it was to be filed with the Registrar of 
companies. These requirements were abandoned by the Act for the Incorporation and Regulation 
of Joint Stock Companies, 1856, making it only a discretionary adoption. It was felt that as most of 
the shareholders were few and close to the company, publishing the accounts was not necessary as 
they had 'insider' corporate governance. However, as the century progressed, there became more 
shareholdings in companies and investors required information they could rely on. In addition to 
this the reliance on the courts to resolve matters diminished as their ability to deal with issues 
lessened as accounting became more complex. By the Companies Act of 1900, an audited balance 
sheet was required to be presented to the shareholders. 
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the causes of secrecy and the circumstances in which it [UK company 
law] came into conflict with accountability in registered companies in 
the UK (1844-1904). 
They concluded that there was an increasing acceptance by directors of the need for 
accountability to investors but this often conflicted with the 'perceived need for 
commercial secrecy' [ibid, p. 285]. J&A [1995, p. 78], again expanding on an earlier 
paper by Parker [ 1990], explained changes in the statutory framework in the context 
of a 'distinct cultural evolution'. 
Conversely, accounting change within local authorities during the 19' century 
has attracted far less attention. Studies by S and B Webb [1906,1908] and Fraser 
[1979] looked at local government in Britain from the Glorious Revolution (1688/9) 
to the Municipal Reform Act (1835), and during the Victorian era respectively, from 
a distinctly political and econon-& point of view. Moreover, the main accounting 
studies relating to 'local govermnent' have tended to take the fonn of an overview, 
some more detailed than others, of the statutory and accounting changes over the 100 
years following the 1835 Act. Most notably, Coombs and Edwards' [1993,1996] case 
studies describe the accounting methods of several corporations and explain why the 
accounting changes occurred. They also looked at the accounting procedures 
implemented by the evolving professional bodies, which by the end of the 19' 
century started to incorporate what we now call 'public sector accountants'. Other 
studies have been produced by Edwards [ 1992] and Jones [ 1989,1992]. 
There have been a handful of studies looking at specific corporations. Livock 
[1965], for example, produced a descriptive analysis focussing on the progress and 
development of the accounting system of the Bristol Corporation for the years 1532- 
1835, but did not venture beyond the Municipal Reform Act [1835]. As detailed 
earlier, one study has been made of the Newcastle Corporation by Halcrow [1953], 
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but again it stopped at 1835. 
Towards the end of the century a much more proactive role was taken by 
government towards regulation, implementing tighter controls over businesses and 
making public bodies more financial-ly transparent and accountable through 
increasing legislation. As we saw earlier, this occurred in the railway industry and 
later insurance. Further, the Buildings and Friendly Societies Act was created 
prompting stringent disclosure and auditing requirements on these bodies. During the 
1870s and 1880s all gas, water and electricity companies were required through 
legislation to publish financial statements. Public authorities too were made more 
accountable especially with the 1882 Municipal Reform Act. The detailed auditing 
and accounting provisions of this Act, which was perhaps the most significant piece 
of legislation affecting local authorities since the 1830's, were thus part of a wider 
trend affecting the accounting arrangements of public bodies in general. This Act 
'strengthened and modernised the audit and account provisions of the earlier 
Municipal Corporations Act' [J&A, 1995, p. 75]. Its effectiveness is evident from the 
TIC accounts, which displayed marked improvements in disclosure from 1882 
onwards. 
The level of political action or inaction had consequences for the functioning 
of the Tyne and so it is important to consider this factor in the study. The 1835 
Municipal Reform Act in particular was a watershed in the increase in accountability 
of the management of the River, which continued throughout the rest of the century. 
Corporations were made more accountable to the ratepayers of their districts under 
the Act, which for the first time obliged them to publish accounting data. The extent 
of the Newcastle Corporation's neglect of the River was made clearer to the public 
when a new form of keeping accounts was adopted by the newly reformed 
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Corporation in pursuance of the Act. This is explored in further detail in Chapter 3. 
This data was exploited by opponents, comprising members of the press, Corporation 
and interested parties from the localities, who did not want to see the River neglected 
any longer. The River Tyne and its port facilities had been allowed to fall into 
neglect. Even though the majority of the Corporation's income came from the River, 
only a small amount was expended on its improvement. It will be shown in Chapter 3 
that opposition fuelled by the increasing availability of accounting data put greater 
pressure on the Corporation. It did so through the mediums of public meetings, 
petitioning, and, most importantly, voicing claims through the press. The Newcastle 
Corporation, on the other hand, reciprocated by using the accounting data to justify 
the lack of investment in the Tyne. Therefore, the study supports the hypothesis that 
published accounts are used to promote the economic interests of interest groups 
irrespective of the explicit purpose for which that information was originally prepared 
[Watts and Zimmermann, 1979]. 
The importance of accounting information as a lobbying tool to promote the 
interests of particular user groups is a recurrent theme of the study, which lends 
support to the view of Watts and Zimmerman [1979, p. 275] that 'political action 
generated accounting theory, not vice-versa. ' As Edwards and Webb [1982, p. 273] 
explained, 'Watts views [financial reports] as products of both market and political 
processes and the interactions among individuals and groups in these processes. ' A 
sin-fflar rationale is put forward by Brief [ 1965, p. 14] who argues that 
in a laissez-faire economy firms will choose the set of accounting 
principles and practices that have the highest utility, given the goals 
the organization is trying to achieve and the constraints under which it 
operates. 
In these ways, accounting can be viewed as a political process. Cooper and Shearer 
[1984, p. 208] write: 
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Not only is accounting policy essentially political in that it derives 
from the political struggle in a society as a whole, but also the 
outcomes of accounting policy are essentially politicaL in that they 
operate for the benefit of some groups in society and to the detriment 
of others. 
Francis [ 1990, p. 7] too recognised, the political dimension of accounting practice: 
For Aristotle practices like accounting - those that mediate relations 
between people - would also be understood as political practices. 
Politics has to do with life in the polis, the communities in which we 
live. It has to do with how humans structure and enact relations with 
each other within these communities. 
As far as the Tyne is concerned, the major stakeholders in the River included local 
and national government, the TIC, the traders and ship-owners, and groups of 
professionals such as the bookkeepers and engineers who were involved in the 
accounting process. In many cases the interests of these parties conflicted, and 
accounting was deployed as a political device 'at the boundary between co-operation 
and conflict ... to act as 
both mediator and contester' in resolving disputes [Francis, 
1990, p. 10]. According to Francis [ibid, p. 7], its ability to be used in this way is one 
of the inherent virtues of accounting practice, which is a theme that we shall return to 
in Chapter 3 when we examine its emancipatory potential. 
Shipping: investment and operations 
This thesis focuses on the users and functioning of the Tyne from an accounting 
perspective, and so it requires some explanation of the shipping interests that operated 
on the River. A vast amount of research on the shipping trade in general has already 
been undertaken, most recently by authors such as Ville [1988,1989,1990] and 
Boyce [1992,1995a, 1995b]. In this section we concentrate on the pattern of 
ownership and investment in shipping companies and the accounting implications, 
although the operations themselves are also considered. 
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The changes to the shipping system during the 19th century have been 
described by Kirkaldy [ 1914] as 'revolutionary'. The growing scale of commerce in 
Newcastle required more capital in shipping. The underlying social and business 
relationships within the local community played an important part. The closeness of 
the entrepreneur to the shipping environment determined the level of understanding 
and need for decision-useful information. At the start of the 19' century ownership 
was localised and often cases of vertical integration" were seen within the shipping 
industry. Large firms became larger, and large and small firms amalgamated, with 
implications for the record-keeping. For example, 
in 1849 the Smith enterprise was moved to a more convenient site 
down the river at North Shields, with the family combining for many 
years ship building, ship owning and ship repairing McCord, [1979, 
p. 49] 
A similar case was found with the sailmakers who invested to extend their business 
interests. Vertical integration was especially prevalent in the coal-trade where 
merchants and mine-owners invested in shipping and often owned the vessels in 
which they sent their coal. Investors were mainly locals and not many different 
parties were involved, reducing the overall risk of the investment. However, as the 
century progressed the type of ownership changed and spread to a much wider field 
of investors, and as a result, communication had to flow to a much wider 
geographical area. 
At the start of the 19' century, shipping vessels generally belonged to small 
firms, comprising sole-traders, families or partnerships. " However, with the increase 
in competition, commercial enterprise, and cost of the new technology, only those 
10 Vertical Integration is when a firm expands into adjacent stages of production - upstream or 
downstream. 
11 There may be more than one owner of the ship and cargo in a Venture. A Venture being a voyage 
to port[s] with the aim of making the best profit possible. However, this system gradually 
disappeared as trade became regularised with organised markets, regular freighting and fixed 
commission. 
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firms with the greatest funds tended to survive leading to a widening of ownership. 
Kirkaldy [1914, pp. 166-8] describes the expansion of fmns Post 1850: 
The comparatively small shipping firms [c-18501 played a conspicuous 
part in our commercial development, and, at the time, made a deep 
impression on the trading world. Some of these firms began with one 
small ship, through whose success other ships were built; and those under 
capitalist ownership, these men staked their own capital and ran their own 
risks. In less than a couple of generations such firms, in more instances 
than one, built up a fleet of sometimes ten to twenty five useful ships 
which in their day made handsome profits. 
Thus, the shipping industry evolved rapidly in the 19' century and was characterised 
by great diversity of function and complexity of organisation. 
An article in the Economist [1958] stated: 
The user of capital should be a very special type of man, capital being 
such a delicate instrument that only those who have special 
qualifications ought to utilise it. 
With regards to shipping, Kirkaldy [1914, p. 153] adds that the knowledge of the 
owner ' should be encyclopaedic, and his experience world-wide. ' It is therefore 
perhaps 
remarkable to note in the absence of formal institutions such as stock 
exchanges ... that so many different people were brought together in a 
single shipping venture. Not only business links but also geographical 
and social ties help to explain how investments were arranged [Ville, 
1989, p. 215]. 
The type of trader and ship-owner on the Tyne did change significantly aided 
by the 1862 Joint Companies Act, giving firms limited liability status. The Joint 
Companies Act of 1862, created in part to help Britain's trade by facilitating 
investment [Ville, 1989], resulted in 'annual investment in shipping [rising] very 
sharply from the 1860's' [Davis, 1978, p. 175]. Limited liability companies gradually 
took the lead in the shipping industry, although they remained a minority in terms of 
numbers: 
Most investment still came from individuals, there were only a handful 
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of partnerships and joint-stock companies. Joint-stock companies in 
the shipping industry were closely associated with the rise of the 
steamship which required much more capital [Ville, 1989, p. 218]. 
These companies had the latest type of ship and were able to obtain the required 
capital, enabling them to show investors with their own balance sheets and dividends 
that they could operate at an advantage. Family ownership became less significant as 
future generations lost interest in the trade, and sold their interests to joint-stock 
companies which attracted investors from many varying professions. It was found 
that 'ordinary people' including clergymen, solicitors, physicians, and teachers who 
were attracted through professional and personal contacts and kinship, were investing 
their own savings in these ventures, hoping to make a greater return than the market 
interest rate at the time [Ville, 1989]. They were in part safeguarded if the investment 
turned out to be poor by the limited liability status of their shares. 
Many owners met the initial cost of adopting steam power using the 64' 
system, which was a variant form of joint-stock ownership. Under the 64' system, 
shipping investors were deemed tenants-in- common, able to buy or sell a share 
without reference to the other owners. These firms relied on their network 
connections that generated interpersonal knowledge, commercial interdependence and 
reciprocal business deals [Boyce, 1995b, p. 364-5]. Shares were bought by family, 
friends, local connections and commercial contracts: 
Tradesmen linked to the shipping industry, such as sailmakers, 
blockmakers, ship chandlers and joiners ... put their money into many 
vessels, particularly coasters whose small size and greater age 
minimized the investment [Ville, 1988, p. 76]. 
After paying management fees, all profits of these companies were paid out as 
dividends, except for very small amounts carried forward for working capital. This 
practice, which in effect prevented the accumulation of financial reserves, meant that 
the 64' system could not create a stable capital base from retained earnings. The 
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problem was exacerbated by the voyage account, whicb was the basis of distributions 
to shareholders, not making provision for depreciation. 
As the type of trader and ship-owner changed, so did the manner of fmancial 
reporting. Limited liability companies with a permanent capital required annual 
periodic accounting statements. Traditionally, it had been common practice to make 
up accounts only on the completion of ventures: 
Ventures were one of the earliest situations in which it was necessary 
to produce a computation of profit; for the profit computation would 
be the basis for determining how the proceeds of the venture were to 
be divided between partners. Because of the short duration of most 
ventures, however, it was normally sufficient to prepare one profit 
statement after all transactions had been completed [Carsberg, 1975, 
p. 249]. 
This was the case under the 64' system: 
When a voyage was completed an account was drawn up by the 
founder who, as 'managing owner' exercised wide responsibility for 
deploying, managing and supplying the vessel, The managing owner 
calculated his commissions from gross or net profit as the terms of his 
management contract allowed and apportioned the remaining profit or 
any loss to each 64'. Thus, at the voyage's end the managing owner 
submitted to 64' owners a profit and loss account listing as debits all 
operating expenses [port charges, stores, commissions and 
loading/discharging costs] and entering as credits the revenue earned 
[listed according to each voyage leg and detailing the type of cargo 
carried as well as the freight rate charged]. When the voyage 
generated a profit, this was entered as a credit in a general account 
[Boyce, 1995b, p. 365]. 
Despite the lack of standards - Maclay [1910, p. 22], for example, noted that 'it 
depends very much on the managers as to the manner in which the ship's accounts are 
kept' - round-trip voyage accounts remained the norm even after the use of stearn- 
power became more widespread after 1870, and the 64' system of ownership 
declined after 1900, but such accounts were now subsumed within annual profit 
calculations: 
The single voyage still remained the unit Of accounting analysis; 
statements to shareholders covered voyages completed during the year 
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and sometimes included estimates of profits arising from pending 
voyages [Boyce, 1995b, p. 365]. 
The perseverance with the traditional methods is perhaps unsurprising given their 
longevity. As Baker [1894, p. 591], writing at the end of the 19" century, observed: 
The simplest form of Shipping is that of a privately owned sailing 
ship. It is the oldest form of account and if properly kept is the 
foundation of all other Shipping Accounts. 
With ownership spreading outwards, communication through networks of 
agents became vital in order to reduce the level of risk. Networks were formed that 
provided the required level of communication and a high level of trust, diminishing 
the importance of vertical integration. 
Vertical integration reduces the cost of negotiating and enforcing 
contracts by specifying property rights and constitutional powers. 
However, if communication is sustained, intermediate contractual 
arrangements may act as viable alternative to vertical integration 
Boyce, [1995a, p. 245]. 
In many cases agents were used to account for and manage the shipping interests of 
the investors. One highly successful shipping concern on the River Tyne was owned 
by the Henley family of Shields. " The Henleys hired agents in many ports, most of 
whom were used irregularly and were replaced if another firm offered a better or 
cheaper service. However one agent who was significant for the Henleys was James 
Kirton. As well as acting as a shipping agent for the Henleys, he also dealt with the 
fmancial side of the Henley business: 
He submitted monthly accounts of business between them. He 
extended credit to Henley masters and paid many bills including those 
of fitters and ship repairers. In addition he paid monthly money to the 
families of Henley employees from the area Ville, [1981, p. 159]. 
Most Newcastle owned ships had agents at destination ports for example at London 
thus extending the range of communication fi7om port of despatch to the destination 
12 Shields consisting of South and North Shields are two neighbouring ports to Newcastle along the 
Tyne coast. 
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port. 
The volume of trade, size of commission and most importantly which 
party the shipping firm or agent had the best freight generating 
capabilities as reflected by local contacts with merchants and trade 
specific knowledge were factors in the decision to set up a branch 
office or employ an independent agent ... 
If shipowners had an 
advantage in terms of their knowledge or contacts within a specific 
trade they formed their own branch offices and modified the reporting 
procedures typical of agency agreements to ensure access to 
information [Boyce, 1995b, p. 363]. 
Thus, Boyce [1995b, pp-375-6] concluded 
that shipowners devised unique contracts based on inter-personal and 
inter-organisational knowledge to harness local information while 
minimising transaction costs. 
The increase in trade and the creation of networks of agents resulted in 
accountability problems. By the third quarter of the 19' century the majority of 
shipping entering the Tyne was not based locally: 
When they examined the amount of tonnage coming into this river 
year by year, and ascertained the ownership of that tonnage, it would 
be found that more than two-thirds of it did not belong to this locality, 
but to owners living away from the district. Seventy per cent of the 
sailing capacity entering that harbour year by year belonged to owners 
residing out of the Tyne, and as dock dues would be paid by ships 
frequenting the port and using the dock, they must come to the 
conclusion that seventy per cent of the taxation, whatever that taxation 
might be, greater or smaller, would be paid by people not living in the 
immediate neighbourhood used the river and contributed to its funds 
[NTCP, 1872, p. 340]. 
This created a need to employ agents who could be trusted. According to Boyce 
[1995a, p. 32]: 
As the distance from the origin grew, asymmetry of information 
increased and investors would normally require progressively larger 
risk premia. Early steam operators were able to avoid these payments 
by attracting family and friends, who could rely on interpersonal 
knowledge, and people from their home port would could depend on 
commercial ties and reputational deterrence to prevent opportunistic 
behaviour. 
Reliance on agents also produced a need for accounts to coordinate and monitor their 
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activities: 
When ship-owners lacked contacts with merchants, they employed 
independent agents who possessed the requisite local knowledge, and 
developed co-operative inter-organisation communication channels to 
monitor operations and to inform planning decisions [Boyce, 1995b, 
p. 362]. 
Another factor affecting the accounting process was the competitive nature of the 
trade, which necessitated close control over the companies' financial affairs and 
decision-making. In summary: 
The existing nature of the business environment socially and 
economically meant that the decision-making infrastructure was 
already advanced. British ship-owners relied primarily on inter- 
personal and inter-organizational networks to bind information about 
business opportunities and mobilize resources needed to take 
advantage of them and was based on a high level of trust. Not 
surprisingly, ship-owners' cost-accounting systems were more detailed 
than merchants [Boyce, 1995a, p. 2] 
Shipping operations: The evidence available in the local archives of the Tyne traders 
themselves proved limited. In particular, what is lacking is continuous data over 
extended periods of time. The only exception to this is the Tyne Steam Shipping 
Company (herein TSSCo) which has already been reviewed by Northway [ 1972]. The 
TTSCo is unique amongst steam shipping companies operating from Newcastle in the 
middle stages of the 19' century in terms of the range of surviving archival data. it 
therefore provides a good case study of the problems faced by steam-ship companies 
in the early years of their development. 
The TSSCo was formed as a joint-stock company with limited liability on I 
July 1864. At the inception, the TSSCo was owned by merchants, coal and steam 
ship-owners, already holding deeply rooted trading connections to the Tyne. These 
owners amalgamated their smaller interests, businesses, vessels, shipping knowledge 
and important, established trading routes such as London, Rotterdam, Antwerp, 
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Dunkirk and Hamburg within the company. The company was very much a local 
affair, and there was 
a strong feeling that the steam-carrying trade of the Tyne should be in 
the hands of men, who are themselves largely engaged in, and 
thoroughly conversant with, the requirements of the Commerce of the 
district [DT. TT/63,1864, Company Prospectus]. 
Two Tyne Commissioners and two local manufacturers were also members of the 
board, the former being Joseph Cowen (MP) " and R. W. Hodgson (whose book on 
the borough of South Shields is an important primary source used in this study), the 
latter, Henry Parker (lead-works owner) and William Hawthorn (engineer). The 
shareholding of the company thus reflected the 'local' importance of the company. 
Nominal capital was E300,000 in 12,000 shares of f25 each. Around twenty-five per 
cent of the 10,100 shares first issued, on which f 18 was paid up, were held by 
established steamer owners. The intention was for the remaining shares to be sold to 
the 'public' locally because 'a shareholder at London, or Liverpool, or Manchester, 
brings little or no business to the company' [DT-TT/63,1864, newspaper report]. 
This local knit of owners perhaps made the company stronger as they all had a 
common interest and would work together in the face of competition. 
The TSSCo carried exports and imports of a mixed range of cargoes rather 
than bulk cargoes of few products. Also, the steamers operated regular routes at fairly 
fixed times, which was very important to their large passenger trade: 
Most of the company's income came from the carriage of goods and 
passengers so that the growth in the number and size of their vessels at 
least created the opportunity for increasing revenue ... Fncreasing] 
capacity was an important consideration ... [There was a] growth in 
the number of voyages as routes operated were extended ... [These 
conditions were dependent on] the prosperity of local industry and 
trade, so that there were a number of years [1866,1877,1885 and 
1894] when national or purely local depressions contributed towards a 
fall in the quantity of goods carried [Northway, 1972, p. 74]. 
"A local brick manufacturer who later was a Newcastle MP and social reformer. He spent a great part 
of his life in the successful endeavour to restore the River Tyne. 
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The difficulty of mixed cargoes, however, was that the cOnIPanY faced running 
steamers half or part full. They could not risk leaving goods behind as 'this invited 
competition and brought complaints from their customers' [DT. TT/64,1881]. 
Moreover, passenger trips had to run according to schedule even if the ships were half 
ftill. The TSSCo tried to solve these problems by separating out the passenger trade, 
and investing in dedicated cargo-steamers with larger capacity, meaning that they 
could now carry all their cargo in fewer dedicated vessels, and thus the risk of 
running vessels half empty at a loss was greatly diminished. 
Perhaps the greatest challenge faced by the company's management 
concerned capital investment decisions and capital maintenance. When the 
investment did not produce the return anticipated it was difficult to meet the 
expectations of shareholders in terms of dividends. As Northway [1972, pp. 83-4] 
observed: 
The decline in the efficiency of the company's operations in the late 
1870s arose not only because the level of profits declined but also 
because of changes in the size of their assets. In 1874 they had 
ventured into the Copenhagen trade and built a special steamer for this 
purpose. In the following year they took over the Yarmouth Line 
which also involved the purchase of two small steamers. All this meant 
a considerable increase in the size of their fixed assets, paid for by 
making additional calls on shareholders and by increasing 
indebtedness. At the same although profits were low they maintained 
the level of dividends, neglecting to set aside adequate amounts for 
depreciation, this maintaining the high book value of their assets. 
With the benefit of hindsight one can see that these new ventures were ifl-advised. On 
the Yarmouth route there was little demand for carriage. Competition on the 
Copenhagen trading route led to freight rates being reduced so much that by 1877 it 
was no longer viable, and the company disposed of its interests. 
The TSSCo responded to these difficulties by rationalising its operations and 
reassessing its capital base: 
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This was followed by a number of years in which they put large sums 
towards depreciation, sold a number of their smallest steamers, 
returned some of the paid up capital to shareholders and concentrated 
their efforts on the most profitable fines. This led to a recovery in their 
profits and a considerable decline in the value of their assets from the 
early 1880s [ibid, p. 841. 
The company now realised that unguarded expansion was not the answer to achieving 
greater retums: 
At one time we thought that by going out right and left opening out 
new lines that we would extend the business of the Company and 
increase the profits. Unfortunately they had the contrary effect 
[DT. TT/64,18 81]. 
Evidence exists in the 'Proceedings at Annual Meetings, 1879' of the company also 
attempting to reduce its costs [DT. TT/10,1879]. Thus, the company's secretary, 
Richard Welford (who also was secretary and treasurer to the Shipowners 
Association) reduced wages and the size of crews, thereby producing a material 
saving in working expenses of over f 1,000 a year. However, this reduction only took 
place the once during 1878, perhaps owing to the threat of loosing good crewmen 
who could get better pay elsewhere. These examples illustrate the importance of 
management control and shrewd decision-making to shipping companies. 
When reviewing the accounting implications of shipping operations, there is 
again limited detail. However, one article written as the close of the 19' century 
published in The Accountant is very informative. The first point to notice is that there 
was no uniformity in how accounting records were to be kept as each type of shipping 
company had their own way of accounting: 
The accounts necessary to be kept will of course depend very much 
upon the way in which the ship is intended to be owned, either as one 
of a line of steamers belonging to a public company or as a single ship 
company or as the private property of certain individuals [Baker, 1884, 
p. 590]. 
The author stresses the need for simplicity above everything: 'the great desideratum 
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in all ship's accounts is simplicity' [ibid, p. 5931. He then goes on to look at the 
typical accounting system of a public company, which as noted before would be 
voyage based: 
As regards the large public companies owning fleets of steamers, each 
company has a system of its own, and probably no two companies 
would follow precisely the same plan, but a very usual method is to 
have a separate voyage book for each steamer, in which the 
transactions of each voyage are set out in detail, commencing with the 
outfit in this country, detailing all the expenses and receipts in the 
various ports abroad, charging the insurance on ship and freight, and 
crediting any average claims that may have arisen, together with any 
returns of premium for laying up, and charging the wages of crew or 
portage bill, as it is technically called, together with the captain's 
wages and other emoluments (if any), and concluding with the 
expenses inwards at her home ports in this country. The outward and 
homeward freights received having been duly credited on the other 
side of the book, a balance is then struck, and the profit or loss as the 
case may be placed to the credit or debit of the Profit and Loss 
Account in the company's Ledger [p. 591]. 
An interesting point of note is that the insurance for the freight was generafly from 
port to port. Also, the law regarding the sea was different to that of the land in that 
one cannot claim ownership of the sea. 
The author goes on to review the accounting techniques for a privately owned 
vessel, first stating the accounts necessary to be kept: 
In vessels privately owned, the Ledger must contain the following 
accounts: - First Cost or Purchase Account, Voyage Account, Captain's 
Account, and a separate Account with each of the co-owners [ibid, 
p. 593]. 
Baker continues to explain what each account is and how it should function starting 
with the First Cost or Purchase Account that recorded the initial purchase of the 
vessel: 
The First Cost Account should be closed as soon as the last payment 
has been made to the vendor, and interest at 5 per cent per annum 
calculated to that date on each payment, and charged in the account. 
This will give the total cost of the vessel, which should then be 
apportioned amongst the several co-owners, according to the number 
of 64' shares held by each. The separate or private account of each co- 
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owner should then be debited with the cost of his share and the 
Purchase Account credited, which will close the Purchase Account 
[ibid]. 
Interestingly, the co-owners of the vessel were held liable for notional interest 
charges as part of the capital cost of the asset. 
Once the ship has been purchased it could then be put to use and a voyage 
made in the expectation of a profit: 
The Voyage Account will contain all payments made for the ship for 
outfit, insurances, etc and also the disbursements at each port abroad at 
which the ship may call during the voyage, together with portage bill, 
captain's emoluments, expenses at port of discharge inwards, and 
managing owner's commission. It will have to be credited with 
outward freight, freights received abroad, homeward freight, forfeited 
wages from the portage bill, sales of stores, etc [ibid]. 
As with the public company, voyages were typically accounted for separately. During 
the voyage the crew's wages and other disbursements were accounted for in the 
Captain's Account: 
The Captain's Account will be charged with month's advance and 
monthly money to the crew, cash to himself and payments on account 
of his outfit, cash advanced to himself and crew at foreign ports, and 
for payment of seamen's wages on return home. It will be credited 
with portage bill less forfeited wages, his own disbursements abroad 
and his remuneration as master, the difference being the balance due to 
him. All these accounts should be kept with interest at 5 per cent per 
annurn, which should be calculated up to the date on which the 
Voyage Account is closed [ibid] 
This was a type of charge and discharge accounting, recording the moneys owing to 
or by the captain personally on the conclusion of the undertaking. Again, the account 
took interest charges into consideration. Finally, when the ship returned to the home 
port, a profit or loss could be determined and divided between the owners in 
proportion to their ownership of the ship: 
The profit or loss on the voyage, being thus ascertained, should be 
apportioned amongst the several owners pro rata, and credited or 
debited to their separate accounts in the Ledger [ibid]. 
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Journals, for their part, were not required and were often left out of the accounting 
process to save time and money: 
In Shipping Accounts the use of a Journal is not by any means 
essential, and many large firms entirely dispense with it, thereby 
saving much time and labour; it is only necessary that the Cash Book 
and Ledger entries should be somewhat amplified, and the cross 
postings carefully made with a Ledger reference to each [ibid, p. 5941. 
The issue of accounting for foreign exchange was a problem, suggesting a lack of 
rules of instruction for those who performed the accounting: 
The question of foreign exchanges is often a great stumbling block to 
young beginners, and they are sorely puzzled when three or four 
different rates of exchange appear in the same account [ibid, p. 595]. 
Thus, Baker explains how the shipping accounts should be kept, albeit using 
simplistic examples. In conclusion, he states that in general the accounts of larger 
firms are better prepared that those of smaller firms: 
In the case of firms managing a number of ships, the auditor will 
probably find that the accounts are carefully and correctly prepared; 
but in the case of some single ship companies an improvement in 
bookkeeping is still much to be desired [ibid]. 
The overriding impression is of a lack of uniformity in accounting procedures across 
the sector. 
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Chapter 3: Control of the River' 
Chapter 3 illustrates how early 19t' century municipal reform gave both the 
Newcastle Corporation and those who opposed it a lobbying tool to promote their 
interests by using accounting information. It thus contributes to a growing body of 
research highlighting accounting's potential as a mechanism for promoting social 
change. 
The Corporation was heavily criticised for neglecting the necessary 
improvement of the Tyne during the first half of the 19' century, and control of the 
River became an issue that was hotly contested. Gallhofer and Haslam (herein G&H) 
[2001, p. 29] showed how in the late 19' century 'radical political activists' used 
accountmg data through the medium of the press as an 'emancipatory' practice to 
challenge the status quo. This study finds that the opposition to the established 
controllers of the River during the first half of the 19' century also used the press to 
achieve their goals, bringing accounting information to bear in support of their 
arguments. The 1835 Municipal Reform Act (herein MCA) exposed the neglect of the 
Tyne to public scrutiny by obliging local authorities to publish accounts. This gave 
the opposition to the Newcastle Corporation's monopoly over the River a clear 
argument to press for the much needed improvement works. In the battle for the 
control of the Tyne, the chapter demonstrates how accomfing was used both as a 
'mediator and as a contester ... at the boundary between co-operation and conflictl 
[Francis, 1990, p. 10]. The Corporation used accounting data to justify inaction as did 
their opponents to promote a more proactive approach to the management of the port. 
As a result, the control of the River was taken from the Corporation and placed in the 
' Chapter 3 develops material published in Brackenborough [2003]. 
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hands of the Tyne Improvement Commission (herein TIC) in 1850. The chapter then 
goes on to frame the issue within the idea of 'emancipation' through accounts, by 
way of a counterbalance to those researchers who emphasise accounting's historical 
role as an agent of social 'repression'. 
Historical background 
In 1600, Queen Elizabeth's 'Great Charter' gave monopoly control over the coal 
trade and principal council offices in Newcastle to the Hostmans' Company 2 in 
return for a shilling tax on every chaldron [measurement of coal] of coal shipped 
from the Tyne. Six years later the Hostmans' Company gained the right to exercise 
Admiralty jurisdiction over the Tyne and with this came the responsibility to improve 
and maintain the River. Trinity House was established by royal charter in 1514. Made 
up from masters, pilots, seamen and merchant navy captains, their role was to 
regulate piolatage on the Tyne as well as to act as a general lighthouse authority and 
charitable organisation for the relief of mariners. Trinity House had control over the 
ports in the areas of London, Newcastle, Hull and Leith. However, in Newcastle their 
authority was undermined by the City Corporation: 
The river jury ' [who sat in the Court of Admiralty] was formerly 
composed of the gentlemen of the trinity-house, who were by far the 
fittest men for the purpose ... The corporation thwarted the river jury, 
that the corporation complied with many requests which the river jury 
had refused to comply with and that, in consequence of all this, the 
river jury of trinity-house gentlemen gave up in disgust ... then were 
succeeded by the cobblers, tailors, saddlers, slaters, smiths and the like 
[appointed by the Corporation] [Mitchell, 1823, p. 17]. 
' Mackenzie [1827, pp. 7034] traces the Hostmans' Company's origin back to a statute of Henry IV, 
in 1404 where they 'seem to have been a kind of mediator between buyers and sellers. ' They loaded 
and unloaded the trade, at this time the bulk of which was coal and stones. 
'This jury was made up of members from the various trades and bye-trades [see footnote four]. The 
majority were not qualified in river matters but made up the corporation committees by virtue of their 
position in political society. They were responsible and Mitchell [1823, p. 181 implies subservient, to 
the Corporation and for conservation of the Tyne. 
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During the latter part of the 17th century, political allegiance mnongst the 
town's merchant classes played a big part in the make-up of the Newcastle 
Corporation. FoRowing the resignation of the brethren of Trinity House, the 
Corporation was free to use its ancient electionary powers to fiH the positions 
available on the river jury with men from the mysteries and societies of Newcastle, 
who were sympathetic to their views. Improving the River was considered beyond the 
means of the Corporation, and as a result it remained neglected. There was very little 
change in the way the Corporation was directed and controlled in Newcastle until 
well into the early part of the 19' century when the political climate started to 
change. Consequently, at the time Mitchell was writing in the 1820's, the river jury 
was composed of, 'only two or three ... [who] know any better how to conserve the 
navigation than they know how to navigate a ship to New Zealand' [ibid, p. 12]. 
The Corporation was aware of the navigation problems of the River as large 
sums of money were spent on assessing its condition. The most significant report was 
by John Rennie, canal and river engineer, costing in excess of f2,000. His report as to 
'the best mode of improving its navigation', produced in 1816, was to be a 
'benchmark' for the future improvement of the Tyne [River Committee, 1836]. 
However, his cost estimate of f519,320 for improving the River [more than 10 times 
their annual total receipts] overshadowed the Corporation's judgement towards 
carrying out any major necessary improvement for years to come: 'The cost of his 
scheme was of major concern to the city and erring on the side of caution, the report 
was accepted but no action taken' [Port of Tyne, 1999, p. 43]. 
'There were 12 Companies called Mysteries, representing groups of traders. These were Merchants, 
Mercers, Drapers, Skinners, Tailors, Saddlers, Bakers and Brewers, Tanners, Cordwainers, Butchers, 
Smiths, Fullers and Dyers. The earliest trade incorporated in 1436 [Smiths] and the last in 1621 
[Butchers]. There were also 15 societies called Bye-Trades. These were not Mysteries. These were 
Mariners, Weavers, Barber Surgeons, Cutlers, Shipwrights, Coopers, House Carpenters, Masons, 
Glovers, Joiners, Millers, Curriers, Paviours, Slaters and Glaziers. The earliest trade incorporated in 
1426 [Coopers] and the last in 1656 [Paviours]. 
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The state of the River, described as a 'cursed horse pond' [Mitchell, 1823, 
p. 27] in the late 18' century, was worsening all the time through the inaction of the 
Corporation. There are numerous accounts of traders complaining to the Corporation 
that ships were running aground, or of being unable to enter the port due to the silting 
up of the River. Damage was being done to their ships. The comment of one trader 
was typical: 
It [is] a most difficult thing to charter a vessel in the Mediterranean, 
though coppered ... [However] they said they received greater 
injury to 
their bottom in the Tyne, than at any other place they went to; and that 
its repair cost more than any addition which was made to the freight 
[NTCP, 1840, p. 9]. 
The Corporation remained unmoved. As Guthrie [1880, p. 5] explained: 
The pressing necessity for enlarged harbour facilities to meet the 
requirements of modern commerce, and to withstand the competition 
of other ports was, apparently, not sufficiently felt. There seems 
likewise to have been a .. great 
fear that the town's revenue would be 
uselessly squandered in embarking on such an enterprise. 
In Newcastle, foreign trade started to increase towards the end of the 1830s 
when the doors were opened to trade with India, China and the Levant. Improved 
shipping technology and design enabled ships to carry more and at a faster rate, 
increasing the volume of trade, especially with Germany and Holland. However, the 
Tyne was not well placed to take advantage of this. One councillor commented that, 
'the River did not afford that accommodation to the increasing commerce and trade of 
the port, which was imperatively demanded' [NTCP, 1839, p. 5]. A report of the 
Newcastle Corporation's Committee on Trade stated, 'the most obvious means of 
increasing the trade of the port, within the power of the Council, is the improvement 
of the River' [ibid] - 
A comment made in the Tyne Mercury [1833], shows that things were being 
better managed elsewhere, such as on the River Clyde where 
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[River dues] are kept distinct from the Corporation's fundsq and are 
laid out in deepening and improving the river and harbour and in 
discharging the debt of the trust'. 
The situation on the Tyne improved after 1850, when, by an Act of Parliament 
[18501, the control of the River was taken from the Corporation and given to the TIC, 
purposely created to improve its management. The greater improvements which 
occurred after that date are reflected in trade figures from Johnson and Aughton 
[1925, p. 40]. These show that the number of foreign vessels trading inwards to the 
port was 708 in 1843 compared to 1,477 in 1863. Similarly, the number of foreign 
vessels trading outwards from the port was 4,088 in 1843 and 8,074 in 1863. 
What the Corporation did spend money on prior to 1850 in the name of 
improvement was called 'Pound Foolish' expenditure, because it was of little benefit 
to the River. For example, the purchase of a dredger, was described in the press as a 
'DESPICABLE machine which, at an expense of 0,000 ... 
is only fit to clean out a 
gentleman's fish-pond, and perhaps not that' [Tyne Mercury, 1838]. Mackenzie 
[ 1827] tells us that the Corporation 'were so far roused to a sense of their duty' as to 
employ Rennie, and presumably the same went for Cubbitt, who compiled another 
report in 1837. The engineers who were asked to report on the condition and 
improvement of the Tyne often had little local knowledge; and although their 
engineering abilities could be applied to any locality, their commercial and financial 
knowledge could not. For instance, they 'had not sufficient knowledge of the traffic 
on the river to offer any opinion respecting it' [NTCP, 1838, p. 6]. These engineers' 
estimates for improvement, based on vastly inflated London prices, created an over- 
prudent Corporation at times and caused them to err on the side of caution. This was 
the case in Rennie's report of 1816 and also Cubitt's report in 1837: 
Extending the quay and applying the dredging machine to the river ... 
the sum [required] would alarm the Council ... Mr Cubitt calculated 
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that the works could not be conducted together at a less annual sum 
than 101)0001 ... [Councillor Doubleday] and the 
River Committee 
also, were of opinion that the two designs could be carried into 
execution at an annual sum considerably less: and this opinion they 
grounded on the fact of having made enquiries of builders and others, 
as to the prices of stone, labour etc. in this part of the kingdom as 
compared with the prices in London, on which Mr Cubitt had formed 
his estimates [NTCP, 1837, p. 1]. 
The River was seen as requiring huge investment before any great benefit 
could be obtained, and the Corporation prioritised expenditure on the town. Indeed, it 
was accused of adopting a cavalier approach in its readiness to commit funds to 
improvement of the town: 
It had been proposed to build new Town Courts, Corporate Offices 
and Judge's Lodging House ... [One councillor] 
had been astonished to 
hear one gentleman say, that not only might the ground in question be 
involved in this expenditure, but that they might expend any sum they 
pleased upon it - while the river Tyne, from which they derived the 
greatest portion of their revenues, and upon the improvement of which 
a large portion should consequently be expended, was to be left 
entirely out of consideration [NTCP, 1838, p. 22]. 
Local and resident engineers also produced reports on the condition and 
improvement of the River Tyne, but perhaps it was felt by the Corporation that these 
men did not hold enough standing to convince the opposition to their River policy 
that they were taking the issue seriously. Consequently, eminent engineers were 
brought in from outside to survey the River that everybody already knew needed 
huge investment. The scale of the investment required meant that the Corporation 
would not be able to avoid debt and reduce costs, a policy they strongly adhered to. 
All the time and money spent on these reports was arguably wasted, as more often 
than not, the reports were buried, and little, if any, action was taken to improve this 
vital artery of commerce. 
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Conflicts of Interest 
As the product of the 1835 MCA, the newly reformed Corporation consisted of men 
from a wide range of business activities - bookseUers, tanners, bankers, printers, 
manufacturers, lawyers, doctors, but only one ship-owner. The Corporation had no 
voice from other surrounding towns located on the Tyne. Towns such as South and 
North Shields and Gateshead were desperate to see improvement of the River. Also, 
the representation of nautical and trading interests on the Corporation who were 
willing to voice any concerns about the River was not significant, with most 
preferring to remain silent in order to remain popular with the rate-paying voters. 
The majority of the Newcastle Corporation elect, made up of 'fifty-six 
gentlemen', had substantial property interests in the town, which helps explain their 
preference for efficient roadways and utility supplied streets over river improvement: 
The Municipal Corporation, which owned and taxed the harbour 
represented none of these interests, and by reason of its legal rights to 
devote the proceeds of its petty customs duties for its own advantage, 
was even pecuniary biased against them all [Webb, 1908, p. 724]. 
However, an article appearing in the Tyne Mercury [1833] suspected that the (real' 
reason for the policy of inaction lay in the desire of the Corporation's members to 
preserve the power they gained from their corporate position: 
The annual average receipts of the Corporation for the eighteen years 
immediately preceding 1827, amounted to f38,142 while the annual 
balance in the hutch ' [the amount left-over at the end of the year] 
never exceeded f2,000. Now if nearly one-half their income were 
curtailed [i. e. to be expended on the improvement of the River], it is 
manifest that their power, and various influence, would be 
considerably broken down ... This 
is sufficient to explain what has so 
long been a paradox to the public, namely, that many members of the 
Corporation, who are largely engaged in trade and manufactures, and 
are Uly aware of the great general benefit that would result from the 
improvement of the river, do, not withstanding, in their corporate 
5 'A large chest [that contained the town's money] with nine separate locks, each of a different 
pattern. The mayor and each of the eight chamberlains (they were elected from amongst the burgesses 
and assisted the clerks of the chamber) had a key so that the chest could not be opened unless all nine 
were present together' [Halcrow, 1953, p. 152]. 
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capacity, refuse their concurrence to any very expensive scheme of 
amendment, and thus, so far, counteract their individual private 
interests. They make this sacrifice rather than see the pomp and glory 
of the Corporation reduced to depend on f20, OOO a year, or that their 
patronage should be in the least diminished. 
For most of the members of the Newcastle Corporation, it seems that power and 
influence were too precious to lose. 
The main argument of this chapter is that it was the publication of accounts 
that made the Corporation's neglect of the River visible to a gathering force of 
opposition (the press, councilors and petitioners mainly headed by the people of 
Shields). However, the Corporation also used the accounts to justify its policy of 
inaction. Thus, it can be seen that accounts were employed to contest the argument, 
and ultimately to resolve it in the Admiralty Enquiry that followed. These issues are 
now considered under three sub-headings: the case for change, the defence by the 
Corporation, and the proceedings of the Admiralty Enquiry that ultimately dealt the 
final blow, and placed responsibility for the River in the hands of the TIC. 
The case for change: Early accounts of opposition to the Newcastle Corporation's 
inaction in improving the River go back to the Ir century. Typical was a series of 
papers entitled 'Conservatorship of the River Tyne' [published 1849]. The line of 
argument was based on the physical condition of the River. This can be seen from the 
writings of Captain Phipps, a well-respected 18' century maritime rnan, who 
considered the Tyne to be 'capable of becoming one of the finest rivers in the world, 
but which ignorance, inattention, and avarice' had converted into what he caHed a 
4 cursed horse pond' [Mitchell, 1823, p. 27]. In another example there was a call for a 
general public meeting because 'the navigation is likely to sustain much ffirther 
injury' unless something was done. Those invited, 'nobility, gentry, merchants, coal 
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owners and ship owners and all other interested in preserving the navigation of the 
river Tyne will attend' [Lawson, 1799]. 
Publication of annual accounts enhanced the accountability of the Corporation 
to the rate-payers. One can clearly see from the accounts of the Newcastle 
Corporation [see Figures 1-4] great improvement in the level of detailed disclosure, 
rendering the activities of the Corporation more open to social and political debate. 
In 1809 [Figure 1] the accounts, in a receipts and disbursements format, show very 
little detail. Most notable is the disbursement title 'General Payments' with a large 
sum of E16,413 [nearly half the total amount] and no ftirther explanation. At this 
point in time the neglect of the River could only be seen physically by the eye, there 
was no available clear accounting information to contest Newcastle Corporation's 
lack of management of the River and the case remained the same 9 years later. By the 
tinie of the first publication to the freeman nine years later of the abstract in a 
ID- 
Receipts' and 'Payments' form, there had been some improvement in the level of 
disclosure [Figure 2]. From these accounts it can now be seen that around f20, OOO 
was received from river related activities, whereas on the payments side, very little 
appears to have been spent on the River as there was still no visible breakdown of 
figures. 
The 1829/30 year end abstract of receipts and payments contained the first 
example of letters next to the numbers, as is demonstrated in figures 3 and 4, 
denoting a reference to a note attached to the abstract giving ftirther detail of a 
particular amount. However, from the evidence available these accounts may have 
been drawn up retrospectively and the catalyst for adding more detail may have 
indeed been the Municipal Reform Act of 1834 or the Municipal Corporation's Act of 
1835.1 reach this conclusion for a variety of reasons. Firstly. when, at the Municipal 
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Investigation of Newcastle Corporation in 1833, the Treasurer who was responsible 
for producing the accounts was asked by the investigation committee: 
What size was the slip of paper upon which the accounts were 
published, previous to 1809? [The Treasurer responded] The published 
accounts were very small indeed, before the year 1809, they only 
shewed the total receipts, total payments and the balance at the end of 
the year in three lines. [The investigation committee asked] Do you 
keep the books now upon a new method? [The Treasurer responded] I 
know of no new method of keeping the accounts. The same method 
has always been adopted in my time. The accounts have, for years, 
been entered by me [Municipal Investigation, 1833, p. 8]. 
Although not conclusive, it does suggest that the accounts at the tirne of the 
investigation differed very little from the earlier ones as there was no mention of the 
additional notes which is quite a significant change. Another piece of evidence 
pointing to the fact that the concept of producing notes may have originated later than 
when they first appeared on the accounts comes from the same investigation, showing 
that accounts were not always prepared on a timely basis. The investigation 
committee asks: 
Why did you go to the year 1829, instead of 1830,183 1, or 1832? 
When infact did you prepare that document? [The Councillor replied] 
As to the first question, I took 1829, because I had not the returns for 
the other years. I have only to reply to the second question, that the 
statements were prepared yesterday. 
The third piece of evidence is the fact that, as it will be shown below, the accounts 
prior to 1835 were not signed during these years by those who prepared them or by 
the auditors who checked then-4 so, again, could have been prepared retrospectively. 
It was around the early 1830s that the financial argument came to the fore that 
was to dominate the battle for power over the Tyne. For example, a petition was 
made to King William by the free burgesses of Newcastle upon Tyne in 1832 
employing data from the accounts. This was election time of the Common Council, 
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and a majority of the burgesses, ' who would have had access to the accounts, tired of 
the 'Toryism in Newcastle' [Cook, 1965, p-212], were 'in favour of upsetting the 
controlling power of the Common Council, ' [ibid, pp. 225-61. The petition asked for 
an enquiry to be established into the mismanagement and poor state of the River. The 
petition was littered with proofs and references to the published annual accounts. For 
example, an extract from the petition read: 
It appears ... that 
from the year 1821 to 1831, both years inclusive, a 
period of II years, the sum of 217,8331. Is. 8 3/4d. has been received 
by the corporation of Newcastle [relating to the river] ... that the paltry 
sum of 1,2651.12s. 9d. only, was during the period, expended in either 
improving the navigation of the river, or facilitating shipping, trade, 
and commerce, or in deepening the bed of the river or otherwise ... 
[while] a clear revenue of upward of sixteen thousand pounds is yearly 
drained from the public without any check [Macgregor, 1832, p. 4]. 
The monetary values used in the petition were based on the authority of Mackenzie's 
History of Newcastle [ 1827], and stated that: 
During the three years preceding 1827, the Corporation received from 
the river E74,764 ... out of which was paid 
f22,472 ... leaving f49,291 ... 
or an average annual income of f, 17,291 ... 
deduct f, 1,291 ... 
for the 
salaries of the harbour master and petty officers employed on the river, 
there will remain a sum of f 16,000 a year available to the 
improvement of the river [ibid, pp. 18-19]. 
From the published accounts, the amounts received from the River can be seen but at 
this time the amounts expended could not suggesting that someone perhaps favouring 
change of the status quo from inside the Newcastle Corporation passed Macgregor 
this information. It's accuracy is open to con ecture as there is no evidence available j 
to substantiate his figure for expenditure. Prior to the 1835 reform the Corporation 
kept all the dues and revenues in one general account. With the majority of the 
revenue generated from the Tyne, and no distinction in the general account between 
' 'An inhabitant charged with the defence of the place in which he lived, and, in return for his military 
services, was entitled to certain privileges and immunities' [Mackenzie, 1827, p. 6521. 
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the sources of revenue, it was harder to determine what amount of the funds came 
from the River, making it less likely to be returned. This revenue was administered 
with 'cool and inexorable partiality' towards the town [Tyne Mercury, 1833]. 
However, the neglect of the Tyne in favour of the town became clearer when 
the new form of keeping accounts was made public by the newly reformed 
Corporation of 1835, and when revenues and disbursements were classified under 
different heads and in more detail. Coombs and Edwards state that: 
the new accounting requirements contained in MCA 1835 covered the 
responsibilities of the borough treasurer, and the financial reporting 
and audit obligations attached to the borough accounts. Jones has 
pointed out that the new system of fund accounting... required the 
assets and liabilities of the corporation to be distinguished from the 
individuals who it belonged to ... The treasurer was obliged to keep 'true accounts of all the same sums of money by him received and 
paid' [s. 93] and the Act detailed the receipts and payments which 
might be entered in the borough fund account [s. 92] [1996, p. 30] 
The 1835 accounts revealed that over f2l, 000 had been received 'For Port and 
Harbour Dues'. whereas less than f 8,000 had been expended on 'Port and Harbour 
Charges', with the majority of expenditure instead relating to town matters [Figure 
3]. These accounts were headed 'Charge' and 'Discharge' for the first time, implying 
enhanced accountability of council members, notwithstanding that this terminology 
was subsequently dropped. The accountability of officials was further emphasised by 
the fact that the printed copies contained the names of officials to signify these were 
signed accounts. Another noticeable feature of the 1835 accounts is the attention to 
detail on the discharge side, with added notes of explanation as featured by the letters 
'[A]' to '[N]' and significantly a much greater disclosure in detail attached to the 
accounts, extending over a number of pages, since the beginning of'notes' in 1829/30 
where one folio sheet was attached. By the time the TIC took control of the 
management of the Tyne, the level of disclosure in the Corporation's 
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accounts was even greater than in previous years, but with the same visible result that 
river income clearly was much greater than what was being spent on her 
improvement. Thus, the 1848 accounts revealed around E23,000 being raised from 
the River with only around f 10,000 expended on it, including f6,429 spent on 
improvements [Figure 4]. The number of payment headings had now expanded to 
'[A]' to '[Z]'again with further details given in numerous sheets attached to the 
abstract explaining the figures. Therefore, extant accounting information shows 
clearly how reluctant the Corporation was to direct any substantial expenditure 
towards the improvement of the Tyne, even though there was great pressure and 
increasing criticism from a growing opposition for them to do so: 
We cannot wonder that feelings of the public should be most sensitive 
on a port of such vital importance to the interests of the community at 
large [Armstrong, 1836, p. 1]. 
One of the main activists using the accounting data was William Mitchell. He 
wrote during the 1820s and 30s in the Tyne Mercury newspaper under the alias of the 
infamous 'Tim Tunbelly' or 'Peter Putright'. The letters of the former were later 
compiled and published in a book [Mitchell, 1823]. He invited comments and 
promoted awareness through the medium of the press. G&H, [2001, p. 29] showed 
how in the late 19' century 'radical political activists' used accounting data by the 
medium of the press as an 'emancipatory' rather than 'repressive ... praxis' and they 
noted 'how few studies have [articulated] accounting in the context of social 
struggle'. Similarly, this study finds that the opposition in the case of the River Tyne 
during the early 19' century also used the press to achieve their goals. Cook [1965, 
p. 213] refers to Mitchell as a 'radical journalist' who was politically opposed to the 
Tory regime. Mitchell attempted to develop public awareness of the state of the Tyne, 
and stimulate opposition against current practice, so that positive steps could be taken 
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to improve the River, which would ultimately benefit Newcastle as a whole. Mitchell 
[ 1823, p. 12 1] commented that: 
The corporation has received this year [1822] the enormous sum of 
f-19,148.6s. 7d. from dues, & c. from the Tyne. Have they, then, 
expended a single farthing on the improvement of that river? There is 
no notice of any such expenditure in the accounts! 
In the example, Tunbelly clearly shows the amounts received from the river, which 
could clearly be seen from the accounts. However, he does not mention what was 
expended in terms of a figure, as I have argued above, this was not disclosed and 
therefore wouldn! t be available to state at the time. 
The development of the argument for change can be seen when a petition was 
lodged with the Corporation almost 20 years later by 120 of the oldest and most 
respected mercantile firms, bankers and tradesmen of the borough, significantly a few 
years after the 1835 MCA. They complained that the large proportion of the 
Corporation's revenue derived from the River was not allocated in a fair manner and 
in relation to the amount generated by the River. As a result the River was not being 
improved to enable newly formed trading relations to prosper. From the published 
accounts the petitioners found that the gross revenue from the River during 1837-39 
to be 79,5751.6s. 4d., and the total expenditure, which now could clearly be seen, on 
improvements to be 35,1681.9s. 7d.. This meant that there was on average f 14,802 
excess each year received from the River but which was spent elsewhere. The 
petitioners then looked at the level of rates levied on the town and found that f 10,689 
was raised but f28,418 expended on the service of the town, such as improvement, 
watering, lighting, and scavenging. This meant that on average f 5,909 excess each 
year was spent on the town but not raised by the town. 
Opposition also came from disaffected councillors who were aware of the 
pecuniary advantage of the River and the handsome return the Corporation received. 
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They pressed hard in Corporation meetings for ftirther revenues to be voted to the 
River Committee basing their arguments on the available accounts. One councillor 
said: 
Let then [the Corporation] take the book of their receipts and 
expenditure, and ask themselves where the revenue which they had to 
expend came from? In the balance sheet, the first class of receipts 
were, port and harbour dues on coals, ships and boat, goods and 
merchandise, and for conveying ballast by which 19,9751. were 
brought to account. Now that large sum came directly out of the river. 
If the river were dried up to-morrow, not one farthing of that 19,9001. 
would they get [NTCP, 1839, p. 8]. 
,) I--- An 1840 'Statement Respecting the Port of Newcastle upon Tyne Dy Dyson, Hall 
and Parkes, Parliamentary Agents opined that 
The complaints made of the present system seem borne by the 
statements of the official servants of the Corporation [who used the 
accounts] as well as by their published accounts. 
Another councillor believed that: 
The Council would not find a safer nor a better investment; and he was 
not alone in thinking that it was to the river they must look for 
improved commerce and trade in this port; and that they should be 
careful to augment the great artery which supplied them with the larger 
part of their revenue [NTCP, 1845, p. 74]. 
One councillor in particular (George Straker), who was a Newcastle merchant 
and user of the River, was a very outspoken activist in the Corporation. He used 
accounts as a basis for his affegations made against some members of the Corporation 
over a number of years, and accused the engineer of the River with mismanagement, 
misconduct, jobbery, and waste. When altering a road in a field at Walker, 'which 
cost a considerable surn, and no account of it in the engineer's accounts', the amount 
was entered in the groins account, i. e. a river account. Straker held that the alteration 
had nothing to do with the groins, and thus the river, but was made for the 
convenience of a public house and should not be placed in this account. The River 
Committee knew nothing about this expenditure supposedly made by them: 'It surely 
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cannot be understood, that when money is given for the river, it is to be wasted in this 
matter' [NTCP, 1839, p. 103]. 
The River Committee also came under heavy fire: 
[The River Committee] were not particular in the expenditure of the 
money awarded to them. They gave in an estimate for one thing, and 
spent the money upon another [NTCP, 184 1, p. 122]. 
But the River Committee had all along mismanaged matters: 'A great sum had been 
lost ... Hunter's Quay had been pulled down four times and rebuilt' [NTCP, 1842 
p. 122]. Even though these allegations were not proven, the episode, which was highly 
publicised at well-attended public meetings and in the local newspapers, increased the 
distrust in the Corporation's accountability. 
Strong opposition also came from interested parties using the Tyne in areas 
surrounding Newcastle who did not have a voice on the Corporation. As mentioned 
above, the towns of the Shields and Gateshead strongly argued that the River suffered 
due to the relative financial advantage the inhabitants of Newcastle enjoyed over their 
neighbours. However, 'petty jealousy of sister towns' influenced Newcastle 
councillors who were unwilling to spend what they saw as Newcastle income on 
other towns on the River [Macgregor, 1832, p. 117]. It was argued that the seaward 
boroughs' 'just influence in the confederation [must be] heartily acknowledged' and 
the 'incubus of clerical seigniorage put to flight' before any working agreement could 
be reached [ibid. ]. The Shields people petitioned the House of Conunons for the 
control of the River Tyne to be taken from Newcastle Corporation altogether on the 
basis that, 
I St, that this body had mismanaged the river; 2ndly, that it had grossly 
misappropriated its revenue; and 3rdly, that the powers and authorities 
by which these deeds had been committed, should be transferred to 
new hands [NTCP, 1849, pp-50-1]. 
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Defence by the Corporation: Just as information in the published accounts was used 
to attack the inaction of the Corporation, the same accounts were utilised by the 
Corporation to justify their lack of expenditure on the Tyne. Support was generated 
for the Corporation's 'Penny Wise' system of avoiding debt and reducing costs based 
on accounting data. One river engineer, Richardson [1836, p. 10], reporting on the 
Tyne commented that 
the first report of the Financial Committee has been published and 
shows plainly enough, that any considerable outlay for the 
improvement of the River, is wholly impracticable, 
owing to the inadequate state of the Corporation's ftmds. However, in his concluding 
comments he did acknowledge that 
where improvement is practicable, it would be unwise to withhold the 
attempt given any over scrupulous consideration of expense, for in the 
preservation, if not the improvement of the navigation of the Tyne, 
Newcastle is entirely dependent [ibid, p. 15]. 
The Corporation vote, dominated by the purse holders (the Finance 
Committee), believed that the River was improved enough to accommodate 
increasing trade. The accounts also proved that there was no money available to fund 
improvement. For example, it can be seen from the accounts previously shown for 
1834/5 [Figure 3] that the balance in the hutch was only f22. The implies that there 
was very little money over and if they were going to avoid debt then doing nothing 
more was the only way forward. Further, 
they could not borrow money for the river. It was contrary to the letter 
and the spirit of the Municipal Reform Act. They were not to expend 
capital for outlay over revenue [NTCP, 1839, p. 3]. 
The Municipal Reform Act [1835] stated that revenues that ought to be applied for 
the public advantage should not be diverted from their legitimate use, and not be 
squandered for the benefit of individuals. Hence, the spirit, of the Act refers to 
corporations using their revenue appropriately instead of spending it wastefully and 
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making up shortfalls by borrowing. At a Finance Committee meeting, one councillor 
commented that the Corporation 
had expended more than their revenue by 40001 during the last 4 years, 
and had run that much in debt. Now was it not more prudent to pay off 
a portion of that balance, than to go on running into more debt? 
[NTCP, 1845, p. 60] 
This same councillor later criticised the River Committee for continuously over- 
spending their allocated part of the budget, and he claimed that the expenditure of the 
River Committee brought no benefit: 
Why, there was no possibility of binding them down to their allotted 
revenue; much less to any intelligible or tangible plan of expending it 
upon the river. The Corporation would not only be condemned, but 
justly so, if they continued to disburse enormous sums upon the river, 
year after year, from which, after all, no proportionate or substantial 
benefit was derived [ibid, pp. 72-73]. 
More pressure was placed on the limited funds for River improvement in 
1846. The usual policy of the Finance Committee of the Corporation was to estimate 
total revenue, make allocations for 'unavoidable' expenses, and then divide the 
difference (often equally) between the River and Town Improvement Committees. In 
1846 the Corporation was able to justify their policy of revenue allocation through 
what was considered a 'more wholesome principle' to their budgeting system, the 
creation of a surplus fund of f, 2,000 to cover any 'unexpected calls upon the 
corporate funds', 'public improvement' or to 'be applied in the reduction of the debt'. 
This approach reduced the funds available for river improvement further [NTCP, 
1846, pp. 379-80]. However, this new policy was overhauled in 1849 due to the far 
poorer state of the Corporation fmances: 
The Finance Committee do not think it prudent to appropriate more of 
that amount than can by possibility be avoided, [and so the 
Conu-nittees were] limited as nearly as possible to the amount of their 
fixed charges ... The Finance Committee are aware that such a 
limitation would put a stop to all river works [NTCP, 1849, p. 141. 
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By the end of the 1840s the situation relating to river improvements had reached 
breaking point. 
Admiralty Enquiry: Dissatisfaction over the conditions and control of the River 
became so acute that in 1849 a Parliamentary Bill was deposited by the Shields 
people opposed to the Newcastle Corporation's inaction. This proposed to take 
control and dues of the River out of the hands of the Corporation of Newcastle and 
entrust them to Commissioners elected for the purpose. The Corporation, seeing the 
opposition's bill as a threat to what they viewed as their 'hereditary rights to river 
dues', and fearful of losing the voting power and ultimately the large revenue of the 
River to a Commission representing interested parties outside Newcastle, framed 
their own Bill - The Tyne Improvement Bill, 1849. In the latter it was argued (as 
before) that under the concept of prudence, there were insufficient funds to increase 
expenditure on the River, and in any case the Corporation was doing enough. The 
opposing bills sparked two 'Admiralty Enquiries' in 1849. The minutes of Newcastle 
Corporation during the time of the first Enquiry typically show the Corporation's 
attitude: 
... It is evident that change 
is going on [to the River] ... The assertion 
that the expenditure upon the river formed a good investment for 
money, involved a bad principle ... Investments should be made 
advisedly, not incidentally ... He believed that [the River would not be 
taken from their control] unless the Council became lax and inattentive 
[NTCP, 1849, p. 47]. 
Captain Washington headed the investigation into the management and 
condition of the River. He gave an account of the various river dues coflected by the 
Corporation and the manner in which they had been expended. Ultimately, it was 
accounting data that was chiefly drawn on by both parties in these investigations to 
contest the issue. The enquiry found: 
99 
That on average for the past seven years the income derived from the 
river has exceeded 26,0001 a year, while the sum laid out in 
improvements has been less than 5,0001 a year ... 
From an inspection 
of the Corporation's accounts of the last year it seems that the receipts 
from the river were 27,9071 and the expenditure, including salaries &c. 
10,8241, showing a balance otherwise appropriated of rather more than 
17,0001. In the column of payments it will be seen that the cost of 
watching the borough for the past year was 6,2291, whereas the rate 
levied for watching was only 3,7741 ... thus showing a 
deficiency of 
rates of 17,4471 [A. E., 1849, p. 3]. 
Captain Washington concluded that: 
According to an abstract of accounts which had been put in by the 
Treasurer to the Corporation, the whole amount received from the 
river since 1809 [when the accounts were first printed] had been 
957,9731; whilst the whole sum laid out on the river; including all 
charges for conveying ballast, salaries, management, &c., during that 
period, had been 397,7191 - the difference between those two sums, 
exceeding half a million of money, having been appropriated to the 
lightening, paving, watering and scavenging the streets of Newcastle 
[AE, 1849, p. 4]. 
A report in the North and South Shields Gazette shows the influence of this 
investigation on the fate Tyne: 
The evidence of gross mismanagement of the River Tyne and 
misappropriation of funds levied for its conservation was so perfectly 
astounding to the Admiralty Court ... that the conclusion arrived at by 
the Admiralty was that such evidence had never before been heard 
respecting any river, and that this important harbour and river should 
not be trifled with any longer [ 1850]. 
Ultimately, it was decided by Parliament that, under the River Tyne Improvement 
Act (1850), the control of the River should be taken from the Corporation and placed 
in the hands of the TIC. Accounting data had served as a powerful lobbying tool in 
the campaign against the Corporation, which lesson was not lost on the TIC's own 
critics during the second half of the 19' century. Perhaps building on the success of 
the campaign, petitioning against the TIC's policies was even more vehement, with 
accounting data often used at the forefront of the argument. Decision making, ways 
of raising and spending funds were just some of the actions of the TIC engendering 
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opposition. However, never again was the control of the Tyne challenged. The TIC 
'embarked upon a major series of port improvements which enabled the Tyne to 
survive as a major port' [McCord, [1979, p-77]. The Commission controlled the Tyne 
over the next 100 years in a much more successful manner. The Commission's 
success can be seen clearly by the following comment: 
One of the most far-reaching changes in human history took place 
between 1850 and 1914, when the volume of international trade 
probably increased ten-fold in this relatively short period ... [aided 
by] 
the more sophisticated harbour facilities [Newcastle City Libraries, 
1969, p. I]. 
British port statistics: The fmal issue in the battle for control of the River involving 
accounting data as a lobbying tool concerns Newcastle's position in the rankings of 
British ports. In 1844 the Newcastle Corporation was promoting the Tyne to the 
Board of Trade, seeking classification as a first-class port. At that time it was second 
only to the Thames in terms of registered tonnage, and its revenue was nearly equal to 
that of Glasgow, already a first-class port: 
The advantages to be derived from the port being ranked as a first- 
class port would be numerous, from the facilities that would be 
afforded to trade from the Custom House department, from being 
included in all public returns ordered by Parliament, and from the 
standing it would then hold, not only in this country, but abroad 
[NTCP, 1844, p. 77]. 
Amongst other benefits, achieving a first-class ranking would make raising finance 
easier, which became particularly critical after the TIC took control in 1850 and 
embarked on a programme of capital improvements. 
However, as we have seen, the port of Newcastle included the irnportant 
shipping centres of North and South Shields, which by 1844 were petitioning for their 
independence. Down to 1848 all Custom business for the port had to be transacted at 
Newcastle, no matter where the vessel was loaded, notwithstanding that North and 
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South Shields together owned more shipping than Newcastle, and the greater part of 
Tyne based vessels loaded and discharged in Shields harbour. Any costs relating to 
the trade incurred by the Shields was paid to Newcastle and any revenue generated by 
trade at Shields was transacted at Newcastle and the Shields did not benefit. Thus, it 
was considered as a 'great hardship that [the Shields] should be compelled to pay for 
landing goods at Newcastle which do not come within ten miles of it' [NTCP, 1834, 
p. 47]. The Shields people wanted to have control over their own affairs as a large 
proportion of the Tyne trade occurred at their ports with A benefit going to 
Newcastle. The relentless petitioning by the Shields people finally paid off in 1848 
when the Port of Newcastle was split into two by an Act of Parliament and now 
became the Port of Tyne and the Port of Shields. The actions of these neighbouring 
towns thus thwarted any attempt of Newcastle to become a first class port, with 
serious consequences for the well-being of the region. Henceforth, the Tyne's trading 
figures would no longer be presented as one. As a result, the Tyne fell in the rankings 
of UK exporting and importing ports, and there was a great fear that its significance 
would be undervalued with adverse effects in terms of trade and its ability to gain 
funds. 
Faced with this new problem, the Newcastle Corporation tried to regain the 
status the port had formerly enjoyed before the split, at least on paper in terms of the 
published statistics. Demonstrating an awareness of the potential of accounting to 
promote their cause, the Corporation used accounting data to demonstrate the relative 
fall off in revenue following the split which can be seen from the table below. 
Thus, in 1856 it was agreed 
that a select committee be appointed to inquire whether the trade and 
commerce of the Tyne will not be facilitated and its character 
enhanced by the consolidation of the two separate existing ports into 
Custom facilities for transacting the business of Newcastle and North 
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and South Shields ... He went over a variety of statistics and adduced 
other considerations, to show that the character of the Tyne suffered in 
general estimation by the division of its registered tonnage, and that its 
rate of progress was retarded positively as shown by the increased 
trade at other ports. The Tyne ought to have but one centre for the 
entry of its commerce, the same as the Thames, the Mersey and other 
large rivers [NTCP, 1856, p. 475]. 
To this end, the Corporation made 
an application to the Board of Trade to have, in addition to the present 
Shipping Returns of the ports of the Tyne, the aggregate amounts of 
the total ships and tonnage of the entire Tyne stated in their Annual 
Return of Shipping ... If this motion were carried, they would see a 
more effectual register of the tonnage of the Tyne. If they did not 
adopt it the registration would be separated into distinct ports, and they 
should look instead of being stronger, much weaker than they were. 
The returns at present would show that Sunderland stood, as a coal 
exporting port, higher than the Tyne [NTCP, 1859, p. xxix]. 
The application was rejected and worse was to come when there was pressure 
from South Shields for independence from North Shields, which was granted in 1865, 
resulting in a tripartite split in the trade statistics. South Shields petitioned, pointing 
out that when North Shields was given independence: 
the principal part of the cargoes loaded in the harbour were shipped at 
South Shields which in 1847 shipped 1,067,628 tons of coal and coke, 
worth 023,018, requiring at least 4000 Customs entires, against 
36,978 tons, worth f 11,075 owned in North Shields [Hodgson, 1903, 
p. 201 ] 
It was not the number of Custom Houses that Newcastle objected to, but the 
division of the statistics degenerating the Tyne's overall ranking even further. New 
lobbying efforts were made in an attempt to regain the port's commercial status by 
amalgamating trading figures for statistical purposes. This time they were successful. 
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The following shows the gross revenue of the TIC during the time of the port 
sphts. 
Year-_J__ Gross Revenue 
1851 17470 
1852 23139 
1853 30414 
1854 41826 
1855 34820 
1856 36355 
1857 46245 
1858 51651 
1859 63398 
1860 66650 
1861 74920 
1862 86948 
1863 95571 
1864 
1865 
106481 
115434 
1866 121473 
1867 125657 
1868 124708 
1869 124470 
1870 137602 
1871 168528 
1872 159698 
1873 163984 
It can be seen from the figures in the table that from approximately the time of 
the first split in 1848 to the second split in 1865 gross revenue fluctuated, moreover, 
on a cumulative basis it wasn't increasing year on year at a rapid pace. After the 1865 
split, gross revenue increased at a lesser rate and in-fact started to reduce. When the 
revenue figures of the 3 ports became one again for statistical and ranking purposes 
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c. 1870, it can be seen that there is a greater increase in gross revenue of around 
E30,000 and a pattern of, in generaL increases each year so much so that by 1888 
gross revenue was E227,547. It could be implied that the lack of earlier growth was 
due to the fall in the ranking of the port and once united for the purpose of Board of 
Trade statistics, the position of the port of Tyne was much better and attracted further 
trade thus increasing the gross revenue. 
Guthrie [1880, p. 34] writes: 
This separation of what is really one port causes considerable 
confusion and misapprehension as to the magnitude and importance of 
the trade of the Tyne, and it has been frequently proposed that there 
should be a union of the three ports under the name of the 'Port of 
Tyne'. Under such a union each of the existing ports would retain all 
the facilities from the transaction of business which it at present 
possesses; but the aggregate figures of the united port would correctly 
exhibit to the nations and abroad the business transacted and official 
status of the Tyne. In the Annual Shipping Returns of the Board of 
Trade the three Tyne Ports are now [c. 1870] grouped to show the 
aggregate commerce of the River Tyne. 
Again this demonstrates the efficacy of accounting data as a political tool. In the first 
place, the Shields people gained a strong voice by using the available accounting data 
to prove that they merited independence from Newcastle. So too did the Newcastle 
Corporation in its subsequent campaign for the combined presentation of the Tyne's 
statistics. Secondly, this last dispute was mainly about the presentation of information 
to third parties and their expected reactions, not the affocation of revenues. As such it 
displays an awareness of the advantages of reporting the desirable position. 
Implications for 'emancipation' in accounting 
The viability of using accounting data as a lobbying tool for political ends is a 
recurrent theme of the thesis. After achieving their original goal of breaking the 
Newcastle Corporation's monopoly over the Tyne, the activists who were 
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campaigning for improved port facilities did not fade into the background, but were 
spurred on to greater efforts to promote their cause. Subsequent chapters will describe 
how they exploited the more detailed levels of disclosure and accountability imposed 
on the TIC as the second half of the I qt' century progressed. Thus, later in the century 
pressure groups mobilised the more sophisticated accounts either to challenge and 
block proposed capital works or to push through altemative schemes. G&H [2001] 
observed a similar phenomenon in relation to the campaign for better conditions of 
employment at Bryant and May, whereby activists learnt from their initial successes 
the value of accounting data in disputes, and so were encouraged to deploy it with 
greater vigour: 
The next issue of The Labour Elector, of 5 January 1889, published 
the accounts of the company for the half-year ending 31 December 
1881. The profits were again contrasted with the poor working 
conditions [ibid, p. 101]. 
G&H [2001, p. 29] showed how in the late 19' century 'radical political 
activists' used accounting data through the medium of the press as an 'emancipatory' 
force. For example, Herbert Champion, a socialist activist, produced the 'Common 
Sense' publication [15 May 1887: 11] in which 'the first expose on Bryant and May 
comes under the heading "Questions that Require Answers"' [ibid, 2003, p. 74]. 
During a speech, 
Champion again exposes the stark contrast between the high financial 
returns to the shareholders and the poor returns to the workers, again 
using accounting publicity ... It was 
doubtless publicity engendered by 
the council speech that brought the criticism to the attention of the 
Bryant and May board. Another socialist activist of the time was 
Annie Besant. She follows Champion in being concerned to use 
accounting disclosure to emphasise the exploitation [ibid, pp. 77-80]. 
The pressures brought to bear on Bryant and May on behalf of the 'Match Girls' 
proved successftd with the company making a number of concessions improving their 
working conditions, such as withdrawing the system of fines, increasing wages by a 
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small amount, the possible provision of a canteen and the acceptance of the formation 
of a match-maker's union. 
The outcome of the battle for control of the Tyne could also be regarded as 
social progress in the sense that it achieved wider representation in the management 
of the River for the towns, regions and interest groups dependant on it for their 
prosperity. Thus, the newly formed TIC was to be made up of members from all 
interested regions. Accounts had been used as a communication medium, informing 
and ultimately aiding radical, democratic forces to challenge and change the existing 
situation. Therefore, the thesis adds to a growing body of critical researchers who 
'have developed the idea that accounting can be used as an emancipatory tool in 
society as a counterfoil to the majority of their number who see it as a tool of 
oppression [see Haslam, 1991; Roberts, 1991, Tinker, 1991, Arrington and Francis, 
1993, Schweiker, 19931. As G&H [2001, pp. 105-6] observed: 
As a systematic communication and practice of informing, including 
through exposing and making visible, accounting can come to serve 
radical democratic forces aiming to challenge and go beyond the status 
quo to effect emancipatory change ... We have especially come to 
recognise how few studies have sought to articulate the ambiguous 
involvement and not necessarily dominant class belongingness of 
accounting in the context of social struggle. Specifically, we have 
noticed a lacuna as far as study into accounting's interface with the 
activities of radical political movements is concerned. 
Critics of both the Newcastle Corporation and the TIC's management of the 
Tyne gained valuable ammunition from the increased disclosure of information in the 
accounts. However, this raises the question of the understandability of accounting 
information,, which becomes more critical as disclosures become more elaborate, 
requiring accounting competencies to be able to understand them. As Chapter 2 
described, the changes in accounting regulation in respect of the Tyne were not 
conducted in isolation, but reflected a general trend in society towards greater public 
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accountability. Making this information understandable was a key concern for 
contemporaries. Jeremy Bentham' in particular, wanted accounting methods 
simplifying so that 'the public at large', 'ordinary people' could understand them: 
In principle, for Bentham, manifest forms of publicity - such as 
journalist reports or official reports of parliamentary activity can 
facilitate greater openness and transparency in society, thus aiding 
accountability. Bentham tried to correct the accounting language so 
that ordinary people could use it for emancipatory development ... [G&H, 2003, pp. 53-4] [wanting to inform] a very broad audience ... Bentham's texts express a concern to critique accounting language and 
render accounting more comprehensible and clearer as well as more 
open to challenge by the public at large [i. e. the 'non expert'] ... Accounting publicity and bookkeeping had to be 'inspective or 
information - elicitative' 'natural' [or commonly understood] were to 
replace 'technical' expressions ... Such interventions amounted 
for 
Bentham to correcting accounting in its language so that it could be 
grasped by the people for emanciaptory development [ibid, p. 32]. 
Bentham 'criticised the technicality of the double entry of his day' and wrote books 
on double entry bookkeeping, critiquing and simplifying the accounting method. 
According to G&H [2000, p. 224], 'Bentham held that an array of parties, and 
ultimately the public in general, would benefit from the prescribing of accountability 
systems', as this would make them easier to understand. In the case of Bryant and 
May, it is significant that the 'socialist agitators', Besant and Champion, 'were 
knowledgeable about accounting' [ibid, 2004, p. 391]. On the Tyne too it was the 
'educated' 'professional' men such as councillors and journalists, men who were 
capable of interpreting the information reported, who led the challenge on the 
7 English utilitarian philosopher and social reformer. Bentham's campaign for social and political 
reforms in all areas, most notably the criminal law, had its theoretical basis in I 
expounded in his Introduction to the Principles ofMorals and Legislation, a work written in 1780 but 
not published until 1789. Bentham at first believed that enlightened and public-spirited statesmen 
would overcome conservative stupidity and institute progressive reforms to promote public happiness. 
When disillusionment set in, he developed greater sympathy for democratic reform and an extension of 
the franchise. He believed that with the gradual improvement in the level of education in society, 
people would be more likely to decide and vote on the basis of rational calculation of what would be 
for their own long-term benefit, and individual rational decision-making would therefore, in aggregate, 
increasingly tend to promote the greater general happiness [The Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy ed. 
Thomas Mautner]. 
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establishment. 
In keeping with the thrust of critical accounting research, G&H are interested 
in the notion of emancipation through accounting not just as an historical issue, but 
because of the possibilities it affords for 'improving' the current state of the world: 
Accounting has the potential to be mobilized for the critical and 
emancipatory project. It can challenge current norms, traditions, ways 
of 'doing things' and expose inequalities, injustices, oppression and 
exploitation. Through this accounting can help engender change 
contributing to the building of a more liberated, democratic and 
happier society [G&H, 1996, p. 25]. 
Critical research into accounting has the potential to build upon and go 
further beyond its current state in order to mobilise a more enabling 
and eniancipatory accounting that can play its part in shaping and 
reflecting a better world [ibid, 1997, pp. 87-88]. 
Neu et al. [2001, p. 758] too are interested in how one can 
intervene in social struggles in a manner that takes advantage of our 
expertise and offers the greatest potential for transforming and 
improving social practices, by focusing on the functioning of 
accounting within public policy struggles. [Their aim is to] extend our 
understandings of accounting's role within social conflict and perhaps, 
more importantly, encourage critical accountants to reintegrate the 
theoretical and praxis components of accounting scholarship through 
interventions in the public sphere [ibid]. 
The ultimate aim is 
the development of alternative accountings and alternative ways of 
seeing and usages of current accountings for global and local 
emancipatory struggles [G&H, 2004, p. 394]. 
For this promise to be realised, studies such as G&H [1991,1993,1994a, 1994b, 
1995,1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 1997a, 1997b, 2000a, 2001,2003,2004], Cousins and 
Sikka [1993], Neu et al [2001] and others [Brackenborough, 2003; Haslam; 1991, 
Schweiker, 1993] need to become the norm rather than the exception. 
In this scheme, history becomes useful in helping to understand these 
relationships and because it proves that social improvement through accounting is 
indeed possible: 
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There is also the additional challenge that we face in accounting that 
although great advances have been made in academic circles in 
pointing to the emancipatory possibilities of an enabling accounting 
[See Broadbent et al, 1997], there is still a paucity of work focusing 
upon the mobilisation of accounting of accounting information in 
emancipatory struggles [G&H, 2004, p. 394]. 
The comparison and contrast of a past with a present accounting and 
the tracing of continuities and discontinuities in accounting's 
trajectory can indicate ways of aligning accounting and emancipation. 
Historical analysis can facilitate a deeper appreciation of both 
repressive and emancipatory dimensions of accounting today with an 
appreciation of the historical longevity of a radical discourse, one can 
argue that radical proposals in circulation today are now long overdue 
[ibid, 2003, pp. 23-4]. 
The implication of G&H's [2004] argument is that causal relationships in history can 
be theorised and thereby translated to other situations. In the case of 'emancipation' 
through accounts, these would include the removal of repressive regimes, gaining 
better wage rates and working conditions or even improving the environment. One of 
G&H's main themes is that enhanced accounting disclosures helped facilitate social 
improvement in the 19' century. Therefore, it could be argued that to enable social 
change today, the social exchanges depicted in accounts need to be made more visible 
and comprehensible. 
However, how much we can leam from the past and implement in today's 
accounting is open to debate. In the first place, there is the difficulty in interpreting 
evidence, which applies to all historical enquiry [Tyson and Oldroyd, 2007]. For 
example, Parker [ 1991 ] informs us that there are many ways in which accounts can be 
misleading. 
It is essentially to remember, nevertheless, that accounting records and 
financial statements, however technically impressive, should, like all 
other historical records, be approached with caution. Their authenticity 
and reliability have to be assessed [ibid, p. 2]. 
This danger is compounded in situations such as the dispute over the control of the 
Tyne where accounting information is being mobilised for a particular purpose. 
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Second, there is the danger of imposing present beliefs on our interpretation of 
history [Nfiller and Napier, 1993], which increases considerably when one tries to 
theorise it [Oldroyd, 1999], as in the case of emancipation and accounting. However, 
P-- - from the beginnings of the discipline, the 'utility' of accounting history has been 
judged by accounting academics in terms of its ability to provide insights into the 
current state of the world, and part of this entails subsuming events into 
generalisations, and generalisations into theory [ibid, Tyson and Oldroyd 2007]. 
G&H [1993, p. 329] maintained that 'history may thus provide us with fresh eyes. ' I 
would tend to agree with G&H in that lessons can be learnt from history and an 
alternative, liberating perspective can be found that can be implemented today for a 
better society. In order to explore the emancipatory potential of accounting further, 
Neu et al. [2001, p. 758] called for a 'networks of aflies', to which this study makes a 
contribution. 
As has been seen above, a key accounting issue in the management of the 
Tyne was to see how the revenue was raised and then put to use. With the disclosure 
of accounting data, opposition parties mobilised the information to enable change, 
first in the control of the Tyne and secondly in the way future revenue was to be 
spent. By using accounts, 'emancipation' was achieved by the neighbouring towns 
which defeated the old Newcastle Corporation's monopoly and gained a new voice 
and stronghold in the management of their own affairs relating to the Tyne. 
Accounting had played a highly political role in these developments. The same is true 
of the next two chapters which look at the funding of the Tyne and how those in 
control of the finances were held accountable for their actions. 
III 
Chapter 4: Funding of River Improvements Post 1850 
Chapter 4 examines the financing arrangements of the Tyne Improvement 
Commission (TIC), and the deployment of accounting information in reducing 
borrowing costs and maximising revenue streams in the period following 1850. Four 
main areas are considered- cost of capital; government funding for the construction of 
a harbour of refuge; increasing the TIC's borrowing powers; and maximising 
revenues from harbour dues. 
Cost of capital 
After the change in control of the River Tyne from the old Newcastle monopoly to 
the newly formed TIC, it became more pressing and obvious that dock and river 
improvement were vital for the future success of the port. These improvement works 
had to be funded, so where was the finance to come from? The newly formed 
Commission started with a large debt and very little income and consequently had 
almost instantly to look to borrow funds. 
The funds transferred from the Corporation to the new Commissioners 
were of very slender amount, and burdened with a debt of L67,349, 
together with upwards of L20,000 for the costs of the great 
Parliamentary contests of 1849 and 1850. The Commissioners had also 
to purchase the dredger and river plant, so they may be said to have 
had at the outset the incubus of debt of about L100,000. The gross 
revenue transferred amounted to about L20,000 per annum. The fixed 
charges upon this, however, were so great, for expenses of conveying 
ballast, interest on debt, port and harbour charges, salaries, collecting 
dues, and such like, that not more than half could be called nett 
revenue - say L10,000 ... The working of the one 
imperfect dredger 
absorbed between 14,000 and L5,000, thus leaving only about L5,000 a 
year actually applicable to new works of improvement Guthrie, [1880, 
p. 93] 
As a consequence of their dire starting position, the TIC was compelled to 
advertise for public loans from a very early stage. The TIC was already borrowing at 
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4 and 5 per cent, and by advertising to the public for loans, the Commissioners hoped 
to be able to borrow at a lower rate of interest. When discussing one improvement 
proposal, that of building the Northumberland Docks, 
Mr. Cowen' said, a great part of the money had already been obtained 
at 4 per cent., the remainder had better be open to public competition, 
as they might in that way obtain it at 3 or 3 1/2 per cent. He therefore 
moved that notice be given by advertisement, for tender of loans for 
sums of not less that L1,000 and that the lowest rate of interest be 
accepted [NTCP, 1852, p. 1] 
However, with no financial track-record to fall-back on, the Commissioners were 
disappointed in their endeavours, even though the responses received to these 
advertisements indicated that money was plentifully available. As far as the 
Northumberland Docks were concerned, it was noted that 
in consequence of the advertisements published by the Commissioners 
for loans to the extent of 110,, 000, offers of loans to nearly three times 
the amount had been received, but none at a lower rate of interest than 
4 per cent [ibid, p. xxxii]. 
These comments infer that a more competitive rate could not be found as lenders saw 
the TIC as a newly formed trust with no financial reputation, and starting with a large 
debt, it could not attract better rates. Guthrie [ 1880, p. 176] adds- 
In the early days of the Commission ... 
before the old unbelief in the 
reality of the Tyne improvements had been dispelled, the 
Commissioners were obliged to pay comparatively high rates of 
interest for loans. 
The TIC concentrated its search for private loans on the north-east in the 
belief that local knowledge and closeness to events would reduce the level of 
perceived risk, enabling investors to lend at a lower rate of interest than investors 
outside. However, the historical role of Tyne ships and seamen in servicing the armed 
forces in times of war could pose a threat to these funds. Exceptional circumstances 
'Byrne [2002, p. 284] described Cowen as a 'radical Progressive innovator', a key 
figure in the creation of the TIC. 
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occurred in the region due to war which resulted in trading ships being deployed for 
the war effort, carrying supplies and men, culminating in a reduction in trade to and 
from the Tyne. As the Tyne area relied on trade for a large proportion of its income, 
the reduction in trade meant that there was not as much money available in the region 
compared to other regions, and so better rates could be achieved from investors 
outside. In 1859, for example, it was recorded that 
Mr Robinson suggested that the Finance Committee should advertise 
for money. The peculiar circumstances of the district [inferring war] 
caused money not to be so plentiful here as in many places, and by 
confining themselves to borrowing in this district it very likely caused 
them to pay higher rates for money borrowed for dock and pier 
purposes [NTCP, 1859, p. xxviii]. 
This demonstrates that the Commissioners were aware of the rates offered beyond 
their own region, and that to borrow locally produced better terms in the absence of 
exceptional circumstances. Hence, 
the Clerk said the rate of money [locally] gave them a good 
opportunity for borrowing now. If we kept clear of war, money would 
be very plentiful indeed [ibid]. 
The following example shows that in 1852 the Tyne Commissioners were 
aware that a borrowing rate of 4 per cent was advantageous given their lack of track- 
record, and that the key to achieving better terms was to be able to show that they 
could pay back their loans- 
The borrowed money for the mooring fund amounted to 17,0001. Of 
this sum 1,0001, bore 4 per cent interest, but the remainder 5 per cent. 
That was an unreasonable charge at the present time; but he was glad 
to say that the time was nearly expired for repaying 10,0001. and, 
therefore, there would be no difficulty in getting the charge for interest 
reduced. There was another sum of 5,0001., the term of which would 
expire in a year and a half The person who had lent the money was 
willing to reduce the rate of interest to 4 per cent., provided that 
Commissioners would take any further sum they might require at the 
same rate of interest. This seemed a very advantageous offer [NTCP, 
1852, P. xxxv]. 
Demonstrating financial viability through the information in the published 
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accounts played a part in providing lenders with the assurances they required, and 30 
years later the Commission were able to state: 
It must not be forgotten that an ample surplus revenue is the only 
foundation for a reduction of the rate of interest which is necessarily 
the first charge on the revenues of the port; and that it is in 
consequence of the accounts presenting for the last years an increasing 
surplus that the rate of interest on new loans and renewal has been 
reduced to 4 per cent [N-TCP 1881, p. lxvi]. 
The increase in the surplus revenue is demonstrated in the table below for the years 
1876-1880. 
Year Surplus Revenue 
1876 7387 
1877 11209 
1878 26452 
1879 35652 
1880 56820 
The TIC always promoted the Tyne as a sound investment by showing its increasing 
revenue position and growing strength through the published accounts. Thus, in 1864 
it was recorded that 'the large revenues and rapidly expanding commerce of the Tyne 
afford the most certain and unexceptionable security for monies advanced' [NTCP, 
1864, p. 92]. By the 1870's, with the Tyne advancing and commerce rapidly 
expanding, the TIC could now confidently and successfully show to lenders through 
the published accounts, that it was a sound investment, with adequate security. Thus, 
it was able to raise loans on the security of the port revenues, achieve better terms for 
borrowing from private lenders, and attain special privileges that were offered by the 
Government and other lending bodies. Again this can be demonstrated by looking at 
the figures in the table below relating to gross revenue receipts for the 10 year period 
of 1863-1872, which generally increase year by year. 
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Year Gross Revenue 
1863 95571 
1864 106481 
1865 115435 
1866 121473 
1867 125657 
1868 124709 
1869 124471 
1870 137603 
1871 168528 
1872 159699 
In 1878, for example, the following comment was made- 
It must be a source of very great satisfaction to the Commissioners to 
find that they were borrowing now from the Bank of England on such 
favourable terms. They all knew that the Bank of England directors 
did not advance money without making due inquiries, and that they 
had advanced this very large sum of money at such a small rate of 
interest, said a great deal from the securities of the river Tyne [NTCP, 
1878, p. xix]. 
This statement suggests that by 1878 not only was the River Tyne perceived as a 
sound investment, but that its books of account had withstood enquiry, both factors 
enabling the TIC to achieve a reduction in its contracting costs of borrowing as well 
as the cost of capital. 
The chapter thus far has concentrated on non-governmental loans to the TIC. 
But central Government too was a significant lender, which will now be examined in 
relation to the development of the port. 
Government funding for the construction of a harbour of refuge 
As we have seen in Chapter 2, the Government tended towards a laissez-faire 
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approach to local issues in the first half of the I 91hcentury, with the notable exception 
of the 1835 Municipal Reform Act. However, the Goverrunent's attitude changed 
somewhat in the latter half of the century. As this study focuses on river matters, it is 
interesting to note that it was also about this time when the Government started to 
become involved in local river issues. In the late 1850s the Government initiated a 
significant scheme of giving grants to enable coastal ports to build harbours of refuge 
(herein HOR). HOR are one or more piers built at the entrance to a port to provide an 
area of sheltered water for shipping in times of storms. Ultimately, such facilities 
would also make it easier for ships to come to port, thus bringing more trade and 
money to the localities affected. The reason for this interest in local affairs was 
perhaps the level of public interest in the i ssue as suggested by Guthrie [ 18 80, p. 115 ] 
in the following remark: 'The question of national harbours of refuge was attracting a 
vast amount of public attention. " 
Kenwood concurs that it was around this time of heightened public interest 
that Government involvement in harbour facilities accelerated: 
The Government's quickening interest in harbour development may be 
said to have begun in 1857, a Select Committee of the House of 
Commons was appointed to consider the question of harbours of 
refuge [Kenwood, 1962, p. 323]. 
The Select Committee recommended the construction of a number of HORs, with a 
Government contribution towards the cost of these undertakings coming in the form 
of national grants. A Royal Commission was appointed to decide the particular sites 
on which the new harbours were to be constructed. Newcastle saw the great benefits 
of a HOR, given that no such facility existed for many miles along the north-east 
coast, resulting in many casualties. Now with the incentive of Government funding, 
the TIC made a strong case for a HOR to be built on the Tyne for local and national 
benefit. However, other ports on the north-east coast put forward their own proposals 
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in opposition to the Tyne. Competition for funds was also seen nationwide as coastal 
towns throughout Britain vied with each other for the proposed government 
assistance in building a new HOR. 
When putting the case of the Tyne forward, accounting data and trade 
statistics were used at the foreftont of the TIC's argument to justify the need for a 
HOR on the Tyne and later to show the Commission had the ability to raise the 
remaining funds for the improvement works that were not covered by the grant: 
Mr. Cowen then entered into some very elaborate and interesting 
statistics, which he said, it was necessary for them to hear, in order 
that they might have a proper idea of the greatness of the Tyne NTCP, 
[1857, p. lix]. 
Cowen produced detailed statistics over time and in comparison with other North 
Eastern ports relating to the coal trade on the Tyne, such as the 'total amount of coals 
shipped from the Tyne', the 'total vend of coals' from the Tyne, and the 'the number 
of registered ships ... 
[and their] tonnage'. For example, the total amount of customs' 
duties paid by the Tyne and Wear for the year ending 3V March, 1856, was cited at 
f545,433; 'while that for the southern groups [Hartlepool and Tees] was only 
f104,941' [ibid]. 
The Tyne application was successful, coming ahead of the competition from 
the other north-eastern ports. 
The Royal Commission stated that the River Tyne, absolutely required 
some increased facilities of shelter and refuge accommodation ... there 
would be no difficulty in the Tyne Commissioners out of their own 
funds raising the amount specified by Government [N-TCP, 1859, 
p. xlvi]. 
As Guthrie [ 1880, p. 116] relates: 
The Royal Commissioners on Harbour of Refuge, in their report to the 
Crown dated 3' March 1859, recommended, amongst other grants, a 
distinct grant of national money in aid of the proposed Tyne works. 
Indeed, the Tyne was viewed as a special case above all other rivers, and was the only 
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one mentioned by name in the initial report. According to Guthrie [ibld], the Royal 
Commission were swayed by 
the very large proportion which the shipping trading to the ports will 
bear to those of the passing trade which will resort to it, either for life 
or refuge purposes. 
The grant was calculated on the basis of national and local benefit of the 
HOR, estimated in proportions of 
1/4 to 3/4. As a result, L250,000 of the estimated total 
expenditure of Lim for the project was to be raised by a government grant, and the 
remaining 1750,000 to be raised locally. Guthrie [p. 117] comments that the Royal 
Commission deemed it 'just and right that the nation should supplement such 
expenditure by a free grant of E250,000 to enable 11,000,000 to be spent. ' There was 
no surviving cost estimate data in the archives regarding this project. 
The Tyne took further borrowing powers to accommodate these works and to 
build the harbour in expectation of receiving the proposed sum. However, the 
promise of assistance by the Government was soon to fade. In 1860 an Enquiry by the 
Board of Trade drew the general conclusion that the possible saving of life and 
property resulting from these harbours was too small and problematical to justify the 
adoption of a system of free Government grants for their construction. So, instead of 
giving out free grants, the new policy was to offer loans, at a value to be renegotiated, 
at preferential rates of interest. The Harbours and Passing Tolls Act of 1861 initiated 
this policy of loans, which came from the Public Works Loans Commission (herein 
PWLC). Loans not exceeding D00,000 were to be offered at a rate of 3%. Any loans 
over f100,000 were to incur higher rates of interest to be determined by the PWLC 
subject to a maximum rate of 5 per cent. The period of repayment of the loan was not 
to exceed 50 years. 
Naturally, the TIC and those with a vested interest in the HOR were 
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disappointed and angry at the Government's U-turn. Newcastle Councillors thought 
they had been unjustly and harshly dealt with, and maintained that they were 'entitled 
to L250,000 as a free gift, and they would be fully just1fied from the posItion of the 
port in asking for a free gift, ' [NTCP, 1868, p. ix]. They accused the Government of 
failing 'to fulfil their engagements' and believed that they had been 'deceived' [ibid]. 
The TIC had already raised and spent a vast amount of money on the piers works 
which had substantially improved the functioning and safety of the port. Now, as a 
result of this U-turn, they were not going to get any assistance in the form of a grant, 
Instead between 1861 and 1896 the TIC were offered loans by the PWLC of 
050,000 at rates of interest 3 
1/4 
-3 
1/2% 
under the 1861 Harbours and Passing Tolls 
Act, compared to total expenditure 'on the Tyne piers works', estimated at 1800,000: 
'A sum of money at least equal to the cost of the Tyne piers works - say L800,000 - 
should have been advanced by Government at this low rate of interest' [Guthrie, 
1880, p. 120]. Ultimately, to their financial detriment, the TIC had to look to private 
individuals, insurance and other companies at rates varying from 4 1/2to 5 %, to make 
up the shortfall. 
It was normal practice for the TIC to borrow from the Government for 
improvement works. However the TIC had to show to the Government that they had 
the means to service the loans: 
It is well known that no money would be advanced by government 
until means were shown to pay interest at 5 per cent., of the principal 
annually [NTCP, 1859, p. I fl, 
5 per cent being the market rate at the time. The TIC used their accounting data to 
contest the amount of loans offered by the Government for the HOR project, first of 
all to justify the expenditure on improvement works in relation to the benefits 
accruing to shipping of providing a safe haven, and secondly to demonstrate that they 
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were able to repay the interest on the increased loans which they requested. Guthrie 
[ 1880, p. 120] referred to 
the original hope of national help held out in 1860 ... the useful work 
the Tyne was performing in affording shelter annually to one thousand 
distressed vessels ... as well at the ample nature of the security which the Tyne revenues gave of such loan with interest being redeemed. 
Thus, in 1869 the Tyne Commissioners unanimously resolved that. 
in the application about to be made to the PWLC for a further loan of 
L 100,000 towards the extension of the Tyne piers, application be at the 
same time made for an advance of D00,000 at a low rate of interest in 
the Tyne Improvement Fund, to assist in the completion of the great 
work of improvement... a most valuable harbour of refuge ... and that 
the secretary be instructed to prepare the necessary memorial and 
statistics, with estimates of revenue and expenditure, to satisfy the 
Public Works Commissioners of the ample security offered for such 
advance [NTCP, 1869 p. xlviii]. 
Upon viewing the 'full statement of the Commissioners' accounts for the year 1868, 
showing likewise the whole financial position of the Commissioners on all the funds', 
the 'subject of revenue and expenditure for the current year' had been considered 
[NTCP, 1869, p. xxv]. As a result, the TIC found that the cost of the piers' works was 
greater than originally contemplated, hence the need for: 
a further advance of L100,000 on the piers fund by the Public Works 
Loan Commissioners, conceiving that this fund has special and 
pressing claims for Government aid [ibid]. 
In the end, the TIC's attempts to obtain further government assistance proved 
unsuccessful. The 1869 application for a loan of L200,000 was tumed down. Again in 
1874, the Commissioners applied for a loan of 1200,000 at the same rate of interest 
but again 'without avail' [Guthrie, 1880, p. 120]. Finally in 1877 'another and the last 
of these fruitless applications was made', this time for L150,000 towards river 
deepening and V5,000 towards the piers works, which had to be withdrawn as the 
PWLC were 'so adverse to the application' [ibid, p. 12 1 ]. Here we see the TIC using 
their accounts to base their argument and 'contest', [Francis, 1990], the Government's 
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decision but 
, in this case, failing to achieve their objectives. 
With the 
North and South Piers completed, the Tyne was the only harbour of 
refuge for passing vessels, and incurred significant extra expense in so 
doing 
... 
The nation, despite pleas, petitions and memorials to the 
Government., did not make a grant to the Port of Tyne, [Reference, 
1999, p. 51]. 
In essence, one could argue that the 'promise' of funding held out by the 
Government gave the localities the confidence to spend on improvement works. 
Whether, the Goverment were ever serious in their intention to provide grants, 
however, is open to opinion. It is possible that it was just a ploy to encourage the 
locafities around the country to dig deep and spend on HOR for the benefit of the 
coun". The following statement by Thomas Faffer, who was the permanent 
secretary to the Board of Trade, speaking at an 1883 Select Committee meeting, 
leaves the question begging whether the Government were genuine or not in their 
policy: 
Q. 277-8 'I may take the Tyne as an illustration: you will agree with 
me that the authorities of the Tyne would not have ventured upon any 
large scheme for deepening the harbour ... except upon the 
expectation of some assistance from the Government which was 
promised at that time? -I should be sorry to say that, for I should be 
sorry to limit the energy of the men of the Tyne ... 
Happily they were 
tempted on a very large expenditure which has turned out both 
physically and financially a great success. 7 
If it was a ploYl then it worked in the respect that it encouraged the TIC to raise an 
enormous amount of funds for the HOR work- However, it left the localities feeling 
cheated. According to Guthrie, [ 1880, p. 118] - 
the Tyne is the only harbour in the kingdom which has complied with 
the conditions on which such aid was to be given , in fact, much more 
than doubly complied therewith. 
It would be interesting to see whether the other hairbour commissions that 
were chosen to construct a HOR on their respective coastlines were dealt the same 
hand as the TIC. At Hartlepool, for instance, the works were never completed. It was 
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originally recommended that on the condition of the locality providing f-500,000, the 
nation would provide 1500,000- However with the withdrawal of goverment 
assistance, the HOR was only partially built due to lack of finance: 'The main 
-'rouiQ I Iii Drevelitillu Lue oulluirifif oi -r. ne -riarDOUr OT Refuge was money Slmflariv 
aL riicv a iuani of lz-L-3vu. Guu was DT-C)-D6ScG. rjul 110 -WaS CAVISli-LiCfed CWiilil- W) 
- -- -- .-7.; e-. . -. -a; ý. -. .. ý_ -ex iacK ot iunus ionowing ine guovernment Ü-Tum t Guthrie, p- ii/1. At Dover, -tenslon 
work [to the piers' continued untiii 18-7: 5) winen ine AamiraTV- MITI 
"ll" narDour Oi rellusze, i nus- ine poncy of reneging on free grants was 
t i1czeri thpqr Aici-inafi, -. rk universal,, but it would be interesting to see 
wfien Uetennining the levels of loans granted and interest charged to other harbour 
comnussions. 
r, xiiwood pyo-3, p.. 3/--Yj found that from the 1880's onwards public loans 
made by the Govemment 'played an insignificant role on the fmancing or harbour 
construction'. This study concurs in that the majority of the PWLC loans occurred in 
the period 1861-1880, which relates to the period from the passing of the Harbour and 
Tolls Act [ 186 1] to the time the works were about completed. A government return 
relating to harbour authorities published in 1883, revealed that only 050,000 of the 
total 0.3m borrowed on the Tyne in 1882 was advanced by the PWLC, the 
remainder coming from private investors. 
Increasing the TIC's borrowing powers 
The TIC's borrowing powers were specified by Act of Parliament and new and 
subsequent Acts changed the level of borrowing powers available to them. The 
following is an example of a memo produced by the TIC proposing new and 
I httpJ/portcities-hardePOOI-90v-uk 
3 http: //www. dover-kentco. uk/tmnsport/harbour-historv. htm 
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increased borrowing powers to enable it to carry out the improvement works [TIC 
Memo, 1885, pp. 1-2]. It clearly illustrates the level of detail required and the vital 
importance of accounting in calculating what was required to be borrowed to achieve 
the aims of their capital projects. 
In 1885, it had been 8 years since the last application was made for increased 
borrowing powers. In calculating what was necessary to be borrowed to carry out 
their improvement works, growth in future income was forecast using past years 
income figures from the published accounts, combined with engineers' costings of 
the improvement expenditure. The last seven years figures were used to project the 
revenue surplus for the next seven years, with the last three years being taken as 
representative of the sustainable level of growth: 
The seven complete years up to the end of 1884, therefore, afford a 
fair basis for estimating the probable progressive growth in the income 
of the Commission during the next few years. The first half, however, 
of this septennial period exhibits a much greater increase than the 
second half, which may be taken as representing more nearly the rate 
of improvement which may be expected for some time to come, and in 
calculating future receipts it will be safer to do on the basis of the 
figures shown in the printed accounts for the last three years - 1882, 
1883 and 1884. 
On the costing side , it was the engineer's estimates of the cost of the 
improvement 
works that were used by the TIC's accountant to base the proposal for increased 
borrowing powers: 
To complete the whole of the present authorised works, the Engineer's 
last estimate shewed that a sum of 1708,745 would be required from 
the I" January, 1884. Of this sum L161,803 was expended last year, 
leaving L546,942 to be spent from the I' January, 1885, viz: - 
On Tyne Improvement Fund B69.407 
On River Moorings Fund 1 7,699 
On Tyne Piers Fund L128,835 
On Northumberland Dock Fund f41,001 
L546,942 
Thus, according to the engineer's estimates another 1546,942 would be required to 
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complete the works. 
The memo continued: 
The unexercised Borrowing Powers at the beginning of the present 
year were: - 
On Tyne Improvement Fund 127ý897 05 
On River Moorings Fund C(. 
On Tyne Piers Fund f23,465 00 
On Northumberland Dock Fund 
L51,362 05 
Assuming that the works will be finished by the end of 1891, after 
which the Commissioners will have to make provision for redeeming 
the Mortgage Debt, an average annual expenditure of 178,135 during 
the next seven years will be necessary. The amount ordered to be 
spent during the present year [1885] is L90,450. On this assumption 
and on the basis of an addition to the present borrowing powers of 
000,000, and an annual increase in the Revenue receipts calculated 
on the last three preceding year's figures, it is estimated that the 
Revenue Surplus, as from the V January, 1885, to the end of 1891, 
available for capital purposes, will be.. L253,070 
Less: first year's appropriation out of revenue in 1891 
To provide for redemption of a Mortgage debt of f, 4,300,000 
L27,950 
Net available Surplus L225J20 
Or an average of 132,160 per annum. 
Deducting this sum of L225,120, and the L51,362 unexercised 
borrowing powers from the balance of the Engineer's estimates, there 
will remain L270,460 to be met by new borrowing powers. 
It was estimated that it would take another 7 years to complete the works. It was so 
calculated that 1546,942/7 years would mean a cost of 08,135 on average to be 
raised each year. However, 190,450 had been authorised to be spent in the present 
year of the application, indicating that the expenditure would not accrue evenly, and 
emphasising the need for an increase in total borrowing powers at the outset to 
prevent funding deficits as the projects progressed. Based on the historical level of 
growth achieved in revenues, the TIC forecast a net available surplus of L225,120 for 
improvements after taking into account any appropriations such as the mortgage debt 
of 127,950. Spread over the 7 years of works, the average B2,160 surplus revenue 
was demonstrably insufficient compared to the average annual cost of 178,135. In 
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summary, the estimates showed that funds of L546,942 were required compared to 
Surplus revenue of only L225,120. When the unexhausted borrowing powers (those 
not used up from previous years borrowings) of 151,382 were taken into account, the 
calculation demonstrated than an extra L270,460 of loans needed to be raised. On this 
basis, an application for increased borrowing powers of L300,000 was made by the 
TIC to the PWLC. 
Maximising revenues from harbour dues 
River dues were an important source of finance, but the way in which they were 
calculated on the Tyne was very archaic and confusing for the trader. It was argued 
that the dues system inherited by the TIC acted as a deterrent to traders and needed 
reform and simplification if further trade was to be attracted to the River. In 1852 the 
North East Chamber of Commerce reported that it was: 
astonished at the amount of dues levied on the shipping in Newcastle 
... there were no 
less than 28 different charges on vessels in and out 
... 
it is of the first importance that the present system of raising funds 
for public purposes in connection with the trade of the Tyne by 
exacting a multitude of different dues -a system which operates 
unequally and injuriously upon different commercial interests, should 
be immediately put an end to ... all passing tolls should 
be abolished 
... In substitution of the 
dues at present levied, a moderate tonnage on 
shipping be resorted to ... [The accounts showed that there would 
be] 
enough revenue to justify the changes [NTCP,, 1852, pp. 1-3]. 
It was estimated that 'the proposed alteration would bring in about L1,600 a year 
more to the funds of the Commission' [NTCP, 1852, p. lxix]. As Hodgson [1901, 
p. 342] relates: 
The existing river dues were not only burdensome to the shipowners, 
but very unproductive to the Commission, since the cost of collection 
was out of all proportion to the revenue raised. 
in support of these proposals, an article appeared in the Gateshead Observer 
[1853] stating that- 
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the plan suggested is so pre-eminently simple, intelligible and 
practicable, so well calculated to render the district attractive to the 
trader, and thereby enable it to maintain its position in the great 
competition to which it is now exposed that we do most sincerely hope 
that no selfish views, no motives of jealousy no infatuation adherence 
to antiquated yet more than questionable customs, and exactions and 
exemptions will be allowed to interfere with the immediate adoption of 
so wise and excellent an improvement in the fiscal system of the Tyne. 
However, the next quote indicates that by 1856 these suggestions had not been 
implemented, perhaps due to the much feared 'selfish views, jealousies, and 
adherence to antiquated customs' hinted at above- 
That it is highly expedient that an effort should be made to effect a 
more satisfactory arrangement of the taxation of the port. They had no 
fewer than twenty-five different sources of taxation from the articles 
that came into the port which should be better if had a more simple 
system [NTCP, 1856, p. xix]. 
The reason for this reluctance to change is not clear from evidence available. Some 
Newcastle Corporation members were freemen and therefore benefited either from 
being exempt from paying the dues or being the recipients themselves, such as some 
of the ballast dues when ballast was deposited on their land. 
The issue was looked at again and a much greater effort was made to change 
what was seen as a factor hindering the increase in trade to the port. By 1860 Ure, the 
new TIC's engineer, proposed a highly influential grand scheme of improvement for 
the Tyne which received full confidence and support ftom those involved in trading 
on the Tyne. The grand scheme required funding and the best mode of providing 
funds was, as Guthrie [ 18 80., p. 13 3] states- 'taxation on shipping and goods using the 
port. 3 
A 4: 1 
Aner conferring with shipowners, merchants, coalowners, and others, 
hearty and zealous support followed for the proposed reform. With a 
few doubters and cavilers who prophesied evil, and who characterised 
the finance scheme of the Commissioners as 'the proposed waste of 
money on Tyne river. ' The scheme of taxation adopted was made as 
moderate as possible consisting of ... 
[main points] the abolition of 
ýk certain old dues called 'ship and boat dues , groundage and plankage 
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dues', and 'ballast office dues 1. in its place to enable money to be 
raised, the levying of a tonnage rate on all vessels entering or leaving 
the port with cargo ... no additional 
due whatever was put upon coal, 
the staple of the port [ibid, pp. 13 3 4]. 
The principal features of the financial plan were adopted in 1861. The pressing need 
for an increase in revenue to be able to carry out the Ure's plans lent urgency to 
reform of the dues calculation and collection system. Accounts had played their part 
in demonstrating the costs of collecting the many dues and the savings that could be 
made if they were rationalised. Hence, it was argued that the proposed changes to the 
dues system would not be detrimental to the finances of the TIC. On the contrary, 
with the complexity of the system reformed, it was thought that trade would increase 
to the area thus increasing revenues of the port. Here is an example of changes being 
made to the accounts, improving the accounting system and disclosure for the benefit 
of the users of the Tyne; it could be argued in an emancipatory way. In particular, the 
TIC gained extra income through the increased trade and traders gained a clearer 
system of dues and a better improved state of the River. 
5.18' Dues: One of the most significant issues regarding dues in the 19"' century on the 
Tyne was the battle for the ownership of the 5/8ths coal dues. As a result of the Tyne 
Improvement Act 1850, the new TIC were given only 3/8ths of the coal dues and 
5/8ths remained with the Newcastle Corporation to compensate them for the loss of 
revenues they had sustained through losing control of the River. The arrangement was 
the result of a compron-use between the Newcastle and Shields Bills in 1850. The 
large proportion of the river dues being received by the Corporation, and the small 
amount received by the river fund, was the cause of constant discontent and 
recrimination. 
By looking at the accounts of the TIC, it was obvious that the funds derived 
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from the River were inadequate for the execution of any comprehensive scheme of 
river improvement. As has been seen in the previous chapter, the amounts received 
from the River were barely enough to cover the administration costs let alone any 
improvement works, while the Corporation received 5/8ths of the dues without any 
river obligations and spent a large proportion of it on the town. According to Guthrie, 
[1880, p. 94]- 
the five eighths of the coal dues retained by the Corporation under the 
Act, entirely discharged from all river liability, amounted to nearly 
L10,000 per annum; so that on the separation of the town and river, 
each got about one half of the whole dues earned on the river. 
The Corporation were getting the benefit of a vastly extended trade without risk or 
exertion to an extent that had not been contemplated at the time of the passing of the 
Act of 1850. For example, by 1859, the 5/8ths of the coal dues retained by the 
Corporation amounted to around 115,000 p. a. [ibid, p. 95], an amount much larger 
than the position in 1850 when the 3: 5 split had been made and the Corporation 
received 110,000. This amount was rising yearly as trade increased. The TIC saw it as 
a loss to them and devised ways using their accounting data to 'contest' [Francis, 
1990], the situation and gain possession of the 5/8ths- 
The continuance of this large amount of river dues to the Corporation, 
rapidly increasing in consequence of the river improvements, was a 
fruitful source of irritation and of much entanglement to the 
Commissioners in their financial operations [Ibid, p. 163]. 
The first proposal was put forward in 1857 by the TIC to acquire the 
Corporation's interest at 10 years' purchase- 
The report of the River Dues Committee' proposed that ten years' 
purchase on the amount of last year's collection be offered by this 
Commission to the Corporation of Newcastle for the transfer of their 
five-eighths of the coal dues [NTCP, 1857, p. xvi]. 
Valuing income streams at so many years' purchase was the traditional method of 
4River Conunittee first formed by the 1835 reform. 
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valuing landholdings, dating back to Tudor times. Twenty years' purchase was the 
conventional multiplier, which equated to a rate of return of 5 per cent per annum 
received in perpetuity [Scorgie, 19961. The offer of 10 years' purchase was extremely 
parsimonious, therefore, especially considering coal dues were rising. However, the 
TIC justified the offer on two fronts, firstly by stating that the dues had increased 
because of the improvement works done by the TIC, and therefore 10% was 'fair and 
adequate' [NTCP, 1869, p. xlv]. The report of the TIC used the accounts to 
demonstrate the 'yearly increasing value of the dues', and that 'this increase is mainly 
attributable to valuable improvements effected by the Commissioners' [ibid]. 
Secondly, it was argued that when 'matters' [it is not clear from the evidence what? ] 
had reached stalemate in the past, and had been been passed over to the government 
for resolution, 'they knew that whenever such cases had been settled - when the 
Government settles such matters - the condition had been ten years' purchase 7 
[NTCP, 1869, p. xlvll. 
The Board of Trade reported on the proposed Bill and agreed in principle but 
thought that: 
it would be most imprudent to leave the settlement of the consideration 
money to the Corporation and the Commissioners, the influence of the 
Corporation being so very great in the Commission NTCP, [1858, 
p. 164]. 
The Bill was later withdrawn because agreement could not be reached and fresh 
discussions ensued, with the idea that the matter be settled by each party appointing 
an arbitrator to act on their behalf to mediate and reach an agreement over the amount 
to be paid for the transfer of the dues. This method of arbitration was agreed, but it 
was never really going to work as neither party appeared willing to compromise: 
They would be sure that the Commissioners offered 10 years' 
purchase., the committee asked for 22 1/2, so that there was a very wide 
difference [NTCP, 1858, p. 216-7] 
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that would always remain. The issue resurfaced again in 1861, after receiving Ure's 
report on the best mode of improving the Tyne, as a way of raising the much needed 
revenue. It was also significant that the Liverpool River Commission had recently 
obtained their remaining share of river dues from Liverpool Corporation: 
A case as nearly as possible analogous was disposed of recently in 
Liverpool, and were the same basis of compensation adopted here, a 
question which has long created a degree of dissatisfaction would be 
disposed of for ever [NTCP, 186 1, p. 13 6]. 
The following example shows the significance of published accounting data in 
the negotiations over the value of the coal dues; or as Guthrie [1880, p. 136] puts it, in 
determining 'a reasonable equivalent' for their total ownership. The following modes 
of settlement were proposed: 'First - the acceptance or otherwise by the Corporation 
of ten years purchase of the annual produce of the five eights dues, ' [NTCP, 1869, 
p. 90]. The Commissioners had offered to purchase this interest of the Corporation at a 
sum equivalent to ten years income, taken on the amount received at the Custom 
House according to the last published accounts of the Corporation. This was not 
accepted, and was considered by the Newcastle Corporation as 'so obviously beneath 
the proper value' [ibid, p. 169]. The Corporation felt that the TIC had already got 
3/8ths of the dues from them and that any further increase would have to be on fair 
terms. 
Secondly - the alternative proposal of a ffiendly application to 
Parliament to settle the amount of compensation. Thirdly - the 
suggestion as to the Cormnissioners dealing alone in Parliament with 
their 3/8' dues, by the substitution thereof a tonnage due on the export 
of coal. Fourthly - the extinguishments of the Corporation's interest, 
by fixing a limited number of years for its continuance. Fifthly - by a 
reference to the Board of Trade, or the Lords of the Treasury, 
empowering the Board selected to decide the whole question at issue. 
Failing to approve of any of these suggested modes of settlement the 
Corporation will submit to the Commissioners a statement of their 
views as to the best way of settling this vexed and long-pending 
question as between town and river [Ibid, p. 90]. 
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The aim of these proposals was that all revenue generated by the River would be 
expended on the River, and by suggesting many ways of obtaining the 5/8ths it was 
hoped that agreement could be reached. 
The Corporation refused all of the proposals, and in response the TIC stated 
that unless an agreement could be reached they would apply to Parliament in the next 
session for powers to transfer the dues. Parliamentary battles had proved costly in the 
past. For example, the 1850 battle over the ownership of the Tyne as a consequence 
left the TIC facing a huge debt upon its formation, and the Corporation spen ing a 
large amount. With this in mind, the Newcastle Corporation decided to come to an 
arrangement with the TIC: 'By their arrangement, which they had just heard read, the 
town had been saved, probably, an immense sum in Parliamentary expenses' [NTCP, 
1870, p. 245]. 
Thus, an agreement was finally reached resulting in the Tyne Improvement 
Act of 1870, whereby the 5/8ths were given to the TIC by Newcastle Corporation for 
a consideration of 1130,000 [Guthrie, 1880, p. 164]. It is not clear from the evidence 
exactly how the final figure was arrived at, but it seems to have been a compromise 
based on 12 years purchase of the historical coal-dues collected. Some councillors, 
however, remained dissatisfied with the arrangement: 
He thought the Corporation interest was by no means compensated ... 
it seemed to him this was only about twelve years' purchase which 
was a very lamentable falling off ... 
for the Corporation it was a very 
bad bargain [NTCP, 1870, p. 246]. 
L 125,000 of the total of 1130,000 was to be paid in equal instalments of f25,000 per 
year over five years and took into account interest at 4 1/2per cent, 
The Corporation of Newcastle assent to the passing of the Tyne 
Improvement Bill now before Parliament for the transfer to them of 
the five-eights of the coal dues ... 
[the consideration] to be payable to 
the Corporation with interest at 4 1/2 per cent payable half-yearly from 
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the I' of January 1871 by five annual payments of L25,000 each, the 
first payment to be made on the Is' of January 1872, and the next on 
the I" of January 1873,1874,1875 and 1876 [and 15,000 to be paid 
initially] [NTCP, 1870, pp. 244-5]. 
The remaining L5,000 related to the one year's remaining compensation owing by the 
Government in relation to differential dues. This had to be paid immediately to 
Newcastle Corporation as it related to the year of handing over the 5/8ths. 
It is necessary to explain here a little about the background to the 'differential 
dues'. as they were known, which came into existence in 1825, at a time when the 
Corporation levied a 2d per chaldron due on coal exported in British ships and Is 4d 
on coal exported in foreign ships. Around this time reciprocity treaties were being 
entered into between the Government and other countries, with the result that the 
dues on coal exported in foreign ships were now to be the same as dues on British 
ships. 'Not to deprive the localities', the Govemment agreed to pay them back the 
difference from the national consolidated fund [ibid, p. 165]. This was called the 
'differential due'. In 1846 the Corporation reduced the foreign rate to 8d per chaldron 
and now the differential due from the Government was only 6d per chaldron. This 
continued until 1861 when the Harbours and Passing Tolls Act abolished all 
differential dues. However, in order that the localities did not loose out the 
Government 'provided for the payment of a ten years' compensation' [ibid, p. 166]. 
The amount was fixed at L8,185 15s 4d on the Tyne per year, which expired in 1871. 
It follows that when the Tyne Bill was passed in 1870, one year of compensation 
remained, which at 5/8ths of 18,000 amounted to 15,000. 
Siispension of works: The development of the River Tyne as a port comprised four 
principal civil engineering components-. river channel improvement [dredging] paid 
for out of the Tyne Improvement Fund (TIF); the provision of dock accommodation, 
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primarily the Northumberland Dock, paid for out of the Northumberland Dock Fund-, 
the building of protective piers, paid for out of the Piers Fund (PF), and moorings 
work paid out of the Moorings Fund (MF). The need to earmark dues for each of 
these separate funds was seen by the TIC as an impediment to its activities, and 
became an issue in the 1870s when the TIC applied to Parliament to increase taxation. 
For the first time in its history the TIC felt obliged to suspend works on the grounds 
that there was not enough money available to carry out the improvements. Whether 
this was a political ploy to exert pressure on the opposition is open to debate, but 
accounting was utilised in the dispute to demonstrate the necessity of taking this 
course of action. This is a very clear example where the accounts of the TIC were 
used to mediate and contest [Francis, 1990]. The TIC used their accounts to justify 
their actions, firstly for the application to increase borrowing powers and secondly to 
suspend all works on the Tyne. Those who opposed the TIC's plans used the 
published accounts to contest the action taken by the TIC. 
The episode started at a time 'peculiarly favourable for carrying on public 
works, labour and material being alike cheap and abundant' [Guthrie, 1880, p. 200]. 
The TIC wanted further funds to take advantage of the situation and so applied to 
Parliament for increased borrowing powers and for powers to enable them to increase 
taxation. In 1875 a 'Special Committee on River Revenues' was appointed by the 
Tyne Commissioners and ultimately their role was to report on the subject of 
applying to Parliament for increased borrowing powers: 
The Commissioners, convinced of the necessity for additional dock 
accommodation [Coble Dene Dock] of a nature suitable to the 
improved state of things, and believing such accommodation the only 
means of attracting valuable trade to the poM resolved to apply to 
Parliament for the necessary powers [Guthrie, 1880, p. 174]. 
Furthermore, the Special Committee proposed to simplify the funding arrangements 
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by amalgamating and consolidating the TIF, MIF and PF into one general fund to be 
called the Tyne River Fund. Guthrie [ 1880, p. 193] states that, 
as revenues for those three funds were all derived from taxation levied 
upon the whole commerce of the river, it was thought a simpler and 
cheaper plan to raise such revenues in one collection instead of three 
collections. The Commissioners would then have had to administer 
two simple trusts, a river trust and a dock trust, and the keeping of 
accounts would have been much simplified and improved. 
The additional taxation proposed to be raised by the Bill was to be obtained by 
consolidating the taxation then raised for these three funds into one schedule, and 
'adding to such taxation to the extent that all vessels entering or leaving the port with 
cargo should pay dues each voyage' [ibid, p. 1941. Up until then the piers and 
moorings dues had only been charged the once, not for both entering and leaving. It 
was also proposed to increase coal dues from Id to I 1/2d. It was argued that the 
proposed increase in taxation was only 'moderate and equitable and would not cause 
any diversion of trade from the port' [Ibid, p. 215]. On the contrary, improvement to 
the River would mean better facilities and an increase in trade attracted to the port. 
Applying for such powers was not unusual as the TIC had applied for 
variations in its taxation and borrowing powers before. However, this time there was 
vehement opposition who argued that the TIC already had enough revenue for its 
improvement works but the funds had been mismanaged. They also argued that the 
Coble Dene Dock (CDD) was not needed and therefore no extra borrowing was 
required. Even though the majority of dues payers were in favour of the scheme, as 
their trading activities depended on the improvement of the River, the voice of the 
opposition was strong, 
compfising the names of many very influential firms of coalowners, 
merchants, manufacturers, and others, large contributors to the revenue 
of the Commissioners [Ibid, pp. 195-6]. 
The opposition, by referring to the TIC's revenue position derived from the 
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published accounts, contested [Francis, 19901 the proposal and accused the TIC of 
extravagance and mismanagement, They contended 'that by economy and ju icious 
management the existing revenues were adequate for purely river purposes, ' [ibid]. 
The CDD project should therefore be abandoned without incurring what were seen as 
'further future losses' [ibid, p. 1921. The consolidation of the various improvement 
funds was another major issue opposed to on the grounds that it might lead to the 
dues being diverted for purposes other than for which they had originally been 
intended. 
In response to the charge of wastefulness, the TIC used accounting and 
engineering reports to justify their actions. The 'Commissioners produced scientific 
and practical evidence as to the absolute economy with which works had been 
executed' [ibid, p. 198]. In addition to wanting additional funds to assist the progress 
of existing improvement works, it was argued by the TIC that further loans were 
required to fund the new works proposed by Ure in 1860 because the cost of labour 
and material had increased since the original estimates. Moreover, further works had 
been executed than originally proposed and additional future works were planned. 
Also, the surplus revenue available on which to raise the capital required for new 
works was being eroded by the rapidly increasing proportion of steam vessels using 
the port compared to sailing vessels. For example, in 1862 steam ships made up 12% 
of total tonnage using the port and sailing ships 88%. In 1875, steamships started to 
dominate the tonnage statistics, now with steam ships making up 60% of total 
tonnage using the port and sailing ships 40%. With taxation based on the registered 
tonnage of a ship, and steam ships able to carry more cargo than sail, fewer vessels 
were required to carry the same tonnage and therefore to be taxed: 
The proportion of cargo carried by a steamship compared to her 
registered tonnage was much greater than that carried by a sailing 
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vessel. Not only so, but the disproportion of cargo to the registered 
tonnage of steam vessels seemed likewise to be constantly increasing. 
It followed therefore that the Commissioner's revenues, derived from 
vessels carrying coals and other goods from the port, did not increase 
in the same ratio with the quantity of such goods taken away from the 
port as it did before the advent of steam, and as had been estimated in 
the calculations on which taxation was founded [ibid, p. 190]. 
To compound the difficulties, steam ships did not require ballast resulting in a loss of 
ballast tax, whereas for sailing ships that did carry ballast, the cost to the TIC of 
disposing of it had increased. 
The voice of the opposition proved influential and ultimately led to a 
Parliamentary review. The Parliamentary Committee found that there was already 
C sufficient' dock accommodation. The current depression in trade meant that there 
was enough dock room to meet the needs of the trade. Therefore an increase in dues 
was not justified. The Bill had to be withdrawn resulting in the suspension of works. 
For the first time since the TIC took control of the management of the Tyne, works 
were stopped. It was argued that this was not a political decision, but a financial one, 
with the accounts used to show the deficiency. Ultimately, by looking at the condition 
of their finances and state of their improvement works, the TIC contested [Francis, 
1990] and maintained that they had no choice but to suspend the works. 
It is shown below that the TIC used their accounts to argue that by suspending 
works they were 'protecting the public creditor' [NTCP, 1876, p. 41 1]. The TIC used 
the information in their accounts to argue that they needed to increase annual taxes by 
B3,000 in order to support the additional borrowings of L828,000 that were required 
to complete their construction projects. This sparked a mass of debate. Information 
from the accounts was deployed from the outset as a basis for understanding the 
situation the TIC were in: 
if the Council will give me their attention for two minutes to some 
large figures, I will make the whole matter perfectly clear ... 
Up to the 
1, 
I :) 
end of 1875 the gross revenue was L178,622 9s 3d. The expenditure 
against that revenue was L171,868 8s 4d leaving a surplus of L6754 
... the maintenance of the 
Commission - that is to say, all the standing 
expenses and various matters which they cannot of course get rid of 
amounts annually to L48,839. The interest on the debt is E123,000. 
The amount of the mortgage debt on the 31st December 1875 was 
L2,871,429, and we now have the means of borrowing still further 
L828,000. That is the surplus power of the Commissioners ... 
they proposed by the bill of last session to take powers to tax shipping 
to the extent of L14,000 per annum, [coal], which was to extend over 
two periods, viz 0,000 at present and 17,000 at the end of five years, 
and they proposed to levy L5,000 a year on merchandise other than 
coal. And therefore the Council will see that in addition to the 16,000 
they proposed to take powers to realise something like 133,000 
annually, and with that go to the market to borrow capital in order to 
complete the works, or in other words, to exercise borrowing powers 
to the extent of L828,000 [ibid, pp. 408-41 1]. 
It follows that by using the accounting data, the TIC argued that they could not carry 
on with the works without the powers that the Bill would have given them- 
When the bill failed and Parliament declined to give the powers that I 
have specified, to obtain this B3,000, how could the works go on? It 
became necessary then to look carefully into the financial position, and 
to take steps to secure the creditors, because after all, those parties 
who , in their confidence 
in this town and neighbourhood and in that 
Commission, have lent 12,871,000 were entitled to the first 
consideration, and it was necessary to take especial care that all 
interest accruing upon that sum should be paid to the very letter ... 
There is every desire on the part of that Commission to go on with the 
works, but prudence, honour, and integrity, required that the greatest 
care should be shown in protecting the public creditor. 
By taking this position, the TIC were running the risk that the works already 
completed as well as those underway could be damaged without further improvement 
work and maintenance. For example, silting, shoaling-up and, breakage to 
construction could result. 'The future state of the Tyne was wrapt in obscurity, and 
nothing was clear' [ibid, p. 201]. It was felt that 'the trade and the commerce of this 
district, are likely to be injuriously affected by the action which the Commissioners 
had taken [NTCP, 1876, pp. 406-9]. Newcastle Corporation wanted explanations why 
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the works had been suspended and suggested that the TIC should be able to borrow 
publicly to resolve the shortage of funds and enable them to carry on with the works. 
Alternative methods of raising funds were proposed. It was said that: 
the whole thing had been decided in a fit of the sulks, simply induced 
by disappointment caused by the loss of the bill ... Money 
had been so 
cheaply lately so why couldn't the Commissioners borrow to sort out 
this temporary difficulty? 
... 
This raised another question, was the present system of borrowing 
money a good one, or could it be improved? If he might be allowed to 
throw out a suggestion, he would ask if the debt of the Commissioners 
could not be transformed into stock and issued upon the market at a 
certain rate of interest? He believed that such a course would be very 
acceptable to money-lenders, especially if the amount of the stock was 
regulated by the income of the Commissioners - there being enough 
income to meet the amount of stock issued, and to carry on the 
improvement of the river. Part of the stock might be made redeemable 
at a certain number of years, and the Commissioners might get rid of 
the difficulty and annoyance of having every now and then to meet the 
calls of parties wishing to withdraw their loans. They would then 
simply have to go to a sharebroker and say 'Sell me so much of my 
River Commissioners' stock, ' [NTCP, 1876, pp. 407-8] ' 
However, the TIC did not want the suspension of the works to be long-term 
and so proposed a revised Bill. Suspending works on the River had achieved its aim 
of weakening of the opposition: 
The suspending of work in the upper reaches of the Tyne had caused 
sand to silt up in various parts of the river below the bridge, and this 
created such a strong feeling in the Commissioners' favour that they 
were successful in getting their bill through Parliament in 1877 
[NTCP, 1885, p. 412]. 
This second Bill was framed by the Parliamentary Committee of the TIC, who 
ý'Over 20 years later, power was taken to raise capital in the form of debenture stock, 
as an alternative to the existing mode of borrowing principal sums for short terms of 
years: 'Last year they got Parliamentary powers to issue Tyne Improvement 
Redeemable Stock to the extent of half-a million repayable as between July 1918, 
and July 1952 ... they 
had now got their financial arrangements into such a condition 
that they were able to borrow nioney upon very favourable terms indeed. This was 
no doubt due, to a very large extent, to the fact of their having floated the half 
million of capital which had Created strong confidence in the money market and 
given them a first class position NNith this who had money to lend' [NTCP, 1898, 
P. X 1. 
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'endeavoured to make it as acceptable as a taxation Bill could be made, and thus if 
possible obviate Objections' [Guthrie, 1880, p. 202]. In the newly proposed Bill, 'the 
amalgamation of the three funds was left out, as this proposal had led to much 
misconception' [ibid, p. 202]. Instead, the TIC argued that there should be moderate 
assistance from the Tyne Improvement Fund (TIF) to the Northumberland Dock Fund 
(NDF) as docks indirectly helped river works, and without the dock improvement, the 
TIF would have had to expend much more: 
It does appear, then, reasonable and a proper basis of arrangement that 
the Tyne Improvement Fund should for these reasons alone, without 
taking into account that the docks are feeders to the river funds ... 
be 
liable to contribute to the Dock Fund a moderate and defined 
assistance or contribution; and on such contribution being made and 
applied in the aid of the construction of the Coble Dene Dock, the 
completion of the dock we proposed should be made to depend on the 
surplus revenue of the Northumberland Dock. Thus the two funds 
would be placed on a strictly defined footing, and ample security given 
against any undue imperilment, wither of dock or river funds, [ibid, 
pp. 206]. 
The increased taxation was therefore principally confined to the two funds which 
absolutely required it, the TIF and the Moorings Fund. This arrangement would 
enable completion of the CDD project- 
Provided that the dock can be made out of dock resources, aided as 
now proposed, we should hope that all opposition to its completion 
should cease. The Bill which we now submit for your adoption enables 
the Commissioner to contribute from the River Fund to the Dock Fund 
either an annual sum from the revenue of the one to the otherl or a 
capital sum in discharge at once of all claims of the dock to river 
assistance. The main object of the present Bill is the same as that of 
the last year, to provide means for completion of the river works and 
to borrow at the lowest rate of interest [Report of Parliamentary 
Committee 13'hDec 1876]. 
Thus, 
the Commissioners by the evidence they gave in support of the Act, 
showed clearly and distinctly that the extension of the borrowing 
powers and the increase of rates were required for river purposes only 
[NTCP 1885, p. 413]. 
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Again the revised Bill attracted opposition, mainly from the same parties who 
had opposed the original one. The amended Bill went before a Parliamentary 
Committee and this time found acceptance with one revision. The proposed 1/2d 
increase in coal dues per ton was restricted to 1/4d. The consolidation of the funds 
was preserved intact, the whole of the new taxation being applicable, together with all 
the other revenues of the Commission, to the purposes of the Tyne Improvement Act 
of 1872 .6 
Although the original proposal made in the first unsuccessful 1876 Bill that 
the various funds be amalgamated into one general fund called the Tyne River Fund 
had been left out, all of the funds were now 'liable for monies borrowed for their 
several purposes' [Guthrie, 1880, p. 215]. By the passing of the Tyne Improvement 
Act, 1877, the borrowing powers of the Tyne Consolidated Fund increased by 
1300,000, of which L200,000 was for the River (TIF) and L100,000 for the Piers 
works, increasing the total borrowings to around 14m. 
As stated earlier in the thesis, the North Eastern Railway Company was used 
as a comparative on more than one occasion when putting forward ideas on how to 
deal with accounting issues, rather than other local authorities; and the financing 
arrangements of the TIC is an example. The bones of contention were the redemption 
of loans and the funding of improvement works through surplus revenue rather than 
increased borrowing powers. The TIC proposed to get powers to extend the period 
for the commencement of the repayment of their capital and to consolidate their 
funds. That latter would have enabled them to complete their different undertakings 
by means of their surplus revenue, instead of increasing their borrowing powers: 
There were gentlemen who would say of the Tyne Commissioners 
9 in conscquence of the numerous Tync Improvement Acts and the successive additions rendered 
necessary from time to time to the Cominissioners borrowing powers, these powers became so 
complex that simplification and consolidation became absolutely necessary, ' [Guthrie, 1880, 
p. 1771. Suggestions were made to Parliament for the consolidation of powers which became law as 
the Tyne Improvement Act of 1872. 
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'Why should they be called upon to redeem their debt at all, when the 
North Eastern Railway Company and other public companies, which 
do similar work have not to redeem their capital? The Capital of the 
NERC remains in perpetuity, the Company paying nothing but the 
interest from time to time, and why not apply the same principle to the 
Tyne Commissioners capital? ') 
Lord Redesdale, House of Lords member, had said that to do so would be contrary to 
public policy, suggesting that different accounting rules applied to public and private 
bodies. Hence, even though the TIC demonstrated by their accounts a continuing 
surplus revenue of around 140,000 p. a. From c. 1880, Parliament refused their request 
arguing as Redesdale did earlier. 
Concluding remarks 
In this chapter it has been shown that the funding of the River Tyne was vital to its 
existence, as without money, no improvements could be made and the River would 
not be useful. The TIC did not have the best start with a large amount of inherited 
debt impeding their progress. Loans were sought from private as well as public 
sources, always with the prudent aim of getting the best loans available at the lowest 
rates of interest. With no financial reputation and history, at first the TIC found it 
hard to obtain competitive rates; and it was only when they were able to demonstrate 
through their accounts a surplus revenue and ability to pay back capital and interest 
that they were successful. 
The Government did not pay much attention to local river improvement 
matters throughout the 19'h century, the only exception being in 1857 when they 
promised free grants to successful HOR applicants. However, the Government soon 
retreated on their promise and left many river commissions high and dry and unable 
to complete the works. It could be inferred that when the Government offered funds 
and then later loans at discounted rates for harbour works , it gave the TIC an 
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incentive to carry out the works. However, after the withdrawal of the pron-ýise of 
assistance, it left the TIC not only feeling deceived but also with a larger debt than 
had originally been anticipated. 
Another important source of revenue was the dues that the ports raised. Much 
of the money expended on port improvement either came directly from the river dues 
harvested from the ports growing traffic or was borrowed on the strength of the 
growing revenue. Here was the greatest example of the truism that the continued 
growth of coastwise shipping was dependent on massive investment in major harbour 
improvements on the part of the river commissions, railway companies, the 
Government and private investors. Accounting data was vital in simplifying the way 
in which dues were collected and accounted for, and in the long battle to obtain the 
5/8ths dues from the Newcastle Corporation. The TIC's revenue position in the long- 
run had the potential to show a surplus. However, in the short-run, without enough 
funding, often resulting from too many outgoings, works and salaries - repayments 
on current loans/borrowings being the most significant drain on resources - and with 
the failure to obtain further borrowing powers and raise taxation, all current 
operations were suspended with the main aim of 'protecting the public creditor', as 
quantified through the accounts. In short, this was a turbulent period in the history of 
the development of the Tyne, where accusations were made of mismanagement and 
lack of economy and some capital works were criticised from start to finish, and 
accounting was deployed in the contests that ensued. 
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Chapter 5: Accounting and Accountabilily 
As an independent trust, the TIC was accountable to various groups such as the users 
of the Tyne, the traders and manufacturers, as well as political bodies such as the 
Government and Newcastle Corporation. Chapter 5 looks at the increasing pressures 
of accountability from internal as well as external parties, which was reflected in an 
increasing desire for better and more detailed accounting information. It also explores 
the influence of changes in the industrial environment on accounting information and 
techniques. For example, the TIC seems to have been influenced by the North Eastern 
Railway Company in its consolidation of accounts. At the time of its adoption by the 
TIC, the technique was relatively unheard of Also, with the advent of the 
accountancy profession arguably there was mounting pressure for professional 
accountants and auditors to be appointed by the Commission. 
As we have seen in Chapter 3, in the early 19th century there was increasing 
resentment that political power in the municipalities should be in the hands of a 
wealthy few, which sparked the move for a 'Municipal Investigation' resulting in the 
Municipal Reform Act, 1835. This Act applied to 184 English and Welsh boroughs 
and attempted to bring Corporations more in line with the social and demographic 
changes brought about by industrial progress, and ultimately to make them more 
accountable to the ratepayers. 
Before this Act, corporations were more in the nature of private rather than 
public institutions; and were responsible to their members, the freemen, ' rather than 
the citizens at large. They looked after the interests of the freemen rather than the 
welfare of the town as a whole. 
'All members of the Newcastle Corporation were Freemen and had vested interests in the tow-n. 
They elected the Common Council and monopolised the powers and offices of town government 
befýre the 1835 reform. ' Brackenborough. 12003. p. 531. 
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Until their publication in pamphlet form by the Newcastle Corporation 
from 1818- the accounts could only be inspected by Companies and 
Freemen [Brackenborough, 2003, p. 531. 
Halcrow [1953, p. 200] adds: 
It was recognised that there was room for improvement in the methods 
of book-keeping ... A number of petitions addressed to the 
Common 
Council by the Stewards of the Incorporated Companies focused 
attention on the accounts and prepared the way for change. 
In 1823 'the accounts were published in a pamphlet form and all the details clearly 
arranged under distinct heads' [Mackenzie, 1827, p. 641]. In consequence of this 
increase in public accountability of local authorities in England and Wales, the 
Newcastle Corporation, the body responsible for collecting and distributing the 
town's wealth and for the improvement of the River Tyne in the first half of the 19th 
century, came under the public spotlight. When accounting data was published it gave 
the opposition a lobbying tool, resulting in the change in control of the Tyne to the 
newly formed TIC, as has been explained in detail in Chapter 3. For its part, the TIC 
came under the spotlight even more than its predecessor and was accountable to a 
whole host of different parties as to how it was funded, how the commissioners spent 
public money, and how they conducted their managerial affairs. 
Membership 
As the TIC was a trust it was accountable to the wide band of parties who had an 
interest in the River Tyne. With the trade on the River increasing, as a consequence of 
various factors such as the development of steam, increase in the demand for coal and 
river improvement works, the River grew in importance. The greater volume in trade 
resulted in an increase in revenues generated from the users of the River, in the form 
of taxes and dues. This in turn fuelled the voices of the many users of the River who 
increasingly wanted a say in its affairs. 
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The constitution of the TIC had been the subject of much controversy at its 
inception, and sporadic outbursts on this matter occurred during the early years, 
especially with regard to the representation of interested parties. The TIC was made 
up of councillors from the various councils. Six from Newcastle, two from Gateshead 
and three from Tynemouth were appointed by their respective councils. A further 
three members were appointed from the South Shields Improvement Commission. 
There were also four life members, mainly coming from a seafaring background, who 
were not to be replaced when deceased. 
Significant criticism of the representation of the TIC arose as interested parties 
became dissatisfied with the management of the Tyne. Matters came to head in 1869 
when an attack was made by Tynemouth, deploring the constitution of the TIC as 
cnever ... acceptable to the public' and 
'favouring Newcastle'. In 1871 representation 
was requested at Jarrow, and soon afterwards a bill was presented to Parliament to 
amend the TIC constitution by the addition of 13 members. It was opposed by the 
TIC on the grounds that the TIC had proved a success, and that to amend the 
membership would expose it to earlier expressed antagonisms, especially those 
involving Newcastle and Shields. The Bill was withdrawn as it did not have sufficient 
financial backing to get through Parliament, especially as it would have incurred legal 
costs to battle against the TIC. However, a similar Bill was presented in 1874. 
Moreover, this time it had the backing of the prominent merchants and shipowners - 
Palmer Bell, Andrew Leslie and Tone - and enough financial power to fight for the 
Bill in Parliament. In view of the great expenditure and improvement works on the 
Tyne, the Bill proposed that the membership of the TIC should include representation 
from the dues payers as well as public representation through the Admiralty and the 
Board of Trade. 
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Ultimately, the membership of TIC was changed allowing traders on board for 
the first time, thus reflecting the importance of trade, the growth in industry and the 
resulting widening in the accountability of the TIC to other parties. By the 1875 Tyne 
Improvement Act, six more members from three classes of dues-payers (shipowners, 
coalowners, and traders, each with two members) were created. Now the TIC had 24 
members in all. At the same time, and significantly, the dues-payers were empowered 
to elect an auditor of the TIC's accounts, thereby giving them a control at the heart of 
the TIC's operations. Although, at this time, the auditors were not qualified people or 
independent, but were instead members elected by their respective councils or by the 
dues-payers, it was a significant move. For the first time the dues-payers had an 
elected member to represent their own interests when looking at the function of 
accounting of the TIC. One life member died in 1881. By the 1886 Tyne 
Improvement Act, the Corporation of Jarrow was allowed one member on the TIC. 
Perhaps reflecting the growing strength and importance of trade, by means of the 
1898 Tyne Improvement Act, the membership of the dues-payers at the close of the 
century had been increased to 15 (five members ftom each section). So, 
crepresentation is now divided equally between the Riparian Municipalities and the 
Payers of Tyne Dues' [UrWin, 1898, p. 5]. 
As the published accounts of the TIC developed and disclosure increased, 
interested parties in the Tyne could observe where the revenue was generated, and 
more importantly, how it was being spent. For example, it will be seen in the 
following chapter when looking at the Coble Dene Dock project, how accounting 
information was deployed in retar&ng the progress of the works, as opposition saw 
the expenditure as wasteful and unnecessary. Furthermore, by increasing the 
representation and allowing the appointment of auditors by the dues-payers, the 
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accountability of the TIC to a wider group of stakeholders increased. One can argue 
that without the availability of accounting data, the affairs of the TIC would have 
been of limited access to the interested parties on the outside. The types of accounting 
reform and significant accounting issues relating to the TIC and the River Tyne are 
the topics of the following sections of this chapter. 
Bookkeeping and Presentational Development 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the man behind much of the financial reform of the TIC 
was James Guthrie, TIC accountant. He was appointed accountant to the TIC in 1852 
and took on the role of Secretary to the TIC in 1853, formally being appointed to the 
office in 1861. Mr. Stevenson MP said of the late James Guthrie: 
He gave to the business of the Commission his great abilities, his great 
care, his admirable memory, and the extreme caution which 
characterised all his business transactions. The finances were of a 
limited character at first, and then soon they grew under his hand and 
under his management until they had attained their present important 
dimension [Guthrie, 1880, pp. xii-xiii] 
One significant reform proposed by Guthrie was the consolidation of the TIC funds. 
It was not consolidation as we understand it today incorporating key calculations such 
as good will, minority interests and distinctions between pre and post acquisition 
profit. They were aggregated statements, however a new idea at the time [Coombs 
and Edwards, 1996]. This is examined below. 
COnsolidation of TIC fiinds: When the technique of consolidating the TIC's funds 
was first proposed by the TIC in the early 1870s, it was a relatively unheard of 
concept, especially so for public bodies. It can be seen from the following extract 
from the Newcastle Corporation proceedings that consolidation was a new idea: 
In seeking to consolidate the funds by Act of Parliament, the 
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Commissioners apply to do what they have never done before and it is 
a most extraordinary position for any public body to take up ... Parliament has never yet sanctioned such a proceeding with any body 
of Commissioners [NTCP, 1872, p. 176]. 
As was seen in the previous chapter, the TIC had four separate funds relating to four 
different areas, the river, piers, moorings and docks. What was proposed by Guthrie 
was to amalgamate the presentation of these funds, and to have, 'as far as the public 
are concerned, only one fund, to be called "the Tyne Improvement Fund"' [ibid, 
193]. 
There were two main factors dominating Guthrie's proposal for consolidation. 
Firstly, the accounts needed simplifying for lenders to understand as they were 
complex and increasing in complexity as further borrowing powers were granted. 
This retarded the process of procuring loans and thus the development of the Tyne. 
Stevenson, MP, wrote of Guthrie's consolidation idea as: 
that scheme of his which he suggested and carried out successfully of 
amalgamating all the funds of the Trust which were so confusing in 
their variety, and which it was impossible to make outsiders 
understand with reference to the nature of the security which the 
Commission offered them when they advance money [Guthrie, 1880, 
P. Xii]. 
Guthrie himself showed an awareness that simplification was a key factor in 
negotiating loans: 
In consequence of the numerous Tyne Improvement Acts, and the 
successive additions rendered necessary from time to time to the 
Commissioners' borrowing powers, these powers became so complex 
that simplification and consolidation became absolutely necessary. Not 
only were there four distinct and independent funds to explain to 
lenders, but three of those funds had each different borrowing powers 
of it own [ibid, p. 177]. 
It simplifies the borrowing of money so far as the public at large are 
concerned. Experience has shown that it is often difficult and 
sometimes troublesome to make people comprehend the difference 
between these funds [N-TCP, 1872, p. 194] 
Whittred's [ 1986, p. 114] research on the evolution of consolidation in 
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Australia by corporate groups during the early-mid 20' century finds that 'an 
increasing reliance on debt, ' was a key factor in the decision to consolidate accounts. 
This was also true of the TIC, as essentially the proposal of consolidation afforded 
more solid, more substantial and more permanent security to those who lent money to 
the TIC. All funds could be used as one as collateral security; and as a larger amount, 
it was expected that lenders would be more willing to offer their money at lower rates 
of interest* 
They will be able to borrow money at a cheaper rate of interest on the 
consolidated fund than on the separate funds. They expect that they 
will be able to save from a quarter to one-half per cent in this way. On 
L1,000,000 of money that would amount to something like 115,000 a 
year [NTCP, 1880, p. 194]. 
It is interesting to note that when Guthrie first proposed consolidation in an 
1871 Memo directed to the Finance Committee of the TIC, he wanted 'consolidation 
embracing the whole of the trust and powers of the Commission' [Guthrie, 1871, p. 2]. 
However, his subsequent comments suggest that he was aware that this may have 
been a step too far at that time: 
If it is considered by the Cornmissioners that the time has not yet 
arrived for promoting a General Consolidation Act, the borrowing 
powers might be consolidated [ibid]. 
It is worth mentioning here that the TIC used the North Eastern Railway 
Company as a point of reference when proposing its own accounting changes; and 
consolidation is a prime example. 'The North Eastern Railway Company a short time 
since consolidated all their different accounts or funds" [ibid, p. 194]. 
Ultimately, so far as the general public were concerned 'there will only be one 
consolidated fund, so far as the Commissioners are concerned the accounts will be 
kept entirely separate and distinct' [Guthrie, 1880, p. 196]. These initial proposals 
caused some concern amongst the Newcastle Corporation, who in a meeting 
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discussing the proposed Bill, feared that if a fund were in deficit and another in 
surplus then the one in surplus had to bear the burden of the other: 
If one thing does not pay its expenses, another thing that is in a more 
favourable position is to suffer the penalty of the non-payment of the 
other [NTCP, 1872, p. 176]. 
There was no objection to the concept of the consolidation of accounts from a 
presentational point of view as the Corporation were aware of the great benefits 
alluded to by Guthrie, but urged the TIC to 'let those funds which Parliament has 
given you for distinct and specific purposes be appropriated for the purposes for 
which you receive them' [ibid]. These concerns were easily dismissed by the TIC, as 
to have done otherwise would have exceeded their statutory powers and been illegal- 
'It is illegal otherwise and every member of the Commission would be personally 
liable for the misapplication of river funds' [ibid, p. 194]. Once this point had been 
clarified, there was no further opposition to the consolidation of accounts, and 
Guthrie's proposal was accepted. Thus, the 1872 Tyne Improvement Act' 
consolidated the borrowing powers of the TIC: 
The simplification and consolidation of the borrowing powers has 
proved of the greatest advantage. Everything that savours of 
complexity and restriction raise doubts, and uselessly impeded the 
easy raising of capital; but with a simple power of borrowing equal to 
the requirements of the case, the Commissioners, with their splendid 
river and docks expanding commerce of the Tyne, ought to obtain 
money at as low rates as any other harbour or great trust of the United 
8 Main points of 1872 Act: Consolidated the Tyne Improvement Fund the Tyne Piers Fund, the 
Northumberland Dock Fund, and the River Moorings Fund into the Tyne Consolidated Fund for 
borrowing purpose. Section 17 Except for the purposes of providing and discharging the principal and 
interest of money borrowed on the security of the Tyne Consolidated Fund, it shall not be lawful for 
the Commissioners to apply the rates, dues and sums received by them on account of any of the four 
funds, or any part of the saine, for any purpose of any fund other than the fund on account of which 
the same are received; and the Commissioners shall keep separate accounts of the receipts and 
payments on account of ' and 
of the money of each of the four funds accordingly; and the 
Commissioners shall also keep a separate account of the money borrowed on the security of the Tyne 
Consolidated Fund as a capital account-, and shall also keep a separate account of the interest paid 
thereon, and shall from time to time apportion and charge the amount of that interest among and to the 
four funds in proportion to the respective amounts of capital from time to time appropriated, out of 
inoney borrowed on the security of the Tyne Consolidated Fund, for the credit of the four funds 
respectively. ' [TIA. 1872] 
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Kingdom [Guthrie, 1880, p. 205]. 
As a result of the 1872 Tyne Improvement Act the amalgamation and 
consolidation of all existing rates and dues into one general fund resulted. This was 
called the River Tyne Consolidated Fund. For the purpose of providing security for 
monies to be borrowed, the accounts belonging to each fund were to remain separate 
and distinct. However, the layout of the published accounts could now be 
rationallsed: 
The accounts would be kept substantially as at present but only one 
Banking Account would be requisite instead of four, one set of 
Mortgage Securities an Interest Warrants instead of four, and one 
Balance Sheet, showing at a glance, the exact financial position of the 
Commissioners [Guthrie, 1871, p. 2]. 
The 1872 Act required the TIC to keep a separate account of the money borrowed on 
the security of the Tyne Consolidated Fund, and also a separate account of the interest 
paid thereon. Looking at the published accounts of the TIC, the most obvious change 
was that the revenue and capital accounts became consolidated. There is no doubt that 
these changes simplified an increasingly complex accounting system for borrowing 
purposes, as mentioned above. 
Proposals for further consolidation: It was obvious from the accounts that some 
funds were in surplus and others in debt, and those in debt were paying interest on the 
amounts that had been borrowed to fund the improvement works. A few years after 
the initial consolidation, some TIC members thought that this was just wasting 
money, as if the 4 funds were consolidated for expenditure purposes as well as 
borrowing, the funds in surplus could help finance the other funds, resulting in a 
reduction in interest and borrowings. 
A letter [1876] was written by a TIC member to the Newcastle Corporation 
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stating: 
You will see that I have not entered upon the often repeate question 
of payment of interest on the Docks Fund debt out of the surplus from 
the other funds ... 
Your opinion that this is authorised by the Act of 
1872, and is merely a question of bookkeeping may be correct, but I 
believe the contrary. I am more than ever convinced that the last Act as 
to the appropriation of the borrowing powers is a mistake, and there 
appears to me to be only one remedy, namely an application to 
Parliament to consolidate all the Commissioners funds for all 
purposes. [italics theirs]. The dues payers, coal owners, and others 
being deeply interested in the subject, I propose making this letter 
public. 
Indeed these ideas had been opposed by the Newcastle Corporation when 
contemplating the initial 1872 Bill. However, now after seeing the benefits of 
consolidation resulting from the 1872 Act, the TIC wanted to take the consolidation 
of funds one step further. Moreover, bearing in mind that the opposition to the initial 
consolidation proposal had been mainly concerned with river funds being applied for 
dock purposes, it was suggested that the three river related funds - the Tyne 
Improvement, Moorings and Piers Funds - be consolidated, but the Dock Fund to 
remain separate. 
The Tyne Improvement Fund was in surplus and other funds in deficit. It was 
argued that Tyne Improvement Fund, 'the great feeder of the Commission' [NTCR) 
1889, p. 12], bore a large share every year of the expense of maintaining the River 
Police (included in the Moorings Fund), as well as the works carried out on the River, 
for example river dredging and assisting with the piers work. These factors 
culminated in a proposal to take consolidation a step further and in 1877 
it was proposed to take another step in the direction of simplification 
and consolidation of the different funds, and to amalgamate and 
consolidate the Tyne Improvement Fund, the Moorings Fund, and the 
Piers Fund, into one general fund, to be called the "Tyne River Fund" 
It was not contemplated that the amounts applicable to those three 
different funds should be lessened or altered in any way, but, inasmuch 
as the revenues for those three funds were all derived from taxation 
levied upon the whole commerce of the river, it was thought a simpler 
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and cheaper plan to raise such revenues in one collection instead of 
three collections. The Commissioners would thus have had to 
administer two simple trusts, a river trust and a dock trust, and the 
keeping of accounts would have been much simplified and improved 
[Guthrie, 1880, p. 193]. 
This proposal made up part of a Bill that also included an application to 
Parliament to increase the borrowing powers of the TIC. As we have seen in Chapter 
there was great opposition to this Bill and its failure to pass through Parliament 
resulted in the works being suspended on the Tyne. One of the reasons for the failure 
of the Bill was the plan for further consolidation; and when a new Bill was proposed, 
'the amalgamation of the three funds was left out, as this proposal had led to much 
misconception' [Guthrie, p. 202]. The misconception was over the use of river funds 
for dock purposes. Many saw the construction of the Coble Dene Dock as a white 
elephant and feared that if these consolidation plans succeeded revenues generated 
from the River would not be spent on river improvements, but would be wasted on 
the dock. These fears proved unfounded, but for many, the further consolidation plans 
were a step too far at this point in time. 
However, with the passage of time as the improvement works began to be 
completed, plans to consolidate the funds were revisited by the new TIC Secretary, 
Urwin. He was conscious that in the past opposition to consolidation plans had been 
spurred by a fear that funds would be misapplied and used for purposes that they were 
not created for. Now, with the works drawing to a close, this was no longer a burning 
issue. In 1885 a recommendation was put forward for the complete fusion of the river 
funds and the dock fund, but with the capital and revenue accounts of each fund to be 
kept distinct for statistical and other purposes. Extracts are taken from his notes 
proposing the fusion of funds of the TIC - 
The River, Piers, and Dock Works are rapidly drawing to a close, and 
as they now form practically otie utidertaking, there is no advantage to 
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be gained from continuing to keep separate accounts of the several 
funds so as to shew up deficiencies on some and surpluses on others 
... Except for borrowing purposes and the payment of interest, 
the 
Northumberland Dock Fund, cannot receive assistance fi7om the other 
funds, and its revenue account has,, for some years past, shewn a 
deficiency. Last year the deficiency amounted to f. 28,194 14s 3d., and 
it is not probable that the receipts will, for some time to come increase 
at a rate sufficient to cover the annual charge for interest, working, 
maintenance, and management and wipe off the accumulated cash 
balance. Some means of meeting the growing deficiency will therefore 
have to be found. This may be done in two ways, either: - 
Ist - By obtaining power to contribute from time to time the Tyne 
Improvement, Moorings, and Piers Funds, for the purpose of the Dock 
Fund, such sums as the Commissioners may think fit, or 
2 nd - By the complete fusion of the River Funds and the Dock Fund, 
even it for statistical and other purposes, the capital and revenue 
accounts of each fund should be kept distinct as at present. 
The latter appears to be the better mode of dealing with the matter, for 
the following reasons-. - The Commissioners' Dock system is merely 
the corollary of the deep water port which they have created, and with 
which it forms one undertaking; the different authorised works are all 
approaching completion; nothing is to be gained by continuing 
independent sets of accounts ... No opposition, or objections on the 
part of the public is likely to be raised against the suggested fusion 
which whilst it can prejudice no one, is calculated to increase still 
further the financial stability of the Commission, and there is no 
reason to suppose that Parliament will not readily assent to it [Urwin, 
1885, pp. 2-3] 
Therefore, a proposal was placed before the TIC that the Commissioners 
should be permitted to amalgamate the four funds for all purposes, so that they could 
take money from one fund for the purpose of another fund, and ultimately wipe out 
the deficiencies. These proposals were accepted by the TIC and Newcastle 
Corporation, and went one step further in 1890 when the policy of 'maximised 
consolidation' was at last realised. The reasoning behind keeping separate and distinct 
accounts was now being questioned, as it was not clear why this was done- 
All the funds [should] be consolidated, and when that was done the 
commissioner ought to be able to borrow money at from 3 to 3 1/4per 
cent without difficulty... [the 1872 Act], for purposes best known to 
themselves the accounts of each of the funds were kept separately, 
each had its separate book-keeping account, and separate statements of 
each of the four funds were presented to the auditor [NTCP, 1889, 
p. xxiv]. 
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Accountability was clearly an issue. The Acts of Parliament required the TIC to 
separate dock and river expenditure, and keeping the accounts distinct enabled the 
TIC to demonstrate to interested parties that they were acting legally. 
The plans for further consolidation would enable the Commissioners to 
'complete their different undertakings by means of their surplus revenue, instead of 
increasing their borrowing powers' [ibid]. Another councillor concurred that 'it 
seemed a right principle, that the surplus revenue should be applied to complete the 
capital works, and so to prevent an increase of the debt' [ibid]. The Commissioners 
wanted to have an amalgamation of the four funds for all purposes, which was made 
law by the 1890 Tyne Improvement Act when all funds were merged without 
restrictions into one fund called the 'Tyne Consolidated Fund'. However, the TIC 
continued to show all receipts and expenditure in respect of each fund separately in its 
books and accounts in order to enhance transparency, and to perhaps forestall any 
unwelcome investigations into how the TIC managed its funds. We return to the 
pressures caused by the threat of external inquiries later in the chapter. 
Level of disclosure - Newcastle Corporation: The study has examined all the 
available accounts relating to the River Tyne in the 19'h century. the Newcastle 
Corporation up to 1849 and the TIC from 1850 to 1900. As anticipated, it was found 
that the accounts showed more detail as the century progressed, reflecting the 
increase in accountability of these public bodies. As Chapter 3 related, in the early 
years of the 19' century the Newcastle Corporation's accounts were limited in detail 
as well as in who could view them. The accounts prior to 1809 (showed the total 
receipts, total payments and the balance at the end of the year in three lines' [NTCP, 
1833, p. 86]. The County Rate Act of 1815 required local authorities to publish their 
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accounts: 
Until their publication in pamphlet form by the Newcastle Corporation 
from 1818, the accounts could only be inspected by Companies and 
Freemen [Brackenborough, 2003, p. 53]. 
However, the stewards of the incorporated companies saw a need for the 
improvement in bookkeeping and this paved the way for change. Up to this point in 
time, it was members of the localities that initiated changes in the accounting 
function. It was not until 1835 that any statutory laws affected the way that 
Corporations practiced accounting. It was the 1835 Municipal Corporations Act that 
obliged corporations to produce an annual return of receipts and expenditure in 
addition to 'a full abstract of his [the Treasurer's] accounts'. These were to be 
available for inspection and purchase by the ratepayers at 'a reasonable price for each 
copy' [MCA, 1835, s. 93]. This Act did not mention the form the abstract should take, 
but did state that it 'should show all monies received ... and 
disbursed' [ibid, S. 60]. 
Furthering the accountability of corporations, ratepayers could also inspect the 
corporations' books, accounts and minutes. As was seen in Chapter 3, ultimately the 
increased disclosure fuelled the battle for the control of the Tyne. By using the 
published accounts, the opponents of the Newcastle Corporation were able to 
engineer the transfer of the control of the River to the TIC in 1850. 
Level of disclosure - Tyne Improvement Commission: The following section looks at 
the development of the published accounts under the TIC. The most significant 
ramifications of the change in control of the River were presentational changes, 
development in accounting information, and in the role of the auditor, all of which 
increased the pressure for the appointment of qualified auditors and accountant in the 
latter years of the 19'hcentury. 
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The TIC was obliged from the outset to publish accounts and appoint four 
auditors, one from each of the respective boroughs represented on the TIC 
(Newcastle, Gateshead, North and South Shields). This was set by the Tyne 
Improvement Act, 1850. The TIC used a bilateral account format, with an account for 
capital and an account for revenue. The accounts were printed and circulated amongst 
the members of the corporations of the different boroughs represented on the TIC, as 
required by the Act. 
Before the TIC gained full control of the River, some councillors had 
expressed a concern over how the accounts were going to be kept following the 
change in control: 
They were about to part with a considerable amount of revenue, and 
which at present was under their control, every shilling of which , in the receipt and expenditure, was set forth in properly audited and 
published accounts, to which every inhabitant had access; but by the 
bill there was no provision for the due accounting of the revenue they 
were about to give up; and the Commission might or might not publish 
their accounts. Surely there was something wrong [NTCP, 1850, 
p. 129]. 
However, these concerns proved unfounded, as when the Tyne Improvement Bill was 
discussed in council a week later it was politely pointed out that there were clauses 
which required 
the Commissioners to publish their accounts in detail... and for the 
appointment of four auditors, one for each borough represented in the 
Commission, ' [Ibid, p. 315]. 
How the accounts were to be kept and presented was left to the bookkeeper to decide, 
although initially he was the same individual who had kept the accounts of the River 
for the Corporation in previous years. Moreover, the Newcastle Corporation still had 
influence through their representation over the accounting function, and the 
bookkeeper continued to produce accounts for the TIC in the same format as he had 
done in the past. 
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However, this method of accounting turned out to be inappropriate as the 
newly appointed auditors refused to pass the accounts in their present state. For the 
first two years, no accounts were published as they were kept 'in the old form used by 
the Corporation, which was not a desirable form' [NTCP, 1852, p. xxi], All the 
accounting information was presented in one sheet comprising a 'Tyne Improvement 
Fund Account 1) together with a Balance Sheet. The first year's accounts are illustrated 
below. It was the auditors who 
declined to pass [the accounts] in their present form. This was due to 
their archaic and inappropriate format being based on the old 
Newcastle Corporation and not as a trust as they were now. After some 
discussion it was agreed that an accountant be employed, to be 
selected by the Chairman, to remodel the accounts for the past year 
and to put them in a form in which they might easily be kept in future 
[NTCP, 1852, p. xxvi]. 
The auditors were ordinary council members and not qualified professionals. 
Moreover, there was no requirement that they should be. The fact that the accounts 
were declined in their present state and deemed inappropriate for a trust suggests that 
at least one of the auditors had some accounting knowledge, or that some form a 
guidance was available at the time relating to trust accounting. An attempt to retrieve 
background information on the elected auditors proved unsuccessful, leaving their 
accounting expertise open to conjecture. The role of the auditor is examined in more 
detail later in the chapter. 
Given the apparent lack of ability of the inherited bookkeeper, reform of the 
presentation of the accounts and a replacement bookkeeper were necessary. The 
current bookkeeper" s lack of knowledge of double-entry was taken as an indication of 
his unsuitability for the post- 
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FIGURE 5 
1851 TIC Accounts [Newcastle Central Library, L627.22, CRD2141-51 
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The worthy old treasurer has not the slightest notion of double entry, 
although he is, I believe, very accurate in his own way, an accountant 
had to be employed [NTCP 1854, p. 103]. 
James Guthrie was the newly appointed accountant and he proved to be a success- 'I 
[Councillor Mather] must say that since then the accounts have been kept in the most 
unexceptionable way' [ibid, p. 1031. The presentation of accounting information 
developed as soon as Guthrie took over. The existing 'Tyne Improvement Fund 
Account' and 'Balance Sheet' were augmented with three new accounts- 'River 
Moorings Fund Account' and 'Balance Sheet'; 'Tyne Piers Fund Account' and 
'Balance Sheet'; and a 'Northumberland Dock Account ). 9 The former two accounts 
were brought about by the 1852 Tyne Improvement Act, which dealt with plans for 
new pier works and additional moorings, as well as obtaining control of the existing 
ones; the latter in 1853 by the commencement of works on the Northumberland 
Dock. Another accounting reform that showed that the TIC was moving away from 
the old municipal accounting format was with the change in the accounting reference 
date: 'The Finance Committee recommend that the financial year of the Commission 
terminate with the 3V December, instead of the 9' November' [NTCP, 1854, p. xix], 
which change was put in place. 
The TIC's accounts were presented in full in the NTCP minutes at the start, 
whereas towards the end of the century they were presented in summary form with 
explanations of the changes from the previous years stated. " The full accounts were 
'attached' to the report but not printed, presumably because there was too much 
information to present in the minutes, a summary being more beneficial. It is obvious 
from looking at the accounts themselves that the volume of detail grew rapidly as the 
century progressed. New accounts were created, the accounts showed more detail, 
1) See Appendix for an example of the accounts presented for the year ending 1853 [FIGS 6-121. 
An example is presented in the Appendix [FIGS. 13-141. 
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and explanatory notes were added. 
Expansion in detail: This section traces the expansion of the TIC's annual report. 
Some additional accounts were created by statutory requirement. However, this was 
not the case with all the accounts. Given that no explanations could be found as to 
why these accounts were created, it seems reasonable to assume that the TIC felt it 
beneficial to disclose further information to satisfy the various parties to which it was 
accountable. In the earlier years of its existence especially, the TIC was subjected to 
inquiry after inquiry that aggrieved the ComMIssioners, which will be examined later 
in the chapter. 
In 1856 an addition to the Tyne Piers Fund Accounts was made in the form of 
'A Statement showing the entire Income and Outlay of the Tyne Piers Fund' from 
1852-1856, which then carried on in subsequent years. In 1860 a new statement of 
'Income and Expenditure of the Tyne Improvement Fund for the 10 years ending 31 sl 
Dec, 1860", and then each year thereafter, I lyrs, 12 yrs etc, was presented. An 
example of the 10 account is shown below. In 1861 a 'Statement of Sums Paid for 
Conveying Ballast" and a 'Statement of the Quantity of Ballast Discharged' were 
added. In 1862 it was a 'Statement of Costs of Working Steamboats'; in 1865 a 
'River Tyne Police Superannuation Fund'; and in 1866 a 'Statement of Howden Yard 
Account'. The accounts for 1872, the first year of consolidation, saw a consolidated 
revenue and capital account. The 1883 accounts included 'A Statement of the 
Revenue and Expenditure of the Harbour Lights, Boats and Beacons Account'; and 
the ones for 1891 'River Police Superannuation Fund Income and Expenditure', 
River Police Pension Fund Income and Expenditure', and 'River Police Balance 
Sheet'. These last three accounts were required by the Police Act of 1890. 
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FIGURE 15 
TIC Accounts, 1860 11,627.22, Cr D2141-51 
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In the year 1899 a voluminous amount of accounting data was produced. 
Whether this was because the annual report provided a summary of the last 50 years, 
or because this was the last year of the 19' century, or incidentally, the first year that 
a professional accountant was employed, or indeed a combination of these factors is 
open to conjecture. The statements, in the usual form, were presented and are 
included on the following pages as an example of the increase in detail and to show 
the development of the accounts at the end of the century, including the total 
consolidation. The 'Consolidated Revenue Account, Year ending 3 1", 1899', 
'Consolidated Capital Account, Year ending 3 1', 1899', and the 'General Balance 
Sheet. ) 31" December, 1899' are presented below [FIGS 16 -. 18]. 
In addition to these three reports which were typical of previous years, the 
annual report for 1899 " included the following additional statements: 'Statement 
showing amount of Capital Expenditure, Revenue Receipts, Revenue Expenditure 
including Interest, Surplus Revenue before Interest has been charged, Interest, 
Surplus or Deficiency on Revenue Account after Interest has been charged, and 
Balance of Sums expended in respect of Northumberland Dock and Albert Edward 
Dock from 1853-1899'; 'Statement of Income and Expenditure of the 
Northumberland Dock and Albert Docks, for the years ending 3V December 1898 
and 1899, shewing in each case the proportion in respect of General Merchandise and 
Mineral Traffic (Coals and Coke)'; 'Statement of Income and Outlay of the Tyne 
Improvement Fund during the 49 Years ending 3V December, 1899'; 'Statement of 
Income and Outlay of the River Moorings Fund, from 171" June, 1852 (the date of the 
Tyne Improvement Act) up to 3V December, 1899'; 'Statement of Income and 
Outlay of the Tyne Piers Fund, ftom 171 June, 1852 (the date of the T. I. Act) up to 
" Examples illustrated intlicAppendix [FIGS 19 -211. 
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FIGURES 16 - 18 TIC Accounts, 18" [1,627.22, Cr D2141-51 
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FIGURE 17 
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31 st December, 1899'; 'Statement of Income and Outlay of the Northumberland Dock 
Fund, from the Commencement in 1853, to the 3V December. ) 
1899'; and 'Summary 
Statement of Income and Outlay from 10' November 1850, to 3V December, 1899 1) 
Significantly, when examining the available accounts it was apparent that 
there was a greater increase in detail, disclosure and volume of statements presented 
from 1882 onwards. The 1882 Local Authorities Act may have prompted this as the 
auditing and accounting provisions of the Act promoted increased disclosure by 
public bodies. Thus, the Act 'strengthened and modernised the audit and account 
provisions of the earlier Municipal Corporations Act 1833' [Coombs and Edwards, 
1993, p. 65]. However, as stated earlier, not all of these additional accounts were 
adopted as a result of statutory requirements. Therefore, they are likely to have been 
innovations by Guthrie and his successors, further improvements to the accounts 
continuing after his death. Guthrie was clearly capable in his financial role: 
[Mather, chairman of the TIC] had looked over these accounts that 
morning, and he could not but say, as he had said on former occasions 
that they did a great deal of credit to their accountants for the plain and 
straightforward manner in which they were made out and these 
accounts gave a clear history of the finances of the Commission from 
the commencement to the present time as could be obtained anywhere 
[NTCP, 1865, p. xxx]. 
Audit 
We now turn to an examination of the auditors' role and audit function within the 
TIC, with a brief comparison to the Newcastle Corporation and private companies. It 
was shown earlier in this chapter that the auditors refused to pass the accounts of the 
TIC in the early years of its formation, suggesting they had some accounting and 
auditing knowledge and ability. The following reference also suggests that the 
auditors were men who understood accounts as it reveals Hedley, the TIC auditor 
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representing the Newcastle Corporation, being involved in auditing the books of other 
concems- 
Mr. Ridley reported that the auditors had examined and passed the 
accounts; and Mr. Plummer added that Mr. Hedley, one of the 
auditors, had told him that he was also auditing the books of three or 
four other large concerns, and that the books of the Commission were 
in the best state of any he had seen, and were a great credit to the 
Commission and to Mr. Guthrie [NTCP, 1858, p. xxvi]. 
As noted earlier, four auditors were initially appointed, one from each of the 
represented boroughs; and in later years an additional auditor was appointed 
representing the dues-payers. 
The requirements imposed on the auditors were minimal in comparison to the 
audits of today; and the scope of the audit was limited to comparing receipts and 
payment vouchers with the accounts, and checking that the balance of cash agreed to 
the bank statements for the first 25 years of the TIC's existence. One way of 
ascertaining the scope of the auditors' responsibilities is by looking at their reports. In 
the early years, the auditors' reports were very brief, consisting of one line 
statements: in the 1850s,, 'Examined and found correct'; by 1865, 'Examined and 
Audited and found Correct'. As niight be expected, there was an increase in the detail 
of the auditors' reports in line with the increased volume of accounting information 
and disclosure. For the accounting year ending 3V December 1872, the first year of 
the consolidation of borrowing powers, the 'Auditors Certificate' read: 
We have examined the accounts of the Tyne Improvement 
Commissioners for the year 1872. Compared the same with the various 
sources of receipt, and the vouchers for payments, and certify the same 
to be correct. The Balance of Cash as shown by the Cash Books, 
corresponds with the sum in the Bank, as per Pass Books on the 31" 
December, 1872. Thomas Hedley, Thos. Clarke, H. E. Smyth and W. G. 
Montgomery, Auditors 
This was a marked improvement in information given, yet clearly the audit was still 
limited in scope. 
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However, by 1875 the level of detail in the report had increased significantly, 
with the phrase 'true and correct' - the precursor of today's 'true and fair' - first 
appearing. The report for the previous year also illustrates a marked increase in the 
scope of the audit compared to two years earlier, suggesting that audit procedures 
were developing at this time. The last 30 years of the 19' century marked the advent 
of an accountancy profession that aimed to uphold professional standards of conduct. 
The increase in the scope of the TIC's audit might therefore have been a response to 
criticism that it should have been appointing independent professional auditors, as 
there were no statutory requirements at the time that would have increased the level 
of audit work. Whatever the explanation, the 1874 auditors' report revealed a much 
more rigorous standard of audit- 
The Auditors have examined the accounts of the Tyne Improvement 
Commissioners for the year ending 31" December, 1874, and find the 
abstract of such accounts, which they now sign, dated this day, 
contains a true and correct statement of the receipts and payments of 
the Commissioners during the year. The vouchers for payments have 
all been examined and compared with the cheques and coupons for 
such payments. The various items of receipt of renewal for the year 
have been checked with the returns of the various collectors of dues 
and other sources and found to be correct. The mortgage register and 
cash book of Consolidated Fund have been carefully gone through, to 
see that all sums borrowed are properly accounted for; and the 
appointment made in such cash-book of the principal sums borrowed 
during the year, and in hand on the 31 st of December last, is found to 
be correct, as shown by the cash-books of that fund, and of the 
different other funds of the Commissioners. The balance sheet shows 
the existing amount of the mortgage debt of the Commissioners, as 
well as the various other sums due to or by the Commissioners, and is 
in all respects a fine representation of the financial position of the 
Tyne Improvement Commissioners on the 3V December, 1874.1 
Hedley, W. G. Montgomery, Thos. T. Clarke, H. E. Smyth [NTCP, 
1875, p. xii] 
Around this time that the utilisation of (non-independent' auditors was 
increasingly criticised, as greater accountability was seen as coming from an 
independent professional auditor- 
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With reference to the question of audit, he had always maintained 
that in reference to public bodies, where money was raised by 
taxation all the accounts should pass through the hands of a 
professional auditor... it was desirable that some third person should 
audit the accounts rather than a person who was concerned in the 
expenditure ... He hoped the time would come when all monies 
raised by taxation and by Parliamentary powers would be audited by 
professional auditors, so that they should see exactly that no cavil 
could be made as to the mode in which they were spent [NTCP, 
1876, p. 376] 
One of the factors in the delay in the appointment of a professional might have been 
cost, as the present auditors did their work gratuitously. A few years later further 
criticisms were made of the audit process: 
The duty of an auditor was not simply to examine a bill and voucher, 
and compare the two. The business of an auditor in his humble 
judgment was to see that where a man paid an account for 110,000, 
L10,000 was taken for the same, legitimately due, and that it was 
applied equally to legitimate sources; otherwise the position of an 
auditor was a farce and a mockery [NTCP, 188 1, p. 90]. 
It was not until 1899 that a 'Chartered Accountant's Certificate' was first 
produced in addition to the 'Statutory Auditors' Certificate' to signify the 
appointment of a professional. Why this occurred then is unclear, but it was in this 
year that a chartered accountant was first employed to examine and check the books 
and accounts of the TIC and to report on the annual accounts alongside the existing 
auditors. He carried out much of the same work as the auditors, as the auditors' and 
accountant's statements read very much the same with regard to the scope of their 
work. The auditors were still elected members from the various councils and dues- 
payers. However, now two of the five individuals did have professional accounting 
qualifications. One can only assume that the independent accountant was necessary to 
enhance the accountability of the Commission. Thus we see an overlap in the work 
completed by both parties. Extracts of the Auditors' and Accountant's Certificates are 
presented here to illustrate the point: 
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Auditors- 'examined the Accounts, Books, and Documents' of the TIC 
and 'found them correct'. 
Accountant* 'completed an examination of the Books and Accounts 
of the TIC and 'find them correct'. 
Auditors: 'Vouchers for the various payments were produced, and the 
Revenue compared with the Return of the Collectors ... and the whole 
accurately correspond'. 
Accountant: 'I have checked the Revenue with the Collectors Returns, 
and Vouchers have been produced and examined ... and 
find them 
correct ). 
It is interesting to contrast here the function of the audit and auditors within 
the Newcastle Corporation and private companies in the 19' century, the former 
drawing from two papers by Brackenborough [2003,2008], who examined the 
auditing function within the Newcastle Corporation, and the latter from a paper by 
Maltby [ 1999], who looked at the auditing process within British private companies. 
In the early years of the 19' century, Newcastle Corporation had 24 auditors 
in total, two from each of the 12 mysteries. 12 The auditors were often elected by 
reason of their 'attending the election meeting' rather than according to ability 
[Mackenzie, 1827, p. 637]. They were often the subject of severe criticism: 
During many years the auditors placed large sums under one head, 
without any proper explanation ... merely signed the chamber-clerks 
general account, as entered into the book, without examining either 
bills or receipts ... 
[As a] consequence of this neglect of duty in the 
auditors, negligence and corruption began to creep into the revenue 
department of the Corporation until at length a spirit of dissatisfaction 
spread through the whole burgesses [ibid]. 
In 1809 most of the mysteries nominated men who 'appeared willing and qualified to 
12 There were 12 Companies cafled Mysteries, representing groups of traders. These were Merchants, 
Mercers. Drapers,, Skinncrs, Tailors, Saddlers. Bakers and Brewers. Tanners, Cordwainers, 
Butchers, Smiths, Fullcrs and Dyers. The earliest trade incorporated in 1436 (Smiths) and the last 
in 1621 (Butchers). There were also 15 societies called Bye-Trades. These were not Mysteries. 
These were Mariners, Weavers, Barber Surgeons, Cutlers, Shipwrights, Coopers, House 
Carpenters, Masons, Glovers, Joiners, Millers, Curriers, Paviours, Slaters and Glaziers. The earliest 
trade incorporated in 1426 (Coopers) and the last in 1656 (Paviours). 
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FIGURE 22 
TIC Financial Reports, 1900 [1,627 T987T, Cr 629062A] 
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fulfil their oath" [ibid], and the unsatisfactory accounting procedures of the past were 
exposed. For example, auditors found substantial arrears owing to the Corporation. 
They also discovered accounts from former years that had never been closed. As a 
result they resolved 'that the whole accounts be laid before us this year, or we will not 
sign the book' [1809, Auditors report of proceedings]. After a short dispute with the 
Corporation, the auditors obtained the remaining books and accounts requested and 
were able to complete the audit. In 1823 'the accounts were published in a pamphlet 
form and all the details clearly arranged under distinct heads' [ibid, p. 641]. Cook 
[1961, p. 222] adds that 'in 1830 the auditors secured the publication in full of the 
corporation accounts ... 
This was a substantial victory in a battle that had lasted since 
1809'. By the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835, it was stated that Burgesses of 
every Borough 
shall elect from the Person qualified to be Councillors by a Majority of 
Votes, Two Burgesses, who shall be called Auditors of such Borough 
[Hein, 1978, p. 53]. 
One auditor was to be elected by the ratepayers and the other by the Mayor, to whom 
each party was responsible respectively. The elected member was not to be a member 
of the Council whereas the Mayor's auditor was obliged to be. However, like the TIC, 
'there was no requirement that the auditor should possess any financial expertise' 
[Edwards, 1992, p. 69]. 
What can be seen here is that in the early years of the 191h century the total 
lack of order in the accounts was exposed by the auditors; and it was they who 
secured vital changes to the way in which the accounts were presented and published. 
This is in stark contrast to the perceived lack of value of the non-independent auditor 
in the second half of the 19'hcentury. As was the case with the TIC, by the 1860's the 
role of the Corporation"s auditors and scope of the audit were being openly criticised. 
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In this case, the chief critic was Gillespie, who was one of the auditors of the borough 
accounts and also an accountant. He wrote a letter to the Newcastle Corporation 
stating - 
I feel it my conscientious duty to direct your attention to some of the 
defects of your system of book-keeping, and the utter inefficiency of 
the present so called audit [NTCP, 186 1, p. 16]. 
Gillespie's outburst was in response to a major cash deficiency found in the 
accounts of the Corporation in 1860. This was only discovered after an investigation 
of the bookkeeping of the Corporation was made after the death of their current 
bookkeeper in 1859. Again, it was the death of an officer that was the catalyst for an 
investigation that aimed to improve the accounting procedures. The seriousness of the 
defalcation led the Newcastle Corporation to employ independent auditors, Messrs. 
Robert Fletcher & Co, to investigate the cash deficiency. Their investigation was to 
last 13 years! 
Gillespie criticised the audit as 'being neither more nor less than the checking 
of the vouchers with the cash amount of the Treasurer for the current year' [ibid]. No 
examination was made of the receipts. In his opinion 'such is not the audit 
contemplated by the act under which the auditors discharge their duties' [ibid]. In 
particular he ascribed the defalcations to the 'absence of a regular balance sheet 
[emphasis his]' [ibid]. The Newcastle Corporation replied by making clear the role 
and scope of the auditor, and by emphasising that it had fulfilled its statutory 
obligations: 
The functions of the auditors were merely to check what had been 
paid, and see that the proper vouchers were produced, and that the 
payments had been made by the authority of that Council [ibid, p. 17]. 
... 
It is not a question for the Auditors. The act clearly intends the 
Auditors to be a check upon the Treasurer, not upon the Council-, and 
their duties are so plainly defined in the 931 Section of the Municipal 
Act 
... 
That section enacts that the Treasurer 'shall submit true 
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accounts of all money received and paid by them, with all the 
Vouchers and papers relating thereto, to the Auditors every half year, for the purpose of being examined and audited, and if the said 
accounts are found to be correct, the Auditors are said to sign the 
same' ... However inadequate Mr Gillespie, as an Accountant, may 
consider this to be, as an Auditor he is assuredly is not empowered to 
go beyond it [NTCP, 1862, p. 65]. 
However, the situation was to change. II years later, on the receipt of Fletcher 
& Co's report recommending many changes to the accounting function of Newcastle 
Corporation, it was suggested: 
It would be proper for the Town Council to appoint a professional 
gentleman resident in the locality, to make on their behalf every three 
months, an exhaustive audit of the whole of the Corporation's accounts 
[NTCP, 1873, p. 120]. 
Further details of the investigation and the recommendations of the report can be 
found in Brackenborough [2008], but it is sufficient to say here that in 1873 a 
professional accountant was employed by the Newcastle Corporation, F. R. Goddard. 
He soon became responsible for a monthly audit, which by 1888, took 281 days. 
Goddard's detailed audit programme [1887] for each significant department of the 
Newcastle Corporation is reproduced by Dicksee [1892, pp. 94-103] in his celebrated 
text entitled 'Auditing'. 
The appointment of a professional accountant by municipal corporations to 
audit their accounts was discretionary and occurred at different times. 
Brackenborough [2008] looks at this in more detail. However, what is clear is that 
there was no statutory requirement to appoint a professional even as late as 1887. 
Thus, Hein [1978, p. 50] observed that Parliament refused a bill proposing that 
'provision should be made that the accounts of ... Municipal Corporations and other 
Local Bodies should be audited only be properly qual-ified accountants'. 
Turning now to the private sector, Maltby [1999, p. 29] states that in the latter 
years of the 19' century there was an increase in the growth of auditing work, 
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'accompanied by an increasing preference for the professional (normally a qualified 
accountant) over the lay auditor'. This was the same within the TIC and Newcastle 
Corporation. She summarises the development in the statutory requirements of the 
audit as follows: 
The 1844 Joint Stock Companies Act, which first made it possible to 
gain corporate status by registration, required companies to produce a 
'full and fair' balance sheet which was to be audited and presented to 
every general meeting of shareholders ... 
In 1856, however, the Act for 
the Incorporation and Regulation of Joint Stock Companies abandoned 
the provisions relating to accounting and audit which had subsisted 
since 1844 ... 
Subsequent legislation tightened the rules for certain 
important classes of company. Requirements for the publication of 
accounts were introduced for railways in 1868, life assurance 
companies in 1870, the gas industry and waterworks in 1871, building 
societies in 1874 and the electricity industry in 1882. But for general 
companies the permissive regime went unchanged until a Companies 
Act was passed in 1900 which required the presentation to 
shareholders of an audited balance sheet [ibid, p. 33]. 
'The scope of the auditor's duties was determined by the company's articles' [ibid, 
p. 381. As was the case in the public sector, 'there was no statutory requirement for the 
auditor to hold a professional qualification' [ibid]. It was not until a Companies Act 
of 1947 that the auditor was required to be a professional accountant. However, like 
in the public sector, professionals were appointed at the discretion of companies 
before it became a statutory requirement. 
To sum up there is a good deal of overlap in the development of the auditing 
function within the TIC, the Newcastle Corporation and the private sector. In all 
three cases there was considerable development during the 19' century in auditing 
and accounting, but most of this was undertaken voluntarily rather than as a result of 
statutory regulation. In the case of the TIC, we have identified the professionalisation 
of accountancy and the practices of the North Eastern Railway Company as being 
possible sources of influence. 
Another factor promoting change was the wide range of internal and external 
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interests to which the TIC was accountable for its financial proceedings. The two 
most prominent catalysts for reform coming from within were agitation by 
dissatisfied members; and the deaths of significant officials, which gave the TIC the 
chance to reflect on the current position in order to build on what was good and to 
improve even more. For example, strict credentials were required for the replacement 
accountant after Guthrie's death in 1880- 
The committee suggest that in the appointment of a new Secretary, he 
should be possessed of considerable experience in finance, drawing up 
reports, &c, a good correspondent, and able to direct and control the 
whole business of the Commission [NTCP, 1880, p. xxviii]. 
Internal controls were improved and new ones put in place to promote efficiency, 
reduce nsk and to minimise losses. For example, increased auditing was promoted to 
add checks on the various departments of the TIC; separation of duties was 
introduced with regards to stock ordering and signing pay sheets. These and further 
examples are examined below. The catalyst for external inquiries came ftom parties 
dissatisfied with how the affairs of the River were being managed. It will be seen that 
accounting data was used to base objections to the culTent position in the many 
inquiries that the TIC were subjected to, and that in turn the TIC used accounting data 
to contest these remarks. We start off by looking at internal measures to promote 
accountability and to improve accounting for the River. 
Accountability: internal structures 
From the early days of the TIC, the accounting controls put in place were constantly 
scrutinised by internal parties, culminating in significant accounting reform. James 
Mather, Councillor and Tyne Improvement Commissioner, was more often than not 
the instigator for change. Welford [1894] includes a brief biography of Mather in his 
series Men of Tivixt and liveed. From his study, it appears that Mather's background 
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was in medicine and philosophy. He was in his early 30's when he became involved 
in politics and was seen as a 'radical reformer'. 
In the Gateshead Observer, Shields Gazette, and other local journals, 
Mr. Mather frequently wrote upon the improvement of the river Tyne, 
so as to render it a harbour of refuge. When the control of the river 
passed into the hands of a Commission he was elected one of the 
members to represent South Shields. For many years he advocated at 
the river board the liberal course of improvements which has 
converted the Tyne into one of the noblest river estuaries in the United 
Kingdom [ibid, pp. 183-4]. 
Many of his reforms involved highlighting deficiencies in the current arrangements, 
simplifying, modifying and creating new accounting methods and systems for the 
purpose of economy, as well as to make them easier to use, examples of which are 
illustrated below. In many cases it was through analysing accounting data that Mather 
based his arguments, contesting the current position [Francis, 1990] and seeking 
reform. 
In the following example, by using accounting data, Mather requested an 
investigation into the 'dues and other charges producing revenue),, and the salanes 
relating to the collection and management of these, with the aim to reduce, simplify 
and modify them- 
Mr. Mather moved, 'That a committee be appointed to investigate the 
dues and all other charges producing revenue to the River Tyne 
Commissioners, also the salaries paid under the same; for the purpose 
of simplifying, modifying, or reducing such dues, charges and 
salafies. '... Mr Mather computed the income of the Commission from 
all sources at B6,000 and the amount of salary paid for its collection 
at 0,000 a year. He thought this sum enormous, and the manner in 
which the taxes were levied highly objectionable [NTCP, 1855, 
P. xxxiv]. 
Another example showing Mather's ideology of reform to simplifý and economise, 
and his use of accounts to reveal the current position and press for change is shown 
here - 
Mr. Mather moved 'That a Select Committee be appointed to 
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investigate the cost and general expenses of the engineering and other 
officers of this Commission, with a view to their better economy, and 
to the consolidation of such offices ... He said the expenses of the Commission were enormous, and he might mention that the 
engineering expenses of the piers now in course of construction cost 
them 5 per cent upon their permanent outlay of L166,000 in five years, 
that their expenses for the Northumberland Dock had cost them 2 or 3 
per cent., and their general expenses on the river cost them about 4 1/2 
per cent making a total of II 1/2per cent on their various works. The 
engineering at the Liverpool docks was only at the rate of 12 13s. 4d. 
per cent. They had three chief engineers for their works on the Tyne, a 
number which he thought not at all necessary; and some practical plan 
should be gone into. Any person who went into the accounts of the 
Commissioners must be palpably struck with the enormous 
expenditure for their officers, and with the complicated and expensive 
arrangements [NTCP, 1858, p. xxxviii]. 
Presumably, the figures relating to Liverpool were derived from the Liverpool 
Commission's own published accounts, as Mather's statements do not reveal his 
source. 
The result of this request was an 1858 Select Committee investigation. The 
report at 14 pages was concise in length. The most significant recommendation was 
the amalgamation of the Harbour Masters and Police departments, as the former was 
not fulfilling its duties. However, reading further it can be seen part of the reason 
why: 'The Harbour Master is seldom or ever afloat ... 
his Assistant and two Boatmen 
who have no boat' [Select Committee Report, 1858, p. 12], and as a consequence 
could not carry out their duties! The report recommended that 'the Harbour-Master of 
Newcastle should retire ... as well as 
his assistant and that a successor, without any 
assistant, be appointed' [ibid, p. 14]. By amalgamating these two offices and retiring 
certain members, the aim was to increase efficiency and reduce costs. 
Perhaps the biggest internal inquiry of the TIC occurred in 1880 after the 
death of the TIC secretary, James Guthrie. Clearly, the catalyst for this inquiry was 
Guthrie's death as it was not pending beforehand. This practice was not new as the 
death of a senior officer, the bookkeeper, within the Corporation of Newcastle 
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stimulated an in depth investigation into the accounting practices in 1859 
[Brackenborough, 2008]. The 1880 inquiry was set up to I investigate into the general 
office arrangements of the Commission'. It was carried out by Tyne Improvement 
Commissioners, was not independent, therefore. 
The report of this investigation, 'Report of the Investigation Committee' 
(herein ROIC), over 100 pages in length, was a private and confidential report, not 
made available to the public, and consisted of an analysis of each department, 
including interviews and evidence and recommendations for change. It stated in detail 
the names of the different officers with their salaries and duties in the employment of 
the Commissioners, and also included a digest of the method of bookkeeping in 
operation and the principles adopted in dealing with the finances of the Commission. 
Further,, the report recommended areas for improvement and change for each of the 
departments investigated. I have produced an organisation chart from the report, 
detailing the most significant members of each department, which is shown below 
together with detailed excerpts from the report relevant to the main accounting issues. 
As would be expected, there was a hierarchy in the TIC organisational structure and 
in the lines of reporting. It was found that infonnation was reported upwards and 
instructions downwards. This was the case within the individual departments and for 
the organisation as a whole, with ultimate responsibility for financial and engineering 
matters resting with the Secretary and Engineer respectively. 
Each department had a chief, master or manager who was responsible for the 
running of their department. Each had their own accounting responsibilities, which 
consisted of various tasks, such as making up pay sheets, pay bills, 'making up 
Yearly Statements required by Secretary as to expenditure on various works' [ROIC 
1880, p. 13], and 'preparing statements of past and estimates of future works' [Ibid, 
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FIGURE 23 
Organisation Chart, produced from the 1880 Investigation Committee Report 
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p. 251. Ultimately, these accounting statements were submitted to Messant, the 
Engineer, for 'examination and certification' [ibid]- 'Mr Messant signs checks on 
petty cash account, certified accounts are entered into the Invoice Book, and sent to 
the Engineer for payment' [ibid, p. 25]. These were then reported to the Secretary or 
handed directly to him- 'Money matters and questions of accounts are all referred to 
the Secretary' [ibid p. 38]. It can be seen that accounting matters were dealt with by 
the Clerks department, Dues Offices, Bookkeepers and ultimately by the TIC 
Secretary. In these departments the books containing the financial records were kept. 
For example, the Bookkeepers department held the set of books for the Tyne 
Consolidated Fund, Tyne Improvement Fund, Northumberland Dock Fund, River 
Moorings Fund, as well as various statistical tables. In the Dues office, there were 
two sets of account-books detailing dues on imports and exports, and two sets of 
statistical books detailing imports and exports. The Clerks department kept various 
minutes and registers and subsidiary books of account. 
The investigation identified various matters that needed reforming. I have 
chosen to illustrate the main issues relating to the accounting function that were 
pinpointed by the Investigation Committee for reform, and also I have documented 
the reforms that were recommended. Although the double entry bookkeeping 
appeared satisfactory, the way it was presented needed simplification by recording the 
accounts into one book. The auditors of the TIC were Council members from each of 
the represented towns. None were qualified as it was not mandatory for them to be so, 
Perhaps with the ICAEW having been formed in this year also, a suggestion was 
made to use an independent qualified paid accountant, and is alluded to again below: 
The system of book-keeping recommended itself because of simplicity 
... 
[However] the committee recommended the Commissioners to 
consider whether it could not be arranged to keep only one set of 
books instead of five, as at present, and also whether the audit of 
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accounts at present conducted gratuitously by gentlemen appointed by 
the Corporations and other public bodies represented, ought not to be 
supplemented by official paid accountants in future [ibid, p-7]. 
At the Coble Dene Dock, it was found that the 'accounts were only kept in 
pencil, and [Turnball, CDD Bookkeeper] did not balance regularly' [ibid, p. 26]. In 
another case, the salaries paid to certain members were deemed as being too high and 
as a consequence a reduction was recommended. Campbell was a draughtsman for 
the TIC. I-Es salary was 1218 pa. Captain Wilson, who worked in the Chief Clerks 
office, had a salary of E220 pa. It was noted that, 'he [Wilson] had not much office 
work' [ibid, p. 12]. It was therefore requested that 'the salaries of Campbell and 
Captain Wilson be reduced to 1100 and L150 each per annum, respectively' [ibid, 
p. 15]. This was quite a reduction, and is an indication of the TIC rationally appraising 
the level of work undertaken by the employees in relation to their salaries. 
In another example, it was found by looking at cost statements that the 
arrangements at Howdon yard were unsatisfactory: 'The present cost of work done, as 
shown by the cost statements' revealed a lack of 'efficiency' and 'economy', leading 
to the recommendation for stricter internal controls to be implemented in the form of 
a new manager and a regular audit under the control of the Secretary: 
who shall have the entire control and authority over the whole 
undertaking, subject nevertheless to such orders as he may receive 
from the Engineer to whom he (the manager) shall report and hold 
himself responsible ... 
[and] a regular audit, conducted under the 
direction of the Secretary, is necessary [ibid, pp. 23-4]. 
In the Harbour Master's office, the auditors did not check the books at all, and 
so it was suggested that the role of the present auditors be extended and new checks 
implemented. The 'auditors do no interfere with this department' and the books, such 
as receipts and payments books for immediate cash transactions, pay bill books, 
warrant issued books are 'not checked by anyone' [ibid, p. 49]. In the Dues office, it 
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was suggested that a travelling auditor be employed with new and extensive duties: 
Now that the business of the Commission is becoming so extensive, it 
may now be well to take into consideration the desirability of 
appointing a Travelling Auditor, to be charged with the duty of 
periodically visiting and examining the books, accounts, and cash, at 
the several Revenue Branches, and the various Petty Cash Accounts; 
and of reporting to this office the result of such examinations, and of 
anything affecting the undertaking of the Commission which may 
come under his notice [ibid, p. 82]. 
The accountability of officers was promoted by rationalising the reporting structure: 
[Currently there are] three heads - the Dock Master, W Emmerson, 
and Mr Ramshaw; and in his opinion, things are not very satisfactory. 
He thinks there ought only to be one head to ensure efficient working 
[ibid, p. 34]. 
Each managed their own branch and were 'entirely independent of and unaccountable 
to the other two, and 'harmonious results will be best secured by making one person 
the chief and the others subordinate' [ibid, p. 44]. 
From an overall perspective, the 'most important suggestions' put forward by 
the Investigation Committee involved a number of internal control improvements and 
additions, such as more frequent audits, greater regulation over payments, and a call 
for independence with regards to the audit: 
Regulations as to the signing of Pay Bills, and official certification of 
accounts for payment. Improved system of keeping Cash and other 
Books. Regular and frequent Petty Cash and Stores' Audit at each 
department, under the direction of the Secretary ... 
Simple method of 
keeping Petty Cash Books for universal adoption ... 
A supplementary 
and general half-yearly audit conducted by paid professional chartered 
accountants [ibid, p. 79]. 
Upon receiving the report, Urwin, the Secretary made the following comments 
suggesting segregation of duties and tighter supervision: 
In my opinion the satisfactory working of the office requires that the 
duties should be rearranged and some what sub-divided; and I think 
Mr Armstrong ought (in addition to his duties) ... 
be in a position to 
exercise in an adequate manner proper supervision over the various 
other duties of the office, which can scarcely be said to be the case at 
present [ibid, p. 81]. 
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In response to the recommendations of the investigation Committee, Urwin stated 
that progress that has been made and agreed for new controls to be put into place. The 
main areas covered further checks by members, and increasing the amount of 
accounting documentation made available to them- 
A New Cash Book, in which will be entered by Mr Armstrong all 
cheques in cash received and paid, including petty cash disbursements 
and sums payable by the Commissioners. This book will contain the 
folios of the general books in which the transactions finally appear, 
which folios will be inserted by the book-keeper, who will also at the 
end of every month check and certify the petty cash balance in the 
hands of Mr Armstrong ... 
I have also arranged for an abstract of all 
outstanding accounts in the general books to be prepared monthly, 
which can be laid before the Commissioners periodically, in order that 
special instructions may be given, if necessary, respecting any 
particular account ... 
In connection with the petty cash arrangements, I may mention that I 
propose opening accounts in the general ledger in the names of the 
several persons holding the sums advanced. At present no separate 
account exists, the amounts having been charged direct to Engineer's 
pay bill account [ibid, p. 23] 
With regards to the Engineers office, the Investigation Committee recommended 
preventative measures, such as initialling of the books when money was being passed 
between clerks, and checking the petty cash: 
... 
institute a regular audit of petty cash by the Head Office. It is also 
imperative that a system of initialling the books of the several clerks 
etc who pass money to each other should be strictly enforced, and a 
better petty cash arrangement introduced, with requisite checks to 
prevent inaccuracies [ROIC, 1880, p. 33]. 
What can be seen from this and other inquiries is that the need for the TIC to 
be accountable to a wide range of stakeholders in the River Tyne resulted in 
significant changes in the way it operated. Significant ramifications include the 
restructuring of accounts and organisation, the revision of accounting techniques and 
methods, and improving the system of internal control. 
186 
Accountability: external bodies 
The TIC was also accountable to a whole host of external bodies. As the TIC was a 
trust, it was accountable to the many different users of the Tyne - traders, ship- 
owners, local industries, and the local areas represented by their respective Councils. 
Because of this, almost anyone could spark an inquiry into the TIC's management of 
the Tyne. The Government, Admiralty, Royal Commissions, or even the Newcastle 
Corporation could get involved in carrying out investigations into the affairs and 
regulation of the TIC. In many cases these external inquiries were not welcomed by 
the TIC, who saw them as too frequent and excessive. Accounting data provided the 
TIC with a means of countering them. 
Almost from the establishment of the TIC, differences of opinion arose among 
the Commissioners with respect to the best mode of improving the River, and the 
manner in which money should be spent. Within only four years of its foundation, the 
TIC found itself under investigation by a Royal Commission. This investigation was 
sparked by dissatisfied members of the TIC from outside Newcastle who complained 
that their localities were being unfairly neglected, despite them providing a large 
proportion of the TIC's revenues. 
Accounting information played a big part in the investigation. 
A letter was read fi7om the Secretary of the Royal Commission 1854, 
requesting information [amongst other things whether] ... the Board of Commissioners appointed in 1850 had worked efficiently; the revenue 
and expenditure, and how the funds of the Commissioners were 
applied. [Mr. Mather objected to this, stating that] they had now 
sufficient data to regulate their own affkirs, they had inquiry after 
inquiry with the same result, and he could not help feeling that the 
investigation would be one-sided ... [The TIC responded stating that] the Board since its construction in 1850 had worked efficiently ... The question as to income and expenditure is best answered by enclosing 
copies of the accounts of the Commission since its establishment 
[NTCP, 1854, p. xxvi]. 
However, these explanations did not satisfy all interested parties. The six 
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Shield s/Gateshead members pressed for further external investigations to be made 
using the TIC accounts to base their allegations. They wrote to the Admiralty 
requesting an inquiry into the way the TIC was being managed. Claims were made of 
mismanagement, useless expenditure being incurred by the TIC, and the 
misallocation of revenue in favour of Newcastle at the expense of the Shields trade. 
As a result, the Admiralty wrote to the TIC requesting accounting information to 
satisfy their inquiries, and it was by these accounts that the TIC refuted the 
allegations made. Thus, a letter was sent from the Admiralty to the TIC: 
"I am commanded by the Lords of the Admiralty to request that you 
will inform their Lordships what is the amount which had been 
received by the River Tyne Commissioners on account of the rates 
authorised to be levied on vessels entering the port under the 63' 
clause of the Act of 1852 for the construction of piers at the mouth of 
the Tyne, and what sums, if any, have been borrowed on security of 
these rates ... [This was requested because] it had been stated at the Admiralty that the Commission had acted a dishonourable part as 
public servants, that they had taken the funds which they had pledged 
themselves to Parliament to apply to a particular work on the Tyne, 
and had appropriated them to almost private purposes at least to a 
speculation over which the Commission had sole control" ... The 
charge that they had been misapplying this fund he [TIC member] 
utterly repudiated. Not one farthing of the fund raised for the 
construction of those piers had been applied to any other than the great 
purposes of the measure [NTCP, 1855, p. liv]. 
However, pressure from the opposition led to a full in depth inquiry on these 
issues in 1855. The inquiry extended over several weeks and amounted to over 400 
pages of evidence and reports. The inquiry commenced with the TIC members for 
Shields and Gateshead arguing that the accounts showed that the TIC had enough 
revenue to carry out the necessary improvement works, affecting their particular 
locality - namely the piers works - which they maintained were progressing far too 
slowly: 
The accounts show that there is plenty of money ... 
This is a matter in 
the conduct of this Commission which has been most detrimental, to 
the interests of the public ... the piers pointed out by Mr. Rendel, as 
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one of the operations to be commenced at once, and for which they 
had provided ample funds; it is most disappointing to them that that 
should be the state of things ... The works 
have been executed in a 
desultory way, sometimes a piece here, and sometimes a piece there; 
upon no uniform line as it is stated [1855, pp. 57-8]. 
In response, the TIC used the same accounting data to contest these 
allegations, which shows that the data could be interpreted in more than one way. The 
TIC focused on the positives of how the expenditure was being used and the progress 
of the works so far. The Commission showed that the majority of the funds raised had 
to be channelled elsewhere, and that the works on the piers were underway. Only 
with time would results be seen, although these were now starting to show: 
You said that before you closed your examination, you would like to 
give some evidence with respect to your financial condition9 ... With respect to the funds, in order to show the desire that we have to do the 
best we can for the harbour of Shields, we have a mooring fund which 
provides, by a separate tax upon the shipping, for putting down 
moorings ... The year 
before the present one, I see there is a balance 
of the money which we lent to that fund, of 8271 12s 5d, that is, a 
portion of the general funds of the river applied to putting down 
moorings, principally in Shields harbour, for the purpose of affording 
greater facilities to shipping. During the present year, that is the year 
ending 3 Is' December, the accounts are not yet made up, therefore they 
cannot be handed to the Commissioners in a sufficient statel but I 
believe it will be found that we have expended from our general 
revenue on that fund 2,0571 and I believe I am fight in stating that we 
are going on now with new works of that description which will incur 
4,0001 and which will consequently draw from our general revenue 
next year 2,0001 more. Now you are surprised at what becomes of our 
money, and how little has gone to the improvement of the river, only 
2,0001 has been applied to the improvement [ibid, pp. 230-2]. 
The opposition responded by criticising where the funds had been spent, 
arguing that the majority of the expenditure was unnecessary and would have been 
better spent elsewhere. Concluding for the opposition: 
The only point to which I need direct your attention and upon which I 
need say a word, is the way in which the revenue has been 
appropriated. It must have startled many of you, as it startled Mr 
Brunel that on river works or improvements there has not been an 
expenditure of more than about 20001 a year. It is stated in Mr 
Stevenson's evidence to be a sum so insignificant that it arrested the 
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attention of Mr Brunel, and led him to searching examination into 
various items of expenditure and the ways and means of the 
Commissioners. The expenditure occasioned by the promotion of the 
Hay Hole Docks, and the expenditure in opposition to the Tynemouth 
Docks, were expenditures that ought never to have been incurred, and 
would never have been incurred if you had had an independent 
Commission, or a Commission under the control of the Admiralty, or 
some parties who had no local interests to serve. I say these 
expenditures are symptoms of disease, and are matters deserving and 
that ought to receive your anxious enquiry [ibid, p. 427]. 
Thus, the accounting data provided the opposition a tool to argue their case and the 
TIC to defend theirs. No doubt both parties had a case to argue. This example shows 
the early teething problems of the TIC with regard to the localities still vying with 
Newcastle over the allocation of expenditure that was now made visible by the 
published accounts. 
Just as one inquiry finished, another was around the comer, much to the 
outrage of the TIC. In 1858 it was Parliament that led its own brief inquiry. Owing to 
the public nature of the inquiry it exposed the TIC to full public scrutiny. The TIC 
were accused of failing to choose the best tender for piers works, and instead giving 
the work to a Newcastle man whose tender was greater: 
Mr. Hodgson, said ... there was one matter which he thought cast a 
great slur on that body - namely, the order of the House of Commons 
to prepare a full account of all contracts which the Commissioners had 
entered into ... it was most ungracious and unfair to caU for it in the House of Commons, and bring it before the public ... the Commissioners had saved 160,000 by accepting the present contract 
for the piers, and the contractor was an honourable and talented man; 
therefore they had nothing to conceal [NTCP, 1858, p. xIiii]. 
Even though the TIC was technically separate from the Newcastle 
Corporation, it still was accountable to it, and this proved to be one of the most 
resented forms of questioning into the TIC's financial affairs. The TIC argued that 
they were formed to replace Newcastle Corporation's control of River's affairs, not to 
be answerable to it. For example, Mr. Mease (Newcastle Councillor) suggested to the 
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TIC that it would be well to 'have a thorough examination of the accounts of the 
Commission, and a general stock-taking, as was done every year by a prudent man of 
business' [NTCP, 1865, p. ii]. Similarly, the Newcastle Corporation requested 
comprehensive accounting evidence to satisfy itself regarding the management of the 
Tyne when a proposal was put forward by the TIC to further increase its borrowing 
powers- 
Mr. Philipson [councillor] moved for, a return of the sums authorised 
to be raised and actually borrowed on account of the Piers' Fund; of all 
outstanding debts and obligations on this account.; a statement of the 
amount of the estimates made and of the amount expended from the 
commencement; of the extent of the work remaining to be executed, 
and of the estimated cost, and of the probable time of completion; also 
of the annual income anticipated from the increased taxation. A return 
of the River Fund, shewing the sums authorised to be borrowed and 
the amount already borrowed; of the amount of outstanding debts and 
obligations; of the works in the engineer's general report which have 
been completed; of those remaining partly or wholly unexecuted, and 
of the estimated cost [N-TCP, 1872, p. xx]. 
Unsurprisingly, the Commissioners felt aggrieved that 
the financial affairs of the River Tyne Commission was continually 
being called in question by the Corporation. The Commissioners knew 
their business as well as the Corporation knew theirs, and a great deal 
better. The finances of the Commissioners had been quite as 
satisfactorily carried out during the twenty-one years of their existence 
as the finances of the Corporation [Ibid, p. 374]. 
For its part, the Newcastle Corporation argued that, 
as the custodians of the pockets of the general public of that town and 
borough, he thought it was expressly their duty to watch every 
measure on money which emanated from the River Tyne Commission 
[Ibid, pp. 374-8]. 
A further example showing Newcastle Corporation's belief that the TIC was 
accountable to them concerned its representation on the TIC - 
He had been told that it was not right for this Corporation to criticise 
the conduct of the River Tyne Commissioners, but this Council elected 
one-fourth of the members of the Commission, and the election of the 
representatives constituted, in his opinion, a right to criticise, and, if 
necessary, to instruct [Ibid, 1885, p. 409]. 
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As far as accountability was concerned, the published accounts of the TIC 
were especially significant because they exposed the way in which the 
Commissioners used the finances available to them to public scrutiny. As the TIC 
was an improvement commission, it was natural that the majority of their work 
should relate to capital works projects. The following chapter looks at how the TIC 
accounted for these projects and also examines the role of the engineer in the 
accounting function. 
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Chapter 6: Accounting for Capital Projects 
Chapter 6 looks at accounting for the capital projects on the River Tyne. All trading 
rivers needed ongoing improvement and the aim here is to consider the accounting 
issues surrounding improvement projects. In particular, the chapter considers the 
deployment of accounting data in the political wrangling surrounding these projects; 
the separation of capital and revenue expenditure, and the question of depreciation-, 
and the management accounting role of the river engineer. 
Generally speaking, costs were calculated using projections and were defrayed 
either by loan or out of income. The cost of structural works was covered by loans, 
and works of maintenance paid for out of income. An example was shown in Chapter 
4 where by the end of 1882, works carried out by the TIC had cost 14.1 m of which 
f3.75m was raised by loans and the remaining 050,000 out of income. Therefore, 
the manner in which projects were costed, and income was separated from capital, 
had a major bearing on investment/funding decisions. 
As was demonstrated in Chapter 4, accounting data could play a big part as a 
facilitator or indeed as a retarder in holding up the progression of works by showing 
that the costs were too great and no funds were available to carry out the works. 
Consequently, there was a rather haphazard approach taken to many construction 
works, some only having their foundation stone laid before they were later 
abandoned, usually due to lack of funds, and others suspended and delayed until 
funds became available. In this chapter, by using a significant capital project managed 
by the TIC as a case study, that of Coble Dene Dock (herein CDD), it will be shown 
how vanous parties manipulated accounting data to their advantage, either to promote 
or to try to put a stop to the project. Clearly the theory of using accounts as a 
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contester is relevant and demonstrated here, [Francis, 1990]. Many felt that the CDD 
was necessary as the Tyne lacked dock space, and when completed would ultimately 
increase revenue for the TIC as more ships would use the Tyne. The opposition to the 
Dock came from the Newcastle Corporation, which argued that the project cost too 
much, and that trade to the Tyne would increase if the existing docks were improved 
involving much less expenditure. They accused the TIC of creative accounting by 
hiding the true cost of the capital works for this dock. Ultimately, owing to the delay 
brought about by the many conflicts in carrying out the construction of CDD, the 
original purpose of the dock no longer had the same signIficance upon completion. 
For example, with the increase in the use of steam power for vessels, time in the 
docks was much shorter and as they could carry more cargo, fewer vessels frequented 
the docks. Seen by some as a misuse of funds from the outset, with hindsight, the 
expenditure could indeed be seen as excessive and misplaced. 
Using river funds for river purposes only and dock funds for dock works only 
was a constant bone of contention, especially when there were excess funds on some 
accounts and desperate shortages on others. As was seen in Chapter 5, when the TIC 
proposed to further their consolidation plans it was argued by the TIC that the docks 
were feeders of the River, and so transferring funds from one to the other should be 
allowed as they were interrelated. However, it was not until the dock works were 
nearing completion that this occurred. 
Within this chapter the use of depreciation by the two main users of the Tyne, 
the TIC and the traders, is also examined. As it was a relatively new concept and one 
without any real guidance or regulation at the time, some industries adopted it more 
quickly than others: 
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After 1800 the use of depreciation in industrial accounting seems to 
have become more common. The practice was taken up in the textile 
industries, while between 1830 and 1850 significant developments in 
the treatment of depreciation occurred in the railway industry 
[Edwards and Newell, 1990, p. 52]. 
The findings relating to the River Tyne therefore provide a useful supplement to 
previous studies in helping to build up an overall picture of the spread of the concept. 
Notwithstanding the importance of calculating income to the TIC's 
funding/investment decisions, the study found that depreciation was not provided 
throughout the 19' century, even though a depreciation deduction was allowed by the 
Income Tax Authorities from the 1880's. It is interesting to note here that the TIC 
was a trading body liable to income tax; and, as pointed out in previous chapters, 
again there was reference made to the practice of the North Eastern Railway 
Company (NERC) in the TIC's own accounting documents. The NERC debited the 
revenue account with capital expenditure. It is clearly shown that categorising 
depreciation was subjective. It was the same for traders as there was no real guidance 
on the issue. However, by the end of the century, there is evidence of a move towards 
greater uniforn-ky in the way depreciation was accounted for. 
As far as capital investment decisions were concerned, the chapter finds that it 
was the responsibility of the engineer to manage these works and to provide the initial 
accounting data such as estimations and costing data. Where possible, the background 
and role of the River Tyne's engineers is examined in this chapter, with some of the 
detail included in the footnotes. For the larger rivers in the 19' century, undertaking 
important projects often meant that a consultant engineer was involved, such as the 
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eminent Messrs. Rennie, ' Stephenson, 2 Armstrong, ' Brunel ' and Walker. ' In some 
cases, the river- authorities - generally town corporations at the start of the 19" 
century and harbour authorities towards the end - employed their own full-time 
resident engineers. The Tyne was no exception, and some of the resident engineer's 
responsibilities can be found by looking at NTCP and TIC minutes. Others can be 
inferred from the types of report they prepared. It was often the case that the engineer 
was the originator of many accounting reports, producing costings and estimates that 
were then used by the TIC's accountant in his reports. Original estimates by the 
engineers were often significantly less than actual cost, and so were heavily criticised. 
The engineers , in response, justified the di erences through ex post analysis of how 6 
the works had been extended beyond the original plan, and so further costs had been 
incurred. It was also found that the works executed under the immediate direction of 
the TIC's own engineers to be 'better, cheaper, and more expeditiously done than 
when let to contractors' [NTCP, 1875, p. 349], enabling the authority to secure the 
greatest efficiency at the least expenditure of public money. 
Political wrangling: Coble Dene Dock, a case study 
The TIC was involved in many capital projects each of which had to be accounted 
for. One significant capital project for improving the Tyne was the construction of a 
new dock at Coble Dene situated within a large natural hollow on the north bank of 
the river on the Tyne at North Shields. The project proved to be a problem for the 
TIC for many years, with strong opposition to the project coming from Newcastle 
I Sir John Rennie, 1794-1874, civil and railway engineer 
2 Robert Stephenson, 1803-1859, civil engineer, son of George Stephenson, railway and IOCOmOtiVe 
engineer 
3 William Armstrong, 1810-1900, industrialist and engineer, invented the hydraulic engine and 
crane. 
4 Isambard Kingdom Brunel. 1806-1859, design engineer of rail and bridges 
5 James Walker. 1781-1862. cwil engineer and chief engineer of Trimtv House, hence a 
considerable invoIN'ement with coastal engineering 
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Corporation. This, together with the lack of available funds, were constant hurdles. 
The latter was seen in Chapter 4. 
Soon after the TIC had taken control of the River Tyne's affairs, many traders 
felt that there was a pressing need for a new dock to be created. A deputation, made 
up of members from the steam coal-trade and railways, argued that a new dock was 
necessary to manage the ever increasing trade. Significantly, the accounting records 
of the TIC fuelled the case for a new dock, showing that trade was on the increase as 
reflected in the increased income generated by the existing dock: 
The income of the Northumberland Dock [a recently established dock] 
had not been such as to justify them [to build a new dock] but now 
they had a statement of accounts which might possibly induce them to 
reconsider the question ... 
Something must be done or the trade would 
leave the Tyne [NTCP, 1853, p. xv]. 
Two dock sites were proposed, one at Low Lights and the other at Coble Dene. The 
construction proposal at Low Lights was backed by the deputation as it was felt that 
the position of the dock was more favourable. 
The TIC understood the need for a new dock but initially contested the 
deputation by using their accounts to show that they did not have enough revenue to 
venture into such a capital project. 'They could not see their way to sufficient 
revenue, to justify them in carrying out the construction work' [ibid]. 
From the gross revenue and surplus revenue reported at the time, it is easy to 
see how the accounts of the TIC could be used to promote and contest the viability of 
constructing a new dock. Those in favour of the dock would see an increasing gross 
revenue and surplus revenue, as presented in the table below. On the other-side, the 
TIC would have more accounting information at hand about how much was needed to 
start such a project and what current expenses had to be paid from the surplus and so 
at this time they deemed their current position as not strong enough to venture. 
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Year Gross Revenue Receipts 
1851 15470 
1852 1 23138 
1853 1 30413 
Surplus Revenue 
9452 
13830 
20152 
However, as trade was increasing, the demand for another dock increased and 
by 1858 gross revenue receipts were in excess of L50,000 and increasing year by 
year- 
in the years 1859 and 1860 the Commissioners were importuned by 
memorials and representations from the coal trade, merchants, and 
captains from vessels belonging to London and Newcastle, town 
councils shipowners societies, the Blyth and Tyne Railway Company 
[Guthrie, 1880, p. 171 ]. 
This time the TIC gave their full backing to the project, and with Ure, the new TIC 
engineer, drawing up the plans in his influential first report on the improvement 
requirements of the Tyne, a Bill was submitted to Parliament for increased borrowing 
powers for improvement works on the Tyne. The Low Lights project was authorised 
by the Act of Parliament, 1861 securing L600,000 in borrowing powers. The TIC 
thereupon communicated again with all the interests to be benefited, 
with a view to obtaining guarantees of traffic. Sufficient guarantees 
were not forthcoming. The Tyne Improvement Act, 1865, was 
therefore obtained, which legalised guarantees of capital by the 
coalowners, the way-leave-rent owners, the Blyth and Tyne Railway 
Company, and the Corporations of Newcastle and Tynemouth [ibid, 
p. 172]. 
However, the scheme collapsed as 'difficulties financial interfered to prevent the dock 
being made' [ibid, p. 173], with just the foundation stone beIng laid in 1864 to prevent 
the powers obtained in the 1861 Act from lapsing. 
Fears were later expressed of the safety of the constructional plans at Low 
Lights following the wreckage of several vessels near to where the dock was to be 
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constructed. Given these difficulties and the ever pressing need for a new dock, the 
CDD became the prime consideration for the dock promoters- 
The Northumberland Dock was totally inadequate to meet the 
requirements of shipping in the port ... the 
formation of a dock in the 
Tyne was now a matter of paramount, urgent, and immediate necessity 
[NTCP, 1872, p. 349] 
Convinced of the need for a new dock 'and believing such accommodation the only 
means of attracting valuable trade to the port' [Guthrie, 1880, p. 174], the TIC applied 
to the Government for the powers gained for the Low Lights Dock to be transferred to 
the CDD project by proposing a new Tyne Improvement Bill. 'In this they were 
supported by the almost unanimous voice of the district' [ibid]. However, the voice of 
the supporters did not include the Newcastle Corporation, which remained adamantly 
against the building of a new dock. The Corporation's case is examined below in 
which published accounts were used as the basis of its argument. After setting out the 
Newcastle Corporation's case, the response of the TIC follows. 
When discussing the proposed Tyne Improvement Bill, which primarily dealt 
with the consolidation of funds and the formation of the Coble Dene Dock, it was 
said at the time that it was 'one of the most important reports ever presented to that 
Council, affecting the future interests and prosperity of the river Tyne' [NTCP, 1872, 
p. 159]. Newcastle Corporation was concerned that with the proposed consolidation of 
borrowing powers the CDD would be partly constructed out of river funds, and that 
the trade of the River would suffer: 'If this dock should turn out to be an unprofitable 
speculation, the whole burthen of the loss must be borne by the entire trade of the 
district' [ibid, p. 161]. 
The issue of using the river funds for dock works had always prompted strong 
debate from the inception of the TIC 
No precedent could be found in which river dues were pledged as a 
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security for the construction of a dock not only so but Parliament 
ordained that dock trusts and river trusts should be kept quite separate 
[NTCP, 185 1, p. viii]. 
'River funds were to be used strictly for river purposes and not to be used for dock 
works' [NTCP, 1853, p. xv]. The TIC found that 'it was a very serious disadvantage 
that the Commissioners were not allowed to pledge the revenues of the river' [NTCP, 
1856, p. lxxi]. When proposing plans for a new dock in 1870, the TIC suggested that 
some of the river funds should be used to aid the dock works. It was felt that a lot of 
the revenue from the River would not have been generated had the capital works not 
been carried out. Therefore, it was only right that some of the benefit gained by the 
River should be channelled towards the capital works. As we have seen in Chapter 4, 
it was more often the case that the TIC had a deficit on the dock funds and a surplus 
on the river funds. Again, it was the Newcastle Corporation that strongly opposed the 
proposals: 
Not one of the many docks in the Thames were formed out of river 
funds, Cardiff Docks, Southampton Docks, Sunderland Docks, 
Seaham Docks, Hartlepool Docks, Hull Docks, were none of them so 
provided ... 
There has been one unbroken and consistent system 
pursued with respect to docks ... and 
Parliament has invariably, 
expressly, and most carefully protected the river dues from any 
responsibility for such speculation NTCP, [ 1870, pp. 163-5]. 
Similarly, in 1872 when the TIC was proposing the new Bill, Newcastle Corporation 
again made its opinions known on the matter: 
It was the duty of that Council, at all hazards, to protect the ratepayers 
generally of Newcastle, and to see that no other source of revenue 
should be applied towards making that dock but the dock fund itself, 
[Ibid, 1872, p. 352]. 
Another concern that the Newcastle Corporation voiced related to the cost of 
building the docks. By looking at the TIC's accounts, the Corporation maintained that 
the TIC did not have the means to meet the proposed expenditure: 
It is obvious that more than one million and a half is proposed to be 
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expended, and it is certain that neither the past accounts of the 
Commissioners nor the pending bill show any means whatever of 
meeting such an expenditure [ibid, p. 162]. 
The Corporation argued that if the bill were successful further applications to 
Parliament would result 'for the completion of the docks, and heavy, excessive, and 
increased taxation on the commerce of the river must inevitably be imposed' [ibid]. 
Newcastle Corporation ftirthered their argument by using the accounting information 
that was generated by the Commissioners, and heavily criticised it on two counts: 
firstly, for the wide variances between the estimated and actual costs of works that 
were still ongoing, and ultimately still incurring costs; and secondly, for the lack of 
accounting information available regarding estimated future revenue streams and 
returns for the proposed CDD project, given that it involved such a large expenditure: 
Not withstanding the magnitude of these figures [the fl. 5m], it must 
also be remembered that they only form an estimate. The experience 
of estimates of the Commissioners, as compared with expenditure is 
anything but favourable. The original estimate for the piers was 
f 180,000, the borrowing powers for the piers are now L600,000 ... the 
revised and increased estimate for the Newcastle Bridge was 155,000; 
the cost up to the end of 1870 was L114,291 10s. 9d; what it will 
amount to in the end it is difficult to say, but certainly not to less than 
five times the amount of the estimate. The estimate for the works at 
Bill Point was 130000, the cost up to the end of 1870 was 143,569 Os. 
8D; what it will reach ultimately it is impossible even to conjecture, 
considering the small progress yet made, but five times the original 
estimate will certainly be inadequate to cover it [ibid]. 
By looking ex-post at the original estimates relating to these projects, and considering 
what had actually been expended and what still needed to be spent, Newcastle 
Corporation demonstrated a poor track-record on the part of the TIC in meeting its 
budgets. Thus, the Corporation voiced a strong concern that even with the original 
estimate from the Engineer for the CDD set as high as around i1m, the final cost was 
likely to end up much more given past experience- 
On referring to the report and estimate of the Engineer, on whose 
authority alone the proposed dock is projected, it will be found not to 
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contain one single word as to the revenue which it is thought may be 
derived from them [and yet they are willing to spend at least 11m] 
... without having had before them the slightest 
information on this 
subj ect ... the absence of full and satisfactory explanations of the intended application of the money [was an issue] [ibid, pp. 162-63] 
Clearly, Newcastle Corporation was concerned that the TIC was about to spend a 
significant amount of money without having sufficient information regarding the 
benefits that the CDD would generate. Furthermore, using the TIC's accounts, the 
Corporation expressed concern that the interest charge alone on the amount proposed 
to be borrowed would be more than what was being spent on all current improvement 
works- 
The commerce of the town ... cannot bear the crushing weight of a debt 
of upwards of four millions sterling, involving a yearly taxation of 
Y, 200,, 000 merely to meet the interest alone. To this E200,000 must be 
added the sum appearing in the Commissioners accounts as their 
annual ordinary expenditure on revenue account, and which 
necessarily increases every year, amounting to 128,377 during 1870, 
the result is, that L228,377 must be raised yearly by taxation; and that 
when this sum has been raised, it is wholly absorbed in the payment of 
interest and of ordinary revenue expenditure, leaving the cost of all 
other works to be otherwise provided for in addition [ibid, p. 163]. 
Finally, by using the trade statistics presented in the TIC's accounts, it was 
demonstrated by the Newcastle Corporation that 'the proposed Coble Dene Dock 
would have no coal traffic to augment its revenue' [ibid]. Newcastle Corporation 
quoted some figures for the tonnage cleared outwards from the Tyne during 1870 and 
concluded that 'these figures clearly show that the great majority of vessels 
frequenting the Tyne are of too small a tonnage to be benefited by the works 
proposed' [ibid]. It was alleged that the TIC had acted with, ' unlimited extravagance 
of expenditure ... and general recklessness of procedure in river matters, ' and to 
borrow more would be 'even more reckless' [ibid, p. xxXlx]. 
The TIC contested these allegations by using their accounting information to 
argue that the Corporation was exaggerating and misinterpreting the data- 
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The report contains many statements that are altogether incorrect, and 
others that are greatly exaggerated, some of the allegations made, 
while technically correct, in the absence of proper explanation convey 
an entirely erroneous meaning; and conclusions are drawn from these 
incorrect exaggerated statements that are as fallacious as the 
statements themselves are false [ibid, p. 197]. 
For example, the large variances between the original estimates and the actual costs 
were justified on the grounds that the originally proposed works had expanded and 
therefore cost more- 'The cost of the works has necessarily risen with their 
dimensions and extent' [ibid, p. 198]. In addition to this, the accuracy of the figures 
quoted by the Newcastle Corporation in their arguments was questioned. For 
example, when looking at the estimate of the piers works, Newcastle Corporation had 
quoted L180,000 as the original estimate: 'How these figures have been obtained, I 
cannot conceive ... 
[the] original estimate for the Piers was L400,000' [ibid, p. 203]. 
The initial estimate was done on the basis that the piers would extend into 15 feet 
water, but given its success, it was then proposed to carry them out into 30 feet water; 
hence, the necessity to go to Parliament for an additional f400, OOO as the work to be 
carried out had doubled from the original estimate. The TIC did not see any further 
costs being incurred, and maintained that 'there is every likelihood that the Tyne 
Piers will be completed within, or nearly so, of the original estimate' [ibid, p. 204]. 
Another example used to show that the original estimates were not inaccurate as the 
Newcastle Corporation suggested them to be, concerned the works at Bill Point: 'I 
don't know where Mr Hammond got these figures' [ibid]. The original estimate was 
L63,000, of which L49,000 had been spent so far, and 'the purely engineering work 
will be finished for that sum' [Ibid, p. 205]. 
Another significant capital project was the construction of a new bridge over 
the Tyne. In this case, the TIC admitted that the original estimates had been 
4 exceeded' [ibid]. However, full justification was given in that the original plans for 
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the size of the bridge had increased by a third after embarking upon the works. Also, 
the foundations were sunk much more deeply than first planned 'and this was another 
and very great additional expense' [ibid]. Moreover, 'wages and material costs have 
increased over the time of the works' [ibid]. It was suggested that Hammond, the 
Newcastle Councillor responsible for the report opposing the CDD proposal, 'had 
made his report in a hurry, and that accounted for the extraordinary amount of 
figuring that appeared on the face of that document' [ibid, p. 220]. This shows how 
easy it was for accounting information to be interpreted in a negative way, by 
mistakenly quoting the wrong figures from the accounts, and by quoting figures 
without due consideration for the explanations of the variances shown. The TIC was 
thus able to justify its position and belittle Hammond's findings by interpreting their 
accounts with full explanation and with greater accuracy. 
When looking at the issue of river funds being used for dock purposes, the 
TIC clearly stated that this was not their intention, and that they understood that the 
legislation prescribed that 'the river funds are strictly for river purposes, and the 
Commissioners are wisely prohibited from diverting them to any sectional object 
whatever' [ibid, p. 216]. Indeed, the TIC strengthened its case by showing the state of 
the trade on the Tyne and the desperate need for a new dock in order to prevent it 
declining: 
Vessels were coming into the port, and it was sometimes three months 
before they could get quit of their cargoes, and that was because of the 
want of dock accommodation in order to enable them to discharge 
their cargoes [ibid, p. 221]. 
With these arguments in mind, the Newcastle Corporation agreed that if the TIC 
would state in the proposed Tyne Improvement Bill, that 'if money was borrowed for 
the Coble Dene Dock, the security for the same should come out of the Dock Fund , 
it would not oppose the Bill any further. The TIC acceded and the Bill was accepted 
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by Parliament resulting in the 1872 Tyne Improvement Act for which- 
the borrowing powers, amounting to 1600,000 which had been 
previously obtained for the Low Lights Dock, were by the Bill 
transferred to the Coble Dene Dock, and no additional capital was 
required to be authorised for the purpose. Like the scheme at the Low 
Lights, the capital of the intended dock was to form part of the 
Northumberland Dock Fund [Guthrie, 1880, p. 176]. 
It was admitted by the Newcastle Corporation that perhaps they could not 
have opposed the bill in any case, presumably because of the high costs involved, 
resulting in the loss of public money: 'With the law in its present state, we cannot 
retain counsel to oppose this bill' [NTCP, 1872, p. 192]. However, the legal position 
was unclear. Work did start on the CDD but the project was heavily criticised from 
start to finish, especially, as we have seen, by the Newcastle Corporation who saw it 
as a waste of tax payers' money. Despite all the opposition, the CDD was finally 
completed in 1884 and renamed the Albert Edward Dock. However, 'it was to be a 
moderate success' only [Manders and Potts, 1999, p. 471. It took over 30 years to 
create the dock, and so its original necessity was not so great given the change that 
had occurred in trading vessels from sail to steam. Steam vessels did not require as 
much time in the docks; and as they could carry more cargo, there was also a great 
reduction in the volume of traffic using the docks. 
Even upon completion, the legacy of the dock was still to hamper the TIC 
when applying for increased borrowing powers for other improvement works. It was 
contended that the TIC had used creative accounting to hide the excessive 
expenditure on the CDD, fuelling the case of those who opposed further increases in 
the TIC's borrowing powers. The opposition illustrated this by using the 'report of 
the Commissioners for last year [1884]', which showed that expenditure on the docks 
so far to be - 
as near as possible 1200,000 beyond the estimate Mr Messant gave to 
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the Commissioners in 1877. In the accounts for last year, for the 
purpose of showing the amount to be as small as possible, the 
Commissioners deducted f. 95,699 19s 3d. for interest which was 
charged to the revenue account. How this sum was subsequently dealt 
with he would have to ask some member of the Commission to explain 
[NTCP 1885, p. 414]. 
The excess expenditure was highlighted by the opposition using data from the TIC's 
published accounts. The way it was presented and the interest dealt with in the 
accounts was criticised: 
The gross balance standing to the debt of the Northumberland Dock 
Fund, which included the Coble Dene Dock, at the end of 1884, was 
f 1,274,274 4s 5d. whilst the extent of borrowing powers for dock 
purposes was f 1,250,000 so that the Commissioner had up to the end 
of 1884 overspend for dock purposes f24,274 4s. 5d. in addition to the 
mysteriously removed item of f95,699 l9s 3d making together in 
round numbers an over expenditure of f, 120,000 on the Coble Dene 
Dock up to the end of 1884. His reason for now adding the f95,699 to 
the f24,274 was that the Commissioners had power to charge, and 
ought to have charged, the interest to capital account during the 
construction of the dock down to July, 1884 [Ibid]. 
Similarly, Youll, the Newcastle Councillor speaking in opposition to the proposed 
increase in borrowing powers, used the accounting information of the TIC to show 
that if the Commissioners had to go to Parliament at all it would be in consequence of 
their 'wasteful expenditure' upon the CDD: 
Last year, notwithstanding the difficulties they were drifting into, the 
capital expenditure of the Commissioners on the Dock Fund, including 
the deficiency of revenue was f76,062 3s 3d. Prior to the 
Commissioners obtaining their Act of 1872 the Northumberland Dock 
showed a surplus revenue over expenditure of something like f, 9,000 
but in consequence of the interest on the cost of the making of Coble 
Dene Dock being charged to the fund, the surplus gradually decreased, 
and was followed by a deficiency and the deficiency in 1884 was 
f 15,549 7s 9d [ibid p. 415]. 
[The TIC had] spent nearly f-900,000 upon the dock; and when would 
it bring in any return? ... He was certain that some years must pass before there was sufficient trade to enable the dock to pay any portion 
of the interest upon the capital expended [ibid]. 
This can also be demonstrated by looking at the acute fall off of 
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surplus revenue from 1883-1887, only starting to recover again in 1888. 
Year 
1883 
1884 
1885 
1886 
1887 
1888 
Surplus Revenue 
42591 
39634 
24501 
16867 
433 
28783 
Separating capital and revenue expenditure and the question of depreciation 
One cannot look at capital accounting in the 19' century without looking at the topic 
of depreciation. Depreciation held the directors of private companies to account in the 
annual report to shareholders for their consumption of fixed assets and had a direct 
bearing on reported profit. Depreciation was not an accounting practice that was 
required by law in the 19'h century, but was used voluntarily by some companies. 
Brief [ 1965, p. 14] commented that one of the most significant accounting errors of 
the 19' century was 'the failure to systematically distinguish between capital and 
revenue expenditure and the failure to periodically allocate the cost of fixed assets to 
expense'. He suggested that accounting practice was 'flexible' in that 
depreciation provisions may or may not be made; past provisions for 
depreciation may be restored to profit; and assets may be revalued to 
provide 'profit' out of which dividends are made [ibid, p. 27]. 
However, in recent years these comments have been criticised for 
underestimating the ability of the accounts' preparers, who, it has been suggested, did 
indeed understand the accounting techniques involved, and were more than capable of 
manipulating the accounts to their advantage. For example, Pitts [2001, p. 42] states 
that 
17()7 
many nineteenth century coal, iron and steel directors understood very 
clearly the difference between capital and revenue expenditure and the 
need to reduce the value of wasting long term assets over their 
lifetime. It is however true that their published accounts did not make 
this clear to the investing public and other interested parties. 
Pitts suggested possible reasons as to why the consumption of assets was obscured 
from shareholders and potential investors; and why, given that charging depreciation 
was not a convention at the time, it could be used opportunistically. There was, for 
example, a 
fear of revealing important information to competitors ... 
fear of 
shareholders' demands for big dividends rather than prudent accounts 
- or a combination of these and others. There was also the temptation 
to omit making provisions for depreciation in poor years to present the 
shareholders with higher profits and to be able to pay dividends and to 
keep this decision private [ibid]. 
Carlon and Morris [2003, p. 2751 found in their study of 150 British unregulated 
companies from the years 1880/81,1889/90 and 1899/01 that 
whether depreciation was charged is related to profitability and, to a 
lesser extent, to the presence of outside shareholders, long-term debt 
holders and the appointment of a professional auditor. However, the 
amount of depreciation charges is related only to profitability and 
appears to be opportunistically determined. 
Depreciation policies were much less consistently applied than other 
accounting policies, particularly for companies in financial difficulty. It was more 
often the case that trading surpluses were distributed as dividends rather than retained 
as depreciation or revenue reserves; and so depreciation was not a widely practised 
form of accounting in the 19' century. Rather than use depreciation, companies often 
wrote amounts off to the capital account for their own advantage, for example to debit 
revenue with expenditure on works and additions to works and plant instead of 
charging them to the capital account, a procedure they were open about. Moreover, 
there was no legislation or consensus at the time regarding the need to charge 
depreciation. Indeed, 'the view that depreciation by law need not be charged in fixed 
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assets was firmly established' [Morris, 1986, p. 71]. 
Edwards [1976] has suggested that the adoption of depreciation may have 
been inhibited by the re-introduction of Income Tax Law in 1842 after a break of 26 
years. 
Until 1878, no deduction from profits was allowed under the 
legislation, although local Commissioners varied in their approach, 
and some did in fact allow deprecation as an expense. Others did not, 
but took a liberal view of what could be treated as repairs and 
maintenance, thus encouraging replacement accounting. And if the 
Commissioner insisted on a strict interpretation of the statute then the 
desired objective could be achieved provided the accounting 
information was presented in an appropriate manner [pp. 206-7]. 
Indeed, Edwards [1986, p. 258] argues in a later paper looking at the use of 
depreciation within the railways in the 19"' century, that 'the tax position provided far 
more obvious support for the systems of repairs and renewals accounting and 
replacement accounting which eventually became dominant'. 
We now examine the issue of depreciation, firstly with respect to the TIC and 
then shipping companies in general. Within the TIC, the only evidence of the term 
'depreciation' found by the study was in correspondence regarding taxation relief 
relating to the latter stages of the 19'h century. Depreciation was not shown in any 
TIC accounts. However, an amount for depreciation was allowed by the Income Tax 
Authorities on plant and craft, but never accounted for by the TIC. A letter from Mr 
Chapman (auditor to the TIC) to the TIC secretary in 1903 shows that depreciation 
has not been accounted for by that body. However, there was an allowance given to 
the TIC by the Income Tax Authorities in their first application in 1887, whereby they 
agreed that L20,000 was to allowed for depreciation; after which a further application 
was made in 1891 for an increase in the allowance to L26,435. This time the TIC was 
unsuccessful, and instead the allowance was reduced to 115,000- 
No depreciation account has ever been opened in the Commissioners' 
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books, and no annual charge has ever been made against Revenue for 
that purpose. On the other hand for the last 16 years an amount for 
depreciation has been allowed by the Income Tax Authorities in 
making their Assessments ... In the year 
1887 1 applied to the Surveyor 
of Taxes for an allowance from the yearly assessment in respect of 
depreciation of the plant &c of the Commissioners, and after some 
correspondence succeeded in obtaining an allowance of L20,000 per 
annum, which was deducted from the amount of the assessment for the 
years ending 5th April 1888,1889,1890 and 1891 respectively. In 
1891 1 sent into the then Surveyor of Taxes a claim for an increased 
allowance of 126,435, which was objected to. I therefore appealed on 
behalf of the Commissioners against the assessment for the year 
ending 5th April, 1892, and subsequently appeared before the Local 
Income Tax Commissioners with the result that they disallowed 
certain items included in the original amount of L20,000 and offered, 
in order to settle the matter and to avoid going into figures and re- 
making calculations every year, to allow the sum of L15,000 for 
depreciation. It was at the same time arranged that the Surveyor of 
Taxes should be furnished by the Commissioners each year with a 
statement of any new plant charged to revenue account to replace old 
plant. The Finance Committee approved and confirmed what had been 
done on 25th February 1892. Since that time the reduced allowance of 
L15,000 has been made off the gross assessment each year. These 
allowances from 1888 to the present time represent a total of L260,000 
and an aggregate saving to the Commissioners of L8,750 [Chapman 
1903a, p. 2]. 
The purpose of Chapman's letter was twofold, firstly to ask the TIC to apply 
for an increase in the allowance given by the Income Tax Commissioners, and 
secondly to question the accounting procedures adopted by the TIC for charges for 
maintenance, renewals and replacements. On the first point, the TIC was advised by 
their accountant, Mr Ormond, not to disturb the current arrangement: 
I find appealing against the Local Surveyors, supported by the London 
Commissioners, are, in recent years, much more strenuous in their 
opposition to all depreciation, the Law in its definition of what is 
depreciation being obscure [Ormond, 1903, p. 4] 
On the second, there was disagreement over the distinction between improvements 
and maintenance expenditure and repairs, which is still relevant in modem tax law-. 
Mr Chapman contends that the amount of the surplus revenue shewn 
in the accounts for last year 'is incorrectly stated as charges for 
maintenance, renewals and replacements, which should have been 
charged against revenue, have been entered as Capital Expenditure' 
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[Urwin, 1903, p. 6]. 
This example shows that categorising deprecation was problematic and subjective. In 
this case, not even the professional accountants could come to an agreement; thus 
indicating a lack of available guidance at the time. 
In response to Chapman, Urwin, the TIC Secretary, stated that in his 
judgement, 'additions to plant [and] ... expenditure representing new and additional 
works have been ... correctly so treated. 
Perhaps quoting from tax law, he continued: 
I notice that Mr Chapman seriously contends that the sum of L54,339 
8s Od for North Pier re-construction should, in whole or in part, be 
written off to Depreciation. This sum forms part of an increase of debt 
of 1488,000 under the 1898 [TI] Act and it is surely too absurd to 
argue that you acquired this Borrowing Power to write off the 
expenditure to Depreciation ... the 
North Pier Work is not either 'in 
whole or in greater part a replacement' and has been properly treated 
by the Commissioners as a new and additional work [ibid]. 
The letter continues with a discussion of the effects of depreciation within railway 
companies; again as we have seen on many occasions, the comparative used was with 
rail and not other harbour authorities. The comment below clearly shows an 
awareness of the alternative practice of charging capital expenditure to revenue as it 
was incurred in order to reduce taxable profits. Unsurprisingly, the Income Tax 
Authorities were not in favour of this: 
Supposing the Commissioners could afford to do what some dividend 
paying Railway Companies do from motives of policy, and not 
because it is in conformity with strict laws of apportionment between 
revenue and capital, and were to debit revenue with expenditure in 
respect of certain extensions of or additions to their works and plant, 
which is unquestionably properly chargeable to capital account, it does 
not follow by any means that the Inland Revenue Authorities would 
accept the result 'for Income Tax purposes'. 
Chapman responded to Urwin's letter stating that: 
With regard to the item of L54,339 for North Pier re-construction, I 
have not altered my opinion that this Is a replacement, and, as such, 
should be charged against revenue, the expenditure having been 
incurred by reason of the destruction of former works, and that if 
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proper representations were made to the Income Tax Commissioners 
relief would be obtained in respect thereof 
So far as the accounts of the Commission are concerned, the large 
surplus revenue shewn in the annual accounts, and amounting in the 
aggregate to L1,726,827, have been applied towards reducing the 
amount of expenditure charge to capital account, but the nett result of 
the capital account would have been the same if more had been 
charged direct to revenue account for renewal and replacements, 
instead of being charged to capital and then written off against the 
surplus revenue, as both the gross capital expenditure and the surplus 
revenue would have been reduced by the same amount [Chapman, 
1903b, p. 2]. 
Ultimately, given the awareness of the beneficial 'use' of writing off capital to 
revenue allied to the choice not to charge depreciation, one can only conclude that the 
TIC perhaps did not wish to reduce reported profits in this way as they needed to 
attract loans. ) and the 
balance sheet would look better without it. 
The lack of uniformity in practice was the same for shipping companies. The 
research here focuses on a series of articles written in The Accountant by Daly, 
[ 1899-1900]. In the first of these he writes- 
There can be no doubt that when the assets of a company are 
depreciating such depreciation should be dealt with in the accounts' 
[7'he Accountant, 1899, p. 23]. 
He clearly shows that the way depreciation was dealt with differed from company to 
company: 
The question of depreciation in a single ship company one on which 
opinions have always differed; and I presume many shareholders will 
always continue to hold the opinion that all profits should be divided, 
and that each shareholder should make such provision for depreciation 
as he thinks fit in his own private accounts [ibid, 1900, p. 1147]. 
Daly argues that this position taken was acceptable in the early days of shipping- 
This view of the matter was not unreasonable in the early days of these 
companies when , in very many cases, the company was 
formed with 
the single object of purchasing and working some particular ship, the 
company being wound up when the ship was lost or sold, and the 
money received from the underwriters or the purchaser divided among 
the shareholders. 
212 
However, now that the way shipping was accounted for had changed, he argues that it 
or depreciation be was perhaps time that a consistent method of accounting f 
introduced: 
But now the articles of so many of these companies provide that the 
company shall become continuous by the purchase of another vessel 
should the original one be lost or sold, and so on, apparently ad 
infinitum, that a very different state of aMirs has to be faced. 
For the last few years the value of shipping, especially of steamers, has 
to continually appreciated, that the sale of an old steamer very 
frequently shows a profit instead of a loss; or if there is a loss, it is but 
a trifling one, and the need for writing off depreciation has not been so 
apparent. But when shipping reverts, as it must some day, to the state 
in which it was a comparatively short time ago, the question will again 
become a burning one. ' 
Daly's predictions were correct; and the debate over depreciation as a cost or a 
reserve was soon to be settled. By the early 20' century the policy used by shipping 
companies changed: 'Ships' managers now as a rule prefer to write off depreciation, 
and thus endeavour to keep the ship at a fair realizable value' [Daly, 1910, p. 183]. 
Napier [1991, p. 48] adds that this 
epitomises the development of the concept of depreciation during the 
nineteenth century, from an almost optional reserve for asset 
replacement to a regular (and unavoidable) measure of the cost of 
using fixed assets. 
The role of the engineer 
Without the engineer, industrial England would not have been what it was. How, 
He uses this example to illustrate: 'Suppose a single ship company purchases a steamer costing 
E40,000, runs her for a few years, divides all the profits, and then, finding that their steamer is 
being supplanted by a newer type of boat, sells her for L25,000. and purchases a second one for 
L40.000 borrowing whatever is necessary to pay for her, after a year or two the second steamer is 
also found to be unsuitable, is sold for 00,000, and a third purchased, again for L40,000, what is 
the position of the company? They have lost L25,000 of their capital, have had to borrow that sum 
to enable them to pay for their new steamer, and will have to pay interest on their borrowed capital 
for many years before the debt is Nviped out and they are again in a position to pay a diNidcrid-, 
while had a reasonable depreciation been written off each year, the losses to be faced would haN, e 
been comparatively small. ' 
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soCiety? 
They came from the only people likely to know much about tools, 
metals, or machinery, or about what was involved in the design of 
great public works like canals and roads... Stephenson [1781-1848] 
was a colliery workman, so ill-educated that he was almost illiterate. 
Many engineers came, if not from the bottom of society, then from a 
level far beneath the notice of the polite educated world [Reader, 1966, 
p. 70]. 
Trained through apprenticeship, engineers lacked the professional status conferred by 
qualifications, as there were no examinations until 1898. However, numerous 
examples have been found in the literature of engineers carrying out a financial role 
as management accountants with great competence [e. g. Fleischman and Parker, 
1990; Boyns and Edwards, 1996; Williams, 1999; Oldroyd, 2001]. Engineers, for 
example prepared colliery valuations as a matter of course from the first half of the 
18' century; and were instrumental in extending discounted cash flow techniques 
from monetary to non-monetary resources'. 
The adoption of DCF is a clear case of accounting and engineering 
technologies combining to facilitate the exploitations of deep coal 
reserves where accounting acted as a determinant of industrial 
expansion P3rackenborough et al, 200 1, pp. 13 7-91. 
However, towards the end of the 19' century, and more-so in the early part of 
the 20' century, the newly established professional accountants started to compete 
with the engineers in this field. Thus, Matthews [1998, p. 72] argues that accountants 
were involved in early cost systems: 'Close involvement with management accounts 
dates from the earliest years of the chartered accountant's professional work. ' He 
quotes examples, such as one of the first jobs performed by Edwin Waterhouse being 
C planning a system of cost accounts'. According to Loft [1990, p. 116], 
there is evidence that consultants were installing systems for 
manufactures at this period [c. 1880], some with an engineering 
background, others With an accounting one. Competition for the work 
appears to have existed. 
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Roslender [1995, p. 8] emphasises the self interest that drove the professions into 
competition, which [Larson, 1977] regards as crucial to understanding lines of 
demarcation between the professions: 
The professions are represented as being continuously locked into a 
process of competition with each other for access to the commanding 
positions within the managerial hierarchies of organizations. It is self- 
interest which motivates professions and their members, self-interest 
which they seek to realize by means of a collective mobility project. 
Chandler and Edwards [1996, p. 7] argue that 'the engineers appear to have felt 
sufficiently threatened to make accountants' activities the subject of careful scrutiny 
and criticism. ' 
As companies changed with the industrial revolution and the scale of 
investment in fixed assets grew at an unprecedented rate, railway companies being the 
prime example, the need for accurate cost accounting also increased. Demand also 
increased for a professionally qualified person to produce these accounts and attitudes 
of accountants began to change as they wanted to be involved in this niche market. 
From an article written in I-he Accountant it is clear that accountants were being 
encouraged to extend their knowledge further to include engineering financial matters 
such as costing. 
The question will perhaps occur to you whether this is not expecting 
too much of Chartered Accountants - whether it does not involve that, 
besides being men of figures, they must also be qualified builders, 
engineers, ironworkers, mining engineers, woollen manufacturers and 
so on. This answer is no! ... 
We must acquire sufficient knowledge of 
each kind of trade to enable us to follow the processes and pick out the 
vital points where continued supervision of necessary. We must then 
adapt our knowledge of methods to the requirements of each particular 
trade [Gibson, 1890, p. 367]. 
In 1901, the editor of The Accmimant regarded knowledge of costs as 'vital' [The 
Accountant, 1901, p. 638]. By 1914, the 
elite professional accountants, the members of the ICAEW were 
coming to see costing as something associated with the accountancy 
215 
which they practised [Loft, 1988, p. 124-5]. 
Cathles [7he Accountant, 1920, p. 256] shows an awareness of the benefits that would 
result to their professional status of taking control of this niche market: 
Devising and organising of efficient costing systems ... provides 
for 
the accountant a field of opportunity which is practically virgin soil .... by taking it up seriously, accountants will raise higher the status of the 
profession to which they belong. 
Ultimately, accountants were victorious and extended their domain into 
costing- 'After 1914 ... engineers 
had largely left the field to accountants [both 
groups now having more clearly defined professional roles]' [Loft, 1988, p. 71-2]. 
According to Loft [1986, p. 165], the First World War was a major factor in this 
transition: 
The bringing of cost accountants and cost accounting 'Into the fight' 
came as a virtually unanticipated consequence of the war-time 
legislation passed with the intention of helping to prevent profiteering 
and to provide a basis for setting the prices of contracts for items for 
which there was no clearly identifiable market price. 
'Contemporaries freely acknowledged the First World War as a major impetus to 
change' [Fells, 1919, p. 31]. The leading article in the first issue of 1he Cost 
Accountant [ 1919, p. 150] said that 
the war has, of course brought good costing methods prominently 
under the public eye. Many manufacturers are to-day keeping Cost 
Accounts who hardly knew that there were such things five years ago. 
Whether the supplanting of engineers with professional cost accountants was quite as 
straightforward as this is still open to debate. However, as far as the TIC was 
concerned, these changes were for the future. It was the river engineers rather than 
professional accountants who dornInated the costing of the great capital improvement 
projects of the TIC described in this thesis. 
As we have seen in Chapter 5, a major internal investgation Into the TIC's 
operations was carried out in 1880, the year of Guthrie's death. A lot can be leamt 
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about the role and duties of the TIC's engineers from that report, and it illustrates the 
breadth of their accounting role. What is clear is that engineers had to create financial 
reports and examine financial data, keep financial records and act upon the 
information they produced. The main financial related duties of the chief clerk in the 
engineer's office included the: 
making up pay sheets ... making up Engineers summary sheets for Tyne Improvement and Northumberland Dock Funds ... examining the 
whole of the fortnightly pay bills and submitting them to Mr Messant 
for examination and certification ... examining accounts for all 
materials bought; seeing that prices agree with those of tender, 
presenting accounts to Engineer to be certified at the proper times, and 
handing them over to the secretary's office for payment ... making up 
yearly statements required by secretary as to expenditure of various 
works, keeping cost of all private dredging or other work done for 
outside firms, and making out and handing to secretary department 
accounts for cost of such works rendering accounts for all dredgers or 
other vessels or plant let out on hire also for damage done to any of 
our crafts or works... [Report of Investigation Committee, 1880, pp. 13- 
14]. 
As it will be seen, most of the Tyne engineers were educated men and had 
come from an apprentice background with some of the major engineering names of 
the time. There were two types of engineer on the Tyne, firstly the resident engineer 
whose main employment derived from the TIC. The other type was a consultant 
engineer whom the TIC engaged on a fee basis. What was seen on the Tyne, and in 
general at ports in England, was that the local authorities often consulted engineers 
from outside their authority when looking at significant capital works. Therefore, the 
consultant engineer dominated the works he proposed and the resident engineer 
merely assisted. There is no explicit statement in the minutes examined as to why this 
was the case, but presumably it was because the more eminent consultant engineers 
had more experience and competence than the local engineers. 
As we have seen in the early years of the 19' century, the Newcastle 
Corporation had a tendency to spend on eminent consultant engineers' reports only to 
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shelve them when the cost of improving works were glaringly too high. An example 
was Rennie's' report as to the best mode of improving the River Tyne and its 
navigation: 
With respect to the expense, it is no easy matter to be correct in a work 
of this nature and extent; I have, however, endeavoured to make out an 
estimate as near as I can, amounting to E519,320 [1816-. p. 10]. 
As a result of this estimate, very little was done with Rennie's report and so the River 
remained in an unimproved state. 
Upon the establishment of the TIC in 1850, the TIC inherited the Corporation's 
local engineer, Mr. Brooks. ' Towards the end of the Corporations period of control of 
the Tyne, there had been growing antagonism between Brooks and Newcastle 
Corporation. His conduct was viewed as unprofessional and he was regarded with 
mistrust by council members. Brooks refused to work with any consultant engineer 
employed and continued with his own plans of how he saw fit to improve the Tyne. 
Brooks was more than happy with the work he was carrying out. However, in the 
1850 Admiralty Inquiry, Brooks was criticised as having produced 'an ill-digested 
scheme of river works ... 
[with] the object of making the river a better ship canal to 
Newcastle'. This mistrust continued when the TIC took charge of the river affairs, 
and the majority of the Commissioners became rapidly dissatisfied with his ability 
and wanted him removing from his position. The published accounts were used to 
show that he had mismanaged the Tyne, spending money where it was not needed. 
Removing him was deemed necessary for 'securing its funds from the many 
unnecessary expenses' [NTCP, 1858, p. 1]. Brooks was also accused of thwarting vital 
7 John Rennie, a Scotsman, worked in Andrew Wilde's engineering works from the early age of 12. 
He went to Edinburgh university and studied agricultural land impr(wement. After universit-y he began 
a career in engineering and was employed by Boulton & Watt for 5 years then after he started his own 
engineering company. 
'Little background information could be found for Brooks. Previously engineer to the Tees Navigation 
Company. One would conjecture that he was a local man and perhaps not university educated instead 
growing up through the apprentice ranks. 
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improvement plans by stating that there were not enough funds available to carry out 
the works. 
Increasingly, consultant engineers were used to report upon the River such as 
James Walker and John Murray' who were called upon to report on the River in 1844 
and 1845 respectively. Brooks failed to work cooperatively with James Walker, the 
Admiralty inspector, and this was seen as unprofessional behaviour. 'The Admiralty 
stated that its powers were limited only to the approval or rejection of plans 
submitted', and in 1855 Brooks produced plans that were not approved by Walker. 
The Admiralty expressed extreme displeasure and the TIC censured 
Brooks, instructing that he and Walker must work in unison. The TIC 
reminded the Admiralty that Walker's duties were legally confined to 
the approval of plans but, regardless, the TIC would be pleased to 
avail itself of his services; in May 1855 Walker was formally 
appointed consulting engineer for the construction of the piers with 
Brooks supervising work and preparing the necessary drawings 
[Rennison, 1990, p. 132]. 
Finally, in 1858 Brooks was criticised for his 'liberal' salary and the costs of 
using 'other engineers' for work that 'ought to have been executed by the Engineer of 
the Commission and that large expenditure of money thereby saved' [NTCP, 1858, 
p. 1]. It was proposed that a new resident engineer should be appointed by the TIC, 
someone who was 
practical and capable of performing such duties, giving energy and 
uniformity to all operations of the River, and thereby securing its 
funds from the many and unnecessary expenses that injure and cripple 
its resources [and] Brooks, be relieved from his services [ibid]. 
His replacement was John Ure", who had vast experience of engineering on the River 
9#A bold and skillful engineer, ' [Miller, 1982, p. 1021. 
loEducated mainly in Cumberland, Ure started work aged 15 in the Glasgow marine engineering 
works of Robert Napier. Ure moved into land surveying before, in 1839, becoming chief assistant to 
Andrew Thomson, a leading civil engineer. He then attended Glasgow University studying Civil 
Engineering and Applied Mechanics before working, from 1845, with JM Rendel of London. In 1852 
he was appointed resident engineer to the Clyde Navigation and Harbour of Glasgow then finally was 
appointed the TIC engineer in 1858. He m6thdrew his active service in 1869 when his sister who 
married John Elder (Robert Napier's works manager) invited him to become senior partner in the 
company after her husband's death. He thus went back to marine engineering, resigned his position as 
resident engineer of the Tyne but agreed to stay on as consultant engineer until fll health 9 years later 
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Clyde. He had a 'clear, practicable nature and at once created confidence' [Guthrie, 
1880, p. 133]. 
In general, works were executed on the Tyne almost entirely by direct labour, 
not by contractors, and the harbour engineers supervised this labour force, sending in 
regular returns of expenditure to the Commissioners which required some accounting 
ability and knowledge. For example, 
Mr Stevenson moved that the report of the Committee of Accounts as 
to the cost of dredging be received, and that the Engineer be directed 
to prepare estimates of the working expenses and materials for 
dredging [NTCP, 1852, p. 107]. 
Another example showing the type of accounting information demanded of the 
engineer, perhaps provoked by Brooks's incompetence, is illustrated in a letter to the 
TIC from W. S. Lindsay, MP and shipowner, in 1854-. 
Mr Brooks the engineer, should be called upon to furnish an account in 
detail, setting forth all the works executed by him since November 
1850; the situation of those works; the cost of each; besides a note of 
the whole expenditure under his direction since 1850 till the present 
date (Italics my own). 
This proposal resulted in a monitoring of projects which was to continue in future 
months and years: 
... that at every ordinary monthly meeting of 
the Commissioners the 
engineer do produce a return showing what river works are in course 
of execution, the point of their progress, and the expenses incurred 
thereon [NTCP, 1855, p. xxiii]. 
So, it can be seen that it became a requirement that cost and expense accounts were to 
be kept retrospectively as well as the typical engineering plans and estimates 
produced ex ante. 
Ure, the much respected TIC engineer from 1860, shows awareness of 
accounting and uses financial estimates in his influential 1860 report on how to 
meant that his activity was vcry limitecL 
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improve the River Tyne- 
The expense of the Works now recommended, which will take about 
four years to complete, I estimate will be nearly as follows: 
1. Three new Dredging Machines with the requisite 
plants to work them, to be made of a construction such 
as the working of the present machinery will show to be 
most suitable sav about 11001000 
2. Repairing yaid, including Slip &c., say about 
3. Taking down and rebuilding Newcastle Town Bridge 
with opening spans, including temporary Bridge, 
as per Parliamentary estimate, including 10 per cent 
Contingencies 
4. Removing Bill Point do 
5. Friar's Goose do 
6. Land compensation for items 3,4,5, do 
7. Constructing River Walls, say 
8. Dredging expenses during these four years will 
average about 130,000 per annum 
10 
1) 
000 
55,000 
63,1000 
20,800 
29,000 
6,000 
120,000 
403,800 
This will involve an annual expenditure of about L100,000 for four 
years, and therefore for working the proposed and the existing 
dredging machinery about L40,000 per annum ... 
[Extracts from Ure's 
report", 1860, pp. 1-3]. 
As well as costing the projects ex ante, Ure also provided calculations regarding the 
funding of the projects by using the financial statements of the TIC to justify his 
report, showing the importance of accounting records- 
I have considered whether the resources of the Commission are equal 
to this expenditure, and it appears to me they are ample. The free 
revenue from the Tyne Improvement Fund is expected, as per Report 
of Committee of 12' December, 1860 to be L27,000 per annum. The 
works now project will cost about 1400,000 and taking into account 
the expenditure of the surplus revenue, there would be a debt on this 
fund, under the Act of this year, when the Works now projected are 
completed, of about 000,000 with a surplus revenue of from L15,000 
to E20,000 per annum, yearly increasing, a dredging plant with 
repairing shops worth nearly L200,000 and unexhausted borrowing 
powers to the extent of about 1200,000 [ibid]. 
His report was an important element in securing the 1861 Tyne Improvement Act, 
which was vital as the Tyne was at 
"Report of John F Ure, engineer to the TIC on the general plan of improvement of the River Tyne. 
1860. 
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its very lowest point of decadence as a navigable river ... relatively to 
the trade carried on, and to its position as regards neighbouring rivers, 
it was at its very worst, ' Guthrie [ 18 80, p- 122]. 
The Act was to amend the acts relating to the River Tyne and to enable the TIC to 
construct docks and other works and to make certain alterations in rates charged. 
In 1865, the TIC went to Parliament to ask for further borrowing powers. 
Again, the engineer's report was vital. However, comments suggest that the financial 
details were dealt with separately by the Dredging and River Works Committee 
[herein DRWC] and not by Ure as was the case in 1861. Ure submitted his report to 
Parliament for plans of improvement and 'at the same time they submitted to 
parliament a well considered scheme of finance of providing the necessary means' 
[Report of the DRWC,, 1865]. However, the engineer continued to prepare estimates 
that were relied upon and used by the financial committee of the TIC. For example, 
Mr Guthrie laid before the meeting a full statement of the 
Commissioners' accounts for the year 1868 ... The committee 
examined the statements and considered the subject of revenue and 
expenditure for the current year, and conferred with the engineers 
relative to the amounts desirable to be expended on new works and 
improvements during 1869 [NTCP, 1869, p. xxv]. 
No explicit examples of comparing budget to actual could be found in the 
evidence available. However, the discussions in the NTCP minutes confirm that such 
comparisons took place, as was seen in the previous chapter when looking at the 
Coble Dene Dock. Ure was a very successful engineer on the Tyne. However, he was 
not immune to criticism and the following comment shows that perhaps engineers, 
however successful they were practically, lacked financial ability. When discussing 
the early estimates of Ure and comparing them to the actual much higher amounts, 
one councillor commented that: 
They [TIC] were guided, in a great measure, by one of the most 
excellent and eminent engineers who lived in this country, but he had, 
one great fault - he looked at matters too much in the engineering 
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light, and not sufficiently in the financial [NTCP, 1872, p. 215]. 
These findings add to the debate in the current literature regarding the financial role 
of the engineer within organisations prior to the 20' century. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
This thesis has examined the function and development of accounting data for the 
River Tyne in the 19' century against a backdrop of major economic, technical, 
political, social and organisational change. The function and development of 
accounting data specifically for the River Tyne has almost entirely been omitted from 
accounting history studies, yet the significance of the port in the 19' century was 
great, coming only second to London in size and being the largest coal exporting port 
in Britain. From an economic perspective, coal was the biggest driving force in the 
region. Ship-owners depended heavily upon the coal-trade. The activities of the port 
exerted a powerful influence on the economic development of the region as the trade 
heavily depended on this outlet. 
By virtue of improvement in steamship design, carriage by sea remained 
successful despite the development of a rail network. Indeed, this major artery of 
commerce transporting huge quantities of coal by sea both at home and abroad 
flourished, with a greater emphasis being placed on the export trade as countries 
overseas were attracted to the Tyne coal because of its relatively low price and 
superior quality. There was a growing use of accounting information in assessing the 
viability of adopting steam in place of sail, a major strategic decision at the time. 
However, the accuracy of these estimates was questionable as more often than not the 
steam ships performed better than anticipated. So it can be argued that accounting 
calculations retarded the progress of the adoption of steam over sail by 
overestimating the profitability of the latter. Indeed, it is a feature of this study that 
accounting impinged on the development of the River Tyne in a vital way, sometimes 
as a retarder of its progress, sometimes as a facilitator. It was through historical 
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company accounts that entrepreneurs were eventually able to demonstrate the 
superiority of steam to current and potential investors. The fact that they had 
committed resources to the new technology in the first place, despite the uncertainties 
in the accounting data, adds to the debate on the usefulness of accounts to 
entrepreneurs during the British industrial revolution, 
Besides the advancement in steam and ship design, big strides were being 
made with other technological inventions affecting the coal and shipping trade. 
Specifically related to the Tyne, coal cutting machinery and development in port and 
dockside equipment affected the progress of shipping as did dock improvements. 
Technological development had long-term affects on efficiency and economy, which 
in turn transformed productivity. The potential for costs savings was even greater as 
more shipping firms became larger and complex. In revolutionising the shipping 
industry, new technology created a new range of factors with potential cost 
accounting implications such as enabling ship-owners to predict voyage times with 
greater accuracy. 
The key question of the role played by accounting in technological innovation 
has been hotly debated by many authors in relation to the industrial revolution as a 
whole. For example, Fleischman and Parker [1997] emphasised the effects of 
technology on management accounting in the Industrial Revolution and cite 
numerous examples of this in relation to iron, coal and textile companies. The effects 
on accounting techniques were potentially just as great in respect of shipping, 
although there is a relative lack of research in this area. The main author in this field 
is McLean [1995,1996,2006a, 2006b], who concluded that the major advances in 
management accounting practice in the shipping industry occurred relatively late. 
When looking at the initial adoption of new technology in shipbuilding, accounting 
225 
information does not appear to be the root cause in the early to mid 19" century. 
Conversely, accounting information does seem to play a more of a part from the late 
century when the pace of technological progression was at its height. The 
developing technology also drove improvements in accounting information. 
A significant archaic rule affecting the trade on the Tyne was the 'Coal Turn 
Act' (CTA). The Act was introduced so that preference was not given to any 
particular vessel. Each ship had to wait its turn, giving merchants more certainty 
about when their ships would sail. However, with the advancement of steam to power 
ships and better coal handling equipment and port development, waiting in turn after 
the much slower sailing ships was not an economic option. The CTA became 
increasingly contentious as more time in port resulted in money lost. Opponents of 
the Act turned to accounting information to engineer its repeal. The accounts of the 
TIC provided a vehicle for demonstrating the detrimental effects of the CTA on the 
Commission's own financial position, resulting in the Act's repeal soon after. 
The shipping industry evolved rapidly in the 19' century and was 
characterised by great diversity of function and complexity of organisation. A vast 
amount of research on the shipping trade in general has already been undertaken. 
However, the evidence available in the local archives of the Tyne traders themselves 
proved limited. In particular, what is lacking is continuous data over extended periods 
of time. The only exception to this is the Tyne Steam Shipping Company which has 
to some extent already been reviewed by Northway [1972]. In general, the first point 
to note about shipping companies is that there was a lack of uniformity in how 
accounting records were kept. Usually,, a type of charge and discharge accounting was 
used, recording the moneys owing to or by the captain personally on the conclusion 
of the undertaking. When the ship returned to the home port, a profit or loss could be 
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determined and divided between the owners in proportion to their ownership of the 
ship. Journals were not required and were often left out of the accounting process to 
save time and money. 
The differing levels of governmental involvement and reform were major 
factors in how society in 19' century Britain was to develop; and the same was true 
of the management of the Tyne, which became increasingly the subject of statutory 
regulation as the century progressed. The major stakeholders in the River Tyne 
included local and national government, the TIC, the traders and ship-owners, and 
groups of professionals such as the bookkeepers and engineers who were involved in 
the accounting process. In many cases the interests of these parties conflicted, and it 
is a recurrent theme of the thesis how accounting was deployed as a political device 
'at the boundary between co-operation and conflict ... to act as both mediator and 
contester' in resolving disputes [Francis, 1990, p. 10]. 
The level of government intervention had major consequences for the 
functioning of the Tyne. The 1835 Municipal Refonn Act in particular was a 
watershed in the increase in accountability of the management of the River, which 
continued throughout the rest of the century. Corporations were made more 
accountable to the ratepayers of their districts under the Act, which for the first time 
obliged them to publish accounting data. The extent of the Newcastle Corporation's 
neglect of the River was made clearer to the public when a new form of keeping 
accounts was adopted by the newly reformed Corporation in pursuance of the Act. 
This data was exploited by opponents, comprising members of the press, Corporation 
and interested parties from the localities, who did not want to see the River neglected 
any longer. The River Tyne and its Port facilities had been allowed to fall into 
neglect. Even though the majority of the Corporation's income came from the River, 
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only a small amount was expended on its improvement. The opposition fuelled by the 
increasing availability of accounting data put greater pressure on the Corporation. It 
did so through the mediums of public meetings, petitioning, and, most importantly, 
voicing claims through the press. The Newcastle Corporationý for its part, 
reciprocated by using the accounting data to justify the lack of investment in the 
Tyne. Therefore, the study supports the hypothesis that published accounts are used 
to promote the economic interests of interest groups irrespective of the explicit 
purpose for which that information was originally intended [Watts and Zimmermann, 
1979]. The importance of accounting information as a lobbying tool to promote the 
interests of particular user groups is a recurrent theme of the study, which again 
supports the view of Watts and Zimmerman [ibid, p. 275] that it is 'political action' 
that 'generates accounting theory, not vice-versa. ' 
Ultimately, it was the Admiralty Enquiry where accounts were used as a 
c mediator and contester' [Francis, 1990], that resulted in the control of the Tyne being 
transferred from the Newcastle Corporation to the newly formed TIC in 1850. The 
TIC represented a much wider grouping of stakeholders. Thus, it can be argued that 
accounts were used as an 'emancipatory' tool in reducing social exclusivity. Whether 
the outcome of the battle for control of the Tyne could be regarded as social progress 
would depend on the perspective of the interests concerned, but it does illustrate 
accounting being deployed effectively by interest groups to engineer social change. 
This also raises the question of whether the events described in Chapter 3 are of 
isolated significance, or whether there are wider inferences that can be drawn. 
Arguably, the findings in the study add to the growing body of research showing that 
emancipation through accounts can be successful. This view contrasts With the 
emphasis in critical accounting research on the repressive nature of accounting in 
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society. It thus contributes to a growing body of research highlighting accounting's 
potential as a mechanism for promoting social advancement [G&K 1996]. 
The outcome of the battle for control of the Tyne could be regarded as social 
progress in the sense that it achieved wider representation in the management of the 
River for the towns, regions and interest groups dependent on it for their prosperity. 
The newly formed TIC was to be made up of members from all interested regions. 
Accounts had been used as a communication medium, informing and ultimately 
aiding radical, democratic forces to challenge and change the existing situation. A 
similar example in the study relates to the campaign by the Shields ports to gain 
independence from Newcastle. Again, accounting data was deployed in support of 
their case, demonstrating its efficacy as a political tool. The Newcastle Corporation, 
in turn, utilised accounting data in its subsequent campaign for the combined 
presentation of the Tyne's statistics. This last dispute was mainly about the 
presentation of information to third parties and their expected reactions; and as such it 
displays an awareness of the advantages of reporting the desirable position. 
Critics of both the Newcastle Corporation and the TIC's management of the 
Tyne gained valuable ammunition from the increased level of disclosure in the 
accounts. However, this raises the question of the understandability of accounting 
information, which becomes more critical as disclosures become more elaborate, 
requiring accounting competencies to be able to understand them; and indeed 
accounts can mislead. Making this information understandable was a key concern for 
contemporaries, including Jeremy Bentham [Gallhofer and Haslam, 2004, p. 391 ]. It is 
therefore significant that it was the 'educated' 'professional' men on the Tyne such as 
councillors and journalists, men who were capable of interpreting and manipulating 
the information reported for their own political ends, who led the challenge on the 
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establishment. 
Raising the necessary funds to pay for the dock and harbour improvements 
that were needed to enable the Tyne to function was a key area involving accounts, 
and was the subject of Chapter 4. The TIC started with a huge inherited debt to deal 
with as well as a pressing need to carry out the vital improvement works. Generating 
sufficient income to service a large debt and thereby enable the harbour authorities to 
borrow money to carry out much needed improvements was only part of the problem. 
Of equal importance was the availability of loanable funds at low enough rates of 
interest. Duties were increased to help fund improvements, but they were never 
enough. Funding was sought from private and public sources, always aiming to get 
the best terms. These loans were publicly advertised for. However, given that the TIC 
was a new trust with no financial track-record, the rates of interest available were 
higher than what was currently being offered to other companies. The surviving 
documentation indicates that TIC was aware of rates beyond the region, and that to 
borrow locally was generally better. 
Accounting data was vital in achieving new loans and better terms, and to 
attain special privileges offered by the Government and other lending bodies. The key 
to achieving better terms was for the TIC to be able to demonstrate that it was capable 
of servicing its debt. Thus, it utilised its published accounts to show its increasing 
revenue position and growing strength as a means of obtaining reductions in the cost 
of borrowing. This also shows an awareness of the merits of acquiring a reputation 
for producing good quality accounts in reducing contracting costs. From the 1880's 
onwards public loans played an insignificant role in the financing of harbour 
construction on the Tyne. Despite the initial difficulties, the TIC had little problem in 
raising capital; and it raised ten times as much capital f Tom private lenders as did 
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from Government sources. For example, the total expenditure on works undertaken 
by the TIC to December 31 1882 amounted to L4.1 million, of which fO. 4 million had 
been expended out of income and B. 7 million raised in loans. Of the borrowings, the 
Commissioners received B. 3 million from private lenders compared to 1350,000 
from the PWLC. 
The interest of the Goverment in river affairs was shown with an offer of free 
loans for any port that could justify a need for a harbour of refuge [HOR]. The TIC 
put its case forward using accounting data and trade statistics at the forefront of its 
argument to justify the need for a HOF, and to show that it had the ability to raise the 
remaining funds needed for the improvement works. The scheme was accepted by the 
Royal Commissioners on Harbour and Refuge. However, the Government was soon 
to do a U-turn, and withdrew the offer of free loans. Instead this was replaced with an 
offer of loansl the value to be re-determined, at a rate of interest lower than the 
market rate. The circumstances of this offer also changed unfavourably for the Tyne 
as rates of interest were increased. Appeals by the TIC for reductions in the rates 
offered and an increase in the amounts loaned were both declined. Here the TIC 
failed to achieve it's objectives by using their accounts to contest the Government, 
[Francis, 1990]. In essence, one could argue that holding out the 'promise' of funding 
was a political ploy on the part the Government to encourage the localities to invest in 
harbour improvements. 
One of the most significant issues regarding dues in the 19' century on the 
Tyne was the battle for the ownership of the 5/8ths coal dues held by the Newcastle 
Corporation from 1850. The fact that most of the coal dues went to the Corporation 
was the cause of constant discontent and recrimination. It was obvious from the 
accounts of the TIC that the funds applicable to the river were inadequate for the 
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execution of any comprehensive scheme of river improvement for which the TIC was 
responsible. The Corporation, on the other hand, received 5/8ths of the dues which 
were rising yearly without any river obligations, and spent a large proportion of it on 
the town. The TIC devised ways using their accounting data to contest the situation, 
Francis [1990], and gain possession of the 5/8ths. 
Ultimately, much of the money expended in port improvement either came 
directly from the river dues harvested from the ports growing traffic or was borrowed 
on the strength of the growing revenue. The investment in docks largely came from 
joint-stock companies, reflecting the increasing depersonalisation of business 
activities and the growing importance of the railway interest in the general economic 
life of the community. Here was the greatest example of the truism that the continued 
growth of coastwise shipping was dependent on massive investment in major harbour 
improvements on the part of the River Commissions, railway companies, the 
Government and private investors. In this thesis it is shown that on one occasion the 
TIC failed to get increased borrowing powers from Parliament and this resulted in an 
action never to be repeated in the history of the TIC, the suspension all the works on 
the Tyne. The TIC used the published accounts to justify this course of action on the 
grounds that it was protecting the public creditor. Whether this was a political ploy to 
exert pressure on the opposition is open to debate, but accounting was ut'lised in the 
dispute to demonstrate the necessity of taking such a step, see work on accounting 
information used to mediate and contest by Francis, [1990]. 
River dues were an important source of finance, but the way they were 
accounted for was very archaic and needed simplification to be able to attract trade 
This was achieved by using accounting data first to demonstrate the disorder in the 
dues system, and secondly to argue that revenues to the port would increase as a 
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result of in increase in trade if the level of complexity were reduced. These changes 
were made in part to aid accounting for the dues and also to make it easier for the 
trader to calculate his costs. 
The constitutional arrangements of the TIC created a lot of debate. By the 
1875 Tyne Improvement Act, the membership of TIC was changed allowing dues 
payers on board for the first time, thus reflecting the importance of trade, the growth 
in industry, and the resulting widening in the accountability of the TIC to other 
parties. At the same time, and significantly, the dues-payers were empowered to elect 
an auditor of the TIC's accounts, thereby giving them a degree of control at the heart 
of the TIC's operations. Although, at this time, the auditors were not qualified people 
or independent, but were instead members elected by the interests they represented, it 
was a significant move. For the first time the dues-payers had an elected member to 
represent their own interests when looking at the function of accounting of the TIC. 
Perhaps reflecting the growing strength and importance of trade, the membership of 
the dues-payers at the close of the century was increased to 15 by means of the 1898 
Tyne Improvement Act. As a result,, 'representation is now divided equally between 
the Riparian Municipalities and the Payers of Tyne Dues' [Urwin, 1898, p. 5]. 
When the technique of consolidating the TIC's funds was first proposed by 
the TIC in the early 1870s, it was a relatively unheard of concept, especially so for 
public bodies. There were two main factors dominating Guthrie's proposal for 
consolidation. Firstly, the accounts needed simplifying for lenders to understand as 
they were complex and increasing in complexity as further borrowing powers were 
granted. This retarded the process of procuring loans, and thus the development of the 
Tyne. Secondly, with an increasing reliance on debt, the proposal of consolidation 
afforded more solid, more substantial and more permanent security to those who lent 
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money to the TIC. All funds could be used as one as collateral security; and as a 
larger amount, it was expected that lenders would be more willing to offer their 
money at lower rates of interest. For the purpose of providing security for monies to 
be borrowed, the accounts belonging to each fund were to remain separate and 
distinct. However, the layout of the published accounts could now be rationalised. 
The 1872 Act required the TIC to keep a separate account of the money borrowed on 
the security of the Tyne Consolidated Fund, and also a separate account of the interest 
paid thereon. Looking at the published accounts of the TIC, the most obvious change 
was that the revenue and capital accounts became consolidated. 
It was obvious from the accounts that some funds were in surplus and others 
in debt,, and those in debt were paying interest on the amounts that had been borrowed 
to fund the improvement works. Proposals for consolidating all funds for borrowing 
and expenditure purposes were made and were rejected as it was argued that river 
funds would be used for dock works, a concept that could not be accepted while dock 
works continued to demand such a large expenditure. However, with the passage of 
time as the improvement works began to be completed, plans to consolidate the funds 
were revisited by the new TIC Secretary, Urwin. He was conscious that in the past 
opposition to consolidation plans had been spurred by a fear that funds would be 
misapplied and used for purposes that they were not created for. Now, with the works 
drawing to a close, this was no longer a burning issue. In 1885 the complete fusion of 
the river funds and the dock fund resulted, but with the capital and revenue accounts 
of each fund to be kept distinct for statistical and other purposes. Five years later, 
'maximised consolidation' was realised. However, the TIC continued to show all 
receipts and expenditure in respect of each fund separately in its books and accounts 
in order to enhance transparency, and to perhaps forestall any unwelcome 
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investigations into how the TIC managed its funds. 
Perhaps the biggest internal inquiry of the TIC occurred in 1880 after the 
death of the TIC secretary, James Guthrie. Clearly, the catalyst for this inquiry was 
Guthrie's death as it was not pending beforehand. This practice was not new as the 
death of a senior officer, the bookkeeper, within the Corporation of Newcastle 
stimulated an in depth investigation into the accounting practices in 1859 
[Brackenborough, 2008]. What can be seen from this and other inquiries Is that the 
need for the TIC to be accountable to a wide range of stakeholders in the River Tyne 
resulted in significant changes in the way it operated. Significant ramifications 
include the restructuring of accounts and organisation, the revision of accounting 
techniques and methods, and improVing the system of internal control. 
The TIC was also accountable to a whole host of external bodies. As the TIC 
was a trust, it was accountable to the many different users of the Tyne - traders, ship- 
owners, local industries, and the local areas represented by their respective Councils. 
Because of this, almost anyone could spark an inquiry into the TIC's management of 
the Tyne. The Government, Admiralty, Royal Commissions, or even the Newcastle 
Corporation could get involved in carrying out investigations into the affairs and 
regulation of the TIC. In many cases these external inquiries were not welcomed by 
the TIC., who saw them as too frequent and excessive. Accounting data provided the 
TIC with a means of countering the allegations made against them. 
In the early days of the TIC, the accounting arrangements were inherited from 
the Newcastle Corporation, including the treasurer. Unfortunately, the inherited 
Treasurer was not able to do double-entry and presented accounts in a format 
unsuitable for a Trust. This resulted in, two years later, an accountant [Guthrie] being 
appointed to restructure the presentation of the accounts appropriately. I have studied 
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all the available accounts relating to the River Tyne in the 19'h century, for Newcastle 
Corporation up to 1849 and the TIC from 1850 to 1900. As anticipated, it was found 
that the accounts showed more detail as the century progressed, reflecting the 
increase in accountability of these public bodies. The most significant ramifications 
of the change in control of the River were presentational changes, development in 
accounting information, and in the role of the auditor, all of which increased the 
pressure for the appointment of qualified auditors and accountant in the latter years of 
the 19' century. 
The TIC was obliged from the outset to publish accounts and appoint four 
auditors') one from each of the respective boroughs represented on the TIC 
(Newcastle, Gateshead, North and South Shields). This was set by the Tyne 
Improvement Act, 1850. The TIC used a bilateral account format, with an account for 
capital and an account for revenue. The accounts were printed and circulated amongst 
the members of the corporations of the different boroughs represented on the TIC, as 
required by the Act. 
It is obvious from looking at the accounts themselves that the volume of detail 
grew rapidly as the century progressed. New accounts were created, the accounts 
showed more detail, and explanatory notes were added. Some additional accounts 
were created by statutory requirement. However, this was not the case for all the 
accounts, which are likely to have been innovations by Guthrie and his successors, 
further improvements to the accounts continuing after his death. Given that no 
explanations could be found in the minutes as to why these accounts were created, it 
seems reasonable to assume that the TIC felt it beneficial to disclose further 
information to satisfy the various parties to which it was accountable, reducing the 
likelihood of costly inquiries. 
2 3' 6 
Significantly, when examining the available accounts it was apparent that 
there was a greater increase in detail, disclosure and volume of statements presented 
from 1882 onwards. The 1882 Local Authorities Act may have prompted this as the 
auditing and accounting provisions of the Act promoted increased disclosure by 
public bodies. Thus, the Act 'strengthened and modernised the audit and account 
provisions of the earlier Municipal Corporations Act 1833' [Coombs and Edwards, 
1993, p. 65]. 
The auditors were ordinary council members and not qualified professionals. 
Moreover, there was no requirement that they should be. The fact that the first 
accounts of the TIC were declined in their present state and deemed inappropriate for 
a trust suggests that at least one of the auditors had some accounting knowledge, or 
that some form of guidance was available at the time relating to trust accounting. An 
attempt to retrieve background information on the elected auditors proved 
unsuccessful, leaving their accounting expertise open to conjecture. The requirements 
imposed on the auditors were minimal in comparison to the audits of today; and the 
scope of the audit was limited to comparing receipts and payment vouchers with the 
accounts, and checking that the balance of cash agreed to the bank statements for the 
first 25 years of the TIC's existence. After this there was a marked improvement in 
information given, yet clearly the audit was still limited in scope. 
The last quarter of the 19' century marked the advent of an accountancy 
profession that aimed to uphold professional standards of conduct. The increase in the 
scope of the TIC's audit might therefore have been a response to criticism that it 
should have been appointing independent professional auditors, as there were no 
statutory requirements at the time that would have increased the level of audit work. 
One of the factors in the delay in the appointment of a professional might have been 
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cost., as the present auditors did their work gratuitously. It was not until 1899 that a 
'Chartered Accountant's Certificate' was first produced in addition to the 'Statutory 
Auditors' Certificate' to signify the appointment of a professional. Why this occurred 
then is unclear, but it was in this year that a chartered accountant was first employed 
to examine and check the books and accounts of the TIC and to report on the annual 
accounts alongside the existing auditors. He carried out much of the same work as the 
auditors, as the auditors' and accountant's statements read very much the same with 
regard to the scope of their work. The auditors were still elected members from the 
various councils and dues-payers. However, now two of the five individuals did have 
professional accounting qualifications. One can only assume that the independent 
accountant was necessary to enhance the accountability of the Commission. Thus we 
see an overlap in the work completed by both parties. 
Finally in this thesis, accounting for the capital projects on the River Tyne was 
examined. It was found that, generally speaking, costs were calculated using 
projections and were defrayed either by loan or out of income. The cost of structural 
works was covered by loans, and works of maintenance paid for out of income. 
Therefore, the manner in which projects were costed, and income was separated from 
capital, had a major bearing on investment/funding decisions. Again it was shown 
that accounting information retarded the progress of many constructional works as 
either the TIC argued that they could not do the works owing to a lack of finance; or 
the opposition accused the TIC of mismanaging funds, and tried to halt it from 
receiving the increased borrowing powers that it needed in order to carry out the 
further works, again adding to the theory of the role of accounting as a contester and 
mediator, Francis, [1990]. Consequently, there was a rather haphazard approach taken 
to many construction works, some only having their foundation stone laid before they 
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were later abandoned, usually due to lack of funds whilst others suspended and 
delayed until funds became available. 
When looking at the Coble Dene project, it was seen that various parties 
manipulated accounting data to their advantage, either to promote or to try to put a 
stop to the project with repercussions for its progress. The many delays that resulted 
meant that the CDD was not as useful upon its completion as had been anticipated 
when it was first proposed. 
Notwithstanding the importance of calculating income to the TIC's 
funding/investment decisions, the study found that depreciation was not provided 
throughout the 19' century, even though a depreciation deduction was allowed on 
plant and craft by the Income Tax Authorities from the 1880's. Categorising 
depreciation appeared problematic and subjective. It was the same for traders as there 
was no real guidance on the issue. However, by the end of the century, there is 
evidence of a move towards greater uniformity in the way depreciation was accounted 
for. Evidence shows that the TIC were aware of the alternative of writing off capital 
expenditure to revenue as it was incurred as a means of reducing taxable profits, 
which unsurprisingly, the Income Tax Authorities were not in favour of Ultimately, 
given the awareness of the TIC of the relative benefits that could be derived from 
accounting for capital expenditure in different ways, one can only conclude that the 
TIC did not want to charge depreciation perhaps because they needed to attract loans, 
and the balance sheet would look better without it. The findings relating to the River 
Tyne therefore provide a useful supplement to previous studies in helping to build up 
an overall picture of the spread of the concept of depreciation. The lack of uniformity 
in practice was the same for shipping companies. 
As far as capital investment decisions were concerned,, for the large part of the 
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19' century, without the influence of an accounting profession, it was found that it 
was the responsibility of the engineer to manage these works and to provide the initial 
accounting data such as estimations and costing data. For the larger rivers in the 19' 
century, undertaking important projects often meant that a consultant engineer was 
involved. In some cases, the river-authorities - generally town corporations at the 
start of the 19'hcentury and harbour authorities towards the end - employed their own 
full-time resident engineers as was seen on the Tyne. 
It was often the case that the engineer was the originator of many accounting 
reports, producing costing data that was then used by the TIC's accountant in his 
reports. Original estimates by the engineers were often significantly less the actual 
cost resulting, and so were heavily criticised. The engineers, in response, justified the 
differences through ex post analysis of the accounting data, showing how the works 
had been extended beyond the original plan. It also seems to have been the case that 
the works executed under the immediate direction of the TIC's own engineers were 
'better, cheaper, and more expeditiously done than when let to contractors' [NTCP, 
1875, p. 349], enabling the authority to secure the greatest efficiency at the least 
expenditure of public money. These findings add to the debate in the current literature 
regarding the financial role the engineer within organisations prior to the 20' century. 
Points for future research 
First and foremost, the thesis has concentrated on the River Tyne and it would be 
interesting to see if there were similafities with other ports in Britain. This leaves a 
large area of research open for future work. For example, did other local authorities 
or trusts encounter the same tntensity of opposition as the TIC, and what were the 
accounting implications? If consolidation was adopted by other river authorities, what 
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did it comprise, when did it occur, and what was the reasoning behind it? It would be 
interesting to see how other river authorities dealt with depreciation. What was the 
financial role of the engineer on other rivers during the 19' century? What was their 
education and background? What actions were taken elsewhere to deal with issues 
arising at ports as the result of economic, social and technological developments in 
the 19' century? 
On several occasions the thesis has referred to the influence of the North 
Eastern Railway Company over the TIC's accounting. One would have expected that 
comparisons, more often than not, would have been with other local authorities. 
However, when discussions were entered into relating to important accounting issues 
- for example, consolidation, repayment of capital and depreciation - there was no 
sign of linking these ideas with other authorities. This raises many questions and 
leaves an interesting area for future research. Why was the NERC used as a 
comparative so much? Was it because their focus on the distinction between capital 
and revenue and their use of the double account system that was similar to that 
employed by the TIC? How was so much known about the accounting practices of 
the NERC by Newcastle Corporation and the TIC? Were the accounts of the NERC 
similar to those of the TIC? Did the NERC have any influence over the TIC? Were 
there any people connections? Edwards [1986, p. 252] notes that 'the railways were 
the first business investment financed by the general public on a large scale'. So this 
may be a reason why the railways had such a pioneering role in the development of 
the TIC's accounting practice. 
it would be interesting to see if other Harbour Commissions that were chosen 
to construct a harbour of refuge were dealt the same hand by the Government as the 
TIC. The withdrawal of the free grant applied to all, but there is still the question of 
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how the Government used its discretion when determining the levels of loans granted 
and interest charged to other Harbour Commissions. The thesis has touched on this in 
relation to Hartlepool, Filey and Dover, but more work is required in this respect. 
Without the contribution of accounting, the River Tyne would not have been 
the success it was in the 19' century. With the control of the River being given to the 
TIC in 1850, effectively ending the ancient monopoly held by the Newcastle 
Corporation, significant improvements resulted. There was a rapid increase in ships 
using the River, particularly related to the coal-trade. The River was improved and 
new docks constructed, providing better facilities and space for the increasing traffic. 
The River Tyne will always be remembered especially for its importance in the coal- 
trade, but its improvement was a tortuous process involving many political battles. 
And it is here perhaps that the role of accounting was most significant. It was 
accounting that enabled the political battles to be fought that in turn enabled the 
development of the River on which the economic development of the region in the 
19' century hinged. 
24" 
APpgn-dix 
FIGURE 6 
FIGURES 6-12: 1853 TIC Accounts, [Newcastle Central Library, L627.22, CRD214 1 -N 
; '-t elz , , - r- -; - Z --- 
Co w g 
--i e 2- *Z 8- 
Ein 
9- 'L 
t5p, -; -f 3 ,i ý -, - 
,. . I- Z, - 
v -r 
4' .4 
-7 -F 
7 ir - 
VL 
jr 
-44 IL Jy ý :z 
:z -1! 4 
i 
- : 1.1 je = ý§ - '-' 
i 
I 
"1 
243 
FIGURE 7 
C4 
1 
-i 
- 
f .4-= -ý -, t c :-;. I !E- -t = .-: L -x .w--17= .-7 -- *z ao I 
L. s ýý -----I -ý! 2., ýn ! ý, -- ýL .-tLý: 14 .. 2 
ml 
.ý--; 
ýP. :-.,,.; =-: ', ý -. E; 
: '. '. .; .5- 
I. M 
. -4 .2. 
t- 
la) F-H-f - s 
il t- it .; - 
P --: . =- ;. F E- ;, e*vI. 
,v, 
%. -. .--1. 
- 
-; t 
ý;, i -L. - Roz- --ý- Ia-. 1 ý !4 -1 -Z 1ý ý *a. 7pý,, -ý F, ll 4g -ý A z '. .. iT pb -P 
'. 
'ki 
==---I le 
c -V- 2 . s. -6 
, 9 .;.:? !, ý 
"a 
--I lp - i 
4 f . 51 
k =i --ý -: -Z *= -Z 'i -; .r 
;zA 
Si 
N-I 
244 
FIGURE 8 
co 
-tr I 
9 
* 
I. 
El 
cq 
4: r 
:1 
caý 
ZL 
PP 
C 
I-' 
. ;; 2:: i 
ok 
i 
245 
. e> 
_EI k 
M 
W[ 
. 
10, 
W2 
ým . 
. C4 i 
p4 
FIGURE 9 
: :F:::;.: 
,=f. 
= 0 
g" 41 Iff! I im I j- 
SIX 
-j! aU 
0 
(-I 
-i 
11 -1 Itb -: I 
n 
ý; Z- A- 
Ai 
-ýt ý* :-; ýfl 25- 
n-4 
: z:;; o 
ic v 
X4, 
ri ;L 
JýT& 
II = ý ; 1 
t a i ;g , ý . 
ellf 
- 0 1 , CA -. -Z . c 0 AA AA I-- 
i-I 
I 
I 
246 
FIGURE 10 
Cý CD 
C-S 
&2 , 
c21 e2 
I 
Car, 
-7 Z 
. ;; zT; 
1- 7.4 
ifl- 
!ra. 
-ý ý: 2 
'Z- 
_. 
-j- 
"ez -; ;ý Z. a 
Li 
Z 
,iZ-. -. ý- ., 
1- 
il: .. _Z 
13 1. 
- ý2 
-. ý E, 
. Z: - --. :; 
Q 
.. - zý. 
ý2e :A 12e. Ate 4 o- 
r4 
E-- *. I. 
C: 3 I 
19-M 
I 
247 
FIGURE II 
., Z II 1ý *- 
co I 
J9 
JR 
V 
js_ 
4, 
c. 
44., 
S 4-a 
I- 
I-I 
ý i. ý Y. 
4: 
Lf 
z 
1 
I 
1 
g 
7c - 
4 - - ;. J 
,I A ; Z: ; - :_ rý 2 
_l_ 
HT'5 
a 
-S 
-Z - . 
LZ 
TZ 
: -x ý- i: - 
t - 
j -. EI 
I 
248 
FIGURE 12 
I 
t " wi A 
t'j 
ml will 
ta S& ell le 
ý I 
S H 
li 
SN?: ý - j -ý i - I Vi, H) I Z I4 2 IL. I 
. 31 
C 
ý:; -ý W 
I 
4 
249 
qGURES 13 -14 Secretary's RepOrt&Nfinutes to Comminees, 1871-1933 
[L627 T987T. Cr 
, 29058A] 
= -LY 
l e U; 
F 7 m ;A j : 
-t 
250 
FIGURE 14 
Z -- =-4 -- -1 
Z 
1-- ;1 
pr ei - ei . u -i ei :Z -- < 
Zi 
t- :: 
Z. -= :.,. Z - z2 1. zrý .' 
Z Z ýi t- . Z: ýE - 
j-- ý4 ý ti .ý -* -,: 8: Z AZ 
4'1 
15 2, g C:! - 
--- Z 
"C 
_'i 
C. 
251 
FIGURES 19 -21: TIC Accounts, 1899, [L627.22, Cr D2141-5] 
7L 
T6 
. r -- It- -. 
ii : 
I -. . - 
z -L 
! ý? - - - - 
ý; - ;--, 
-- . -- -e - -- 3 -- Z. I :i 
& -Z .. ic 
i. -Z 
/ 
5- :f 
z 2-1 
r. IS. I: I- 
55 
t _; i X 
2 
1 1% -5: 
252 
FIGURE 20 
L9 
13 
p IE 
1 
.. IY! .- I .. ýz --i - i, "; -, -4 
n f. : === . - -f 
re 
bc 
't r 
6 V. - - z 
ra , ., '. I 
ýwo 
ý? 4 i-If I r_, 94 :-, Z , V. 
. 
.9 
1114 
13 A. . C: ý , . i. 2 -. Z. -: 
rq 
7 ;: 'S 
cz: 
1 
. : 
- -- - - - - -- - -1 
253 
FIGURE 21 
J 
I I Fi F.. -- t-! II 
10 
V7 
t Ij 
t 1ý =* . , *4 1 -. -. - : 
z 
.I t t5 -, : . . 
I I. 
;r 1. 
Lt 
7: z 6 : 
-ý 
-2 
" 
-11 
ý< k: P3 - 4" 04 t -ý - -, 
91 iL 
1 IN : ot 
Ott 
r7 
M4 
1 7, 
- 5 i. - -. - - - -- - -- 
- 03, - . - 
h 'r 
ic 
f. 
:z 
I 
254 
Bibliography 
Manuscript Sources: 
Admiralty Enquiry, 1849. 
Harbours of refuge, Report from the Select committee. Proceedings, minutes of 
evidence, appendix and index, 1858,1857-58 Vol. XVII. 
Lindsay, R. [1851], Ae Times, 24' June. 
General Iron Screw Company Prospectus, [ 1852]. 
Glover Brothers Annual Circular, [ 1864]. 
Shields Gazette [1852]. 
Tyne Improvement Acts, [1850,1857,18611) 18701) 1872,1898,1899]. 
Tyne Improvement Commission Records, Newcastle City Library: 
Abstract of accounts, 3 vols, 1851-1939, [L627.22, Cr D2141-5]. 
Financial Reports 1884-1936, [L627 T987T, Cr 629062A]. 
Albums of public notices 1879-1929, [L627 T987T, Cr D1439]. 
Engineer Reports 1865-1891, [L627 T987T, Cr 628796A]. 
Misc reports/memos 1849-1905 4 vols., [L627 T987T, CR 953595A-953598A]. 
Secretary's Report&Mnutes to Committees, 1871-1933, [L627 T987T, Cr 629058A]. 
Various TIC papers 1840-1900, [1,042, Cr 961104A]. 
General Scrap Books 2 vols., [L627 T987T, Cr 961066A]. 
Report of the Dredging and River Works Committee, [ 186 1 ]. 
Dredging Reports, 1870, [GU. TH/254]. 
Report of Parliamentary Committee 13' December [1876]. 
255 
D- 
Keport of the Investigation Committee, River Tyne Improvement Report of the River, 
1880, [D. NCP/5/8]. 
Chapman, [ 1903 a] Letter to TIC 
Chapman, [ 1903b] Letter to TIC 
Urwin, [ 1903] Letter to Ormond. 
Ormond, [ 1903] Letter to Urwin. 
Tyne Steam Shipping Company Records, Tyne and Wear Archives: 
Proceedings of annual meetings, 1879-1911, DT. TT/4/1. 
Shareholders General Meetings, 1865-1919, DT. TT/10. 
Scrapbook containing newspaper articles company prospectus and annual reports, 
1864-1888, DT. TT/63. 
Scrapbook containing newspaper articles company prospectus and annual reports, 
1889-1904, DT. TT/65. 
Twentieth century records: 
Corporate Records, DT. TT/ 1 -7. 
Financial Records, DT. TT/8-9. 
Shareholder Records, DT. TT/ 10- 19. 
Staff Records, DT. TT/20-23. 
Records of Vessels, DT. TT/24-39. 
Publicity Material, DT. TT/63-70. 
256 
Contempora! a Printed Sources: 
Armstrong, W. G. [ 1836], Observations of the Improvement of the Navigation of the 
Tyne, Newcastle: Emerson Charnley. 
Armstrong, W. G. [1864], The industrial resources of the district of the three 
northern rivers, the Tyne, Wear and Tees : including the reports on the local 
manufactures, Newcastle, 
Baker, J. [ 1884], 'Shipping Accounts, The Accountant, June 30-. 59 1. 
Brooks, W. A. [1867], 'Memoirs of the River Tyne', Minutes of Proceedings of the 
Institution of Civil Engineers, XXVI: 3 98-44 1. 
Brown, J. [ 1823 ], A Short Account of the Customs and Franchises of the Freeman of 
Newcastle, Angus, Newcastle. 
Bruce, J. Collingwood [1886], Handbook to Newcastle-on- Tyne, Andrew Reid, 
Newcastle. 
Charleton, R. J. [ 1894], A History of Newcastle upon Tyne, W. H. Robinson, 
Newcastle. 
Daly, R. R. [ 1899], 'Shipping Accounts', The Accountant, January 7- 21-24. 
Daly, R. R. [ 1900], 'Shipping Accounts', Die Accountant, December 15 .- 1146-48. 
Daly, R. R. [ 1910], 'Shipping Accounts', 7-heAccountant, April 6: 181-4. 
Dicey, AN. [ 1905], Lectures on the relation between law and public opinion in 
England during the nineteenth century, London, Macmillan. 
Dicksee, L. R. [ 1892], Auditing, apractical manualfor auditors, Gee, London, 
Dodson, I[ 1750], The Accountant, or, the Method ofBook-keeping, London. 
Dunn, M. [ 1844], A Historical, Geological and Descriptive wew of the coal trade of 
the North of Englwid, Pattison and Ross, Newcastle. 
257 
Dunn, N1L [ 1849], A treatise of the winning and working of collieries, Newcastle. 
Fells, J. M., [1919], 'Some principles governing the ascertainment of cost' The 
Incorporated Accountants'Journal, Nov. 1919 -31-34. 
Fordyce, W. [ 1860], A history of lead, coke, coaýields, coal mining, iron and its ores 
etc, Newcastle. 
Garcke, E. and Fells, J. M., [ 1911 ], Factory Accounts, Crosby Lockwood, London. 
Gibson, N. J. [1890], 'Engineering Cost Bookkeeping', The Accountant, July, 12- 
366-7. 
Guthrie, J. [1880], 7-he river Tyne its history and resources, Newcastle. Andrew 
Reid. 
Hamilton, R[ 183 0], The progress of society, John Murray. 
Harcourt, L. F. C. [ 1885], Harbours andDocks, Oxford, Clarendon Press. 
Hodgson, G. [ 1903], The Borough of South Shields, ftom the earliest period to the 
close of the nineteenth century, [Newcastle: Andrew Reid]. 
Jeans, J. S. [ 1877], Notes ofNorthern Industries, London. 
Macgregor, J. [1832], Observations on the River Tyne with a view to the 
Improvement of its Navigation, [Newcastle- J&J Hodgson]. 
Mackenzie, E. [1827], A Descriptive and Historical Account of the Town and 
County ofNewcastle upon Tyne, Vot II., Newcastle - Andrew Reid, 
Maclay, R. M. [1910], 'Notes on the Audit of the Accounts of Ships and Shipping 
Companies', Ihe Accountant, August 6. 
Mather, J. [1859], 'Report of the Select Committee relative to the Engineering atid 
other officers of the River Tyne Commission', Observer Steam Press, Gateshead. 
M. C. I. : Municipal Corporation Inquiry 1833/4. 
Mitchell, W. A. [ 1823 ], The letters of Tim Tunbelly Gent., Newcastle: W. A. Mitchell. 
258 
Newcastle Corporation, [1809], Report on the proceedings of the auditors of the 
accounts of the Corporation ofNewcastle upon Ty-ne, Gateshead- I Marshall. 
Newcastle Corporation, [ 1849], An Account of the gross income and expenditure of 
the Corporation of Newcastle upon Tyne as published annually for the last forty 
years, Newcastle: Hugh McColl. 
N. T. C. P. : Newcastle Town Council Proceedings 11836-19051. 
Plummer, B. [1874], Newcastle upon Tyne - its trade and manufactures, Newcastle 
Andrew Reid. 
Ren n ie, J. [ 1816], Report on the Improvement of the Tyne. 
River Committee [1836], Papers relating to the River Tyne, Newcastle: T&J 
Hodgson. 
Sykes, J. [ 1829], Ihe state of the coal trade in the UK., Evidence taken before the 
select committee of the House ofLords, Newcastle upon Tyne, 
Thompson, W. [1777], The Accountants' Oracle, York. 
Tyne Mercury 1833 - 183 8. 
Ure, J. F. [ 1860], Report of John E Ure engineer to the Tyne Improvement 
Commission, on the generalplan of improvement of the River Tyne. 
259 
Seconda!: y Sources 
Alderoft, Derek H. [1966], 'Technical Progress and British Enterprise 1875-1914', 
Business History, 8,2 -. 122-13 9. 
Alford, P. W. E. [1977], 'Entrepreneurship, Business Performance and Industrial 
Development', Business History, XIX, 2: 181-99. 
Allen, J. H. [ 1962], Hydraulic studies in the estuary of the River Tyne, Newcastle. 
Alvesson, M. and Willmott, H. [1992], 'On the idea of emancipation in management 
and organisation studies', Academy ofManagement Review, 17,3 -. 432-464. 
Armstrong, P. [1994], 'The Influence of Michel Foucault on Accounting Research', 
Critical Perspectives on Accounting 5, L 25-55. 
Arnold, A. J. [1997], "'Publishing your private affairs to the world": corporate 
financial disclosures in the UK 1900-24', Accounting, Business and Financial 
History, 7,2: 143-173. 
Arrington, C. E. and Francis, J. R. [1993], 'Accounting as a human practice: the 
appeal of other voices' Accounting Organisations and Society, 18,2/3: 105-106. 
Arrington, C. E. and Francis, J. R. [1993], 'Giving economic accounts: accounting 
as cultural practice' Accounting Organisations and Society, 18,2/3 : 107-24. 
Atkinson, F. [1950], North East England People at Work, 1860-1950, Moorland 
Publishing. 
Babbage, C. [1835], Economy of machinery and manufacturers, Charles Knight, 
London. 
Bagwell, P. S. [ 1974], The transport revolutionftom 1770, B. T. Batsford, London. 
Banyard, C. W. [1985], The Institute Of Cost and Management Accounts, London, 
ICMA. 
260 
Baxter, S. T. and Davidson, S. [1962], Stu&es in Accounting Iheory, Sweet and 
Maxwell, London. 
Baxter, W. T. [1980], 'Account Charge and Discharge', Accounting Historians 
Joumal, 7.1 - 69-71. 
Benston, G. J. [1982], 'Accounting and Corporate Accountability', Accounting 
Organisations and Society, 2,: 87-105. 
Bhimani, A. [1994], 'Accounting enlightenment in the age of reason, European 
Accounting Review 3,3: 299-442. 
Black, M. [1957], Me application of scale hydraulic models to the study offlood 
conditions on the River Tyne, Newcastle. 
Botticelli, P. [1997], 'The British Engineering Press during the Second Industrial 
Revolution: Responses to Corporate Capitalism', Business History Review 7 1, 
Summer: 260-286. 
Bowling, H. G., Coombes, I. C., and Walker, R. [1958], The Lwid of three rivers, 
London, Macmillan. 
Boyce, G. [19921 '64thers, Syndicates, and Stock Promotions. Information Flows and 
Fund-raising Techniques of British Shipowners Before 1914', The Journal of 
El- 
Economic History, 52,1 : 181-205. 
Boyce, G. [ 1995 a], Information, Mediation and Institutional Development: The Rise 
of Large-scale Enterprise in British Shipping, 1820-1919, Manchester University 
Press. 
Boyce, G. [1995b], 'Accounting for managerial decision making in British shipping, 
18 70-1918', Accounting, Business and Financial History, 5,3 -3 60-3 78. 
261 
Boyns, T. and Edwards,, 1& [1995], 'Accounting systems and decision-making in 
the mid-Victorian Period: the Case of the Consett Iron Company', Business History, 
37,3 : 28-46. 
Boyns, T. and Edwards, J. R. [1996], 'Change agents and the dissemination of 
accounting technology: Wales' basic industries, c. 1750-1870', Accounting History, 
1,1.327-353. 
Boyns, T. and Edwards, J. P.. [1996], 'The development of accounting in mid- 
nineteenth century Britain: a non disciplinary view', Accounting Auditing and 
Accountability Journal, 9,3: 40-60. 
Boyns, T., Anderson, M., and Edwards, J. R. [19961, British Cost Accounting 
1887-1953! 
0 
Ed. Garland London. 
Boyns, T and Edwards, J. R [1997], "'The construction of cost accounting systems 
in Britain to 1900: the case of the coaL iron and steel industries", Business History, 
39, J). 1-29. 
Boyns, T and Edwards, J. R. [1997], 'Cost and management accounting in early 
Victorian Britain: a Chandleresque analysisT, Management Accounting Research, 
81: 19-46. 
Boyns, T and Edwards, J. R. [2000], 'Pluralistic approaches to knowing more, a 
comment on Hoskin and Macvae'. Accounting Historiam Journal, 27,1 : 151-8. 
Brackenborough, S. J., McLean, T., and Oldroyd, D. [2001], 'The emergence of 
D. C. F. analysis in the Tyneside Coal Industry c. 1700-1820', British Accounting 
Review, 33: 137-55. 
Brackenborough, SA, [2003], 'Pound Foolish Penny Wise System: The Role of 
Accounting in the Improvement of the River Tyne, 1800-1850', Accounting 
Historians Journal, 30,1 : 45-72. 
262 
Brackenborough, S. J. [2008], 'The Death and Defalcations of Officers Change 
Agents for Municipal Reform in the Nineteenth Century', Working Paper. 
Bricker, D. J. [1999], 'The Importance of History for Accounting Research', Abacus, 
271: 72-77. 
Brief, ILP. [1965], 'Nineteenth Century Accounting Error', Journal of Accounting 
Review, 7: 12-28. 
Brief, ILP. [1976], Nineteenth century capital accounting and business investment, 
Arno Press NY. 
Brief, R. P. [ 1976], Me late nineteenth century debate over depreciation, capital and 
income, Amo Press NY. 
Brierley, S. E. [1983], 7-he effects of the Keilder reservoir on the River Tyne 
morphology, Newcastle. 
Bryer, XA. [1991], 'The Railway Mania of 1845 -A great Railway SwindleT, 
Accounting Organisations and Society, 16,5/6: 439-486. 
Bryer, R. A. [1993], 'The Late Nineteenth Century Revolution in Financial 
Reporting', Accounting Organisations and Society, 1,7/8 -. 649-690. 
Bryer, ILA. [2000], 'The FEstory of Accounting and the TransitIon Into Capitalism in 
England Part 1. Theory', Accountitig Organisatiotis and Society, 25,2: 131-162. 
Bryer, R. A. [2000], 'The I-Estory of Accounting and the Transition into Capitalism in 
England Part 2: Evidence', Accountit7g Organisations cuid Society, 25,24: 3 27-3 8 1. 
Buchanan, R. A. [1983], 'Gentlemen Engineers. The Making of a Profession', 
Victorian Studies, 26,4- 407-429. 
Buchanan R. A. [ 1989], Me Engineers, London. 
Burgess, J [1993], The History Of Ports W'd Coastal Towns of Eastern England, 
Carlisle. 
263 
Burn, W. L. [1956], Newcastle in the early Nineteenth Century', Archaeologia 
Aelina, 34,4- 245-258. 
Byrne, J. [2002], 'The sum of us', Good Weekend, Sept 7, p- 18-2 1. 
Callon, M. [1980], "Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation: Domestication of 
the Scallops and Fishennen of St. Brieuc Bay" in J. Law [ed. ] Power Action and 
Belief a New Sociology of Knowledge pp. 196-233 [London: Routledge-Kegan Paul]. 
Carlon, S. A. and Morris, R. D. [2003], 'The economic determinants of depreciation 
accounting in late nineteenth century Britain, Accounting, Business & Financial 
History 13,3 : 275-303. 
Carnegie, G. D. and Napier, CA [1996], 'Critical and interpretive histories- insights 
into accounting's present future through its past, Accounting Auditing and 
Accountability Journal, 9,3 - 7-3 9. 
Carnegie, G. D. and West, B. P. [2005], 'Making Accounting Accountable in the 
Public Sector, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 16: 905-928. 
Carsberg, B, [1975], Economics ofBusiness Decisions, ]Penguin. 
Cathles, A. [1920], 'The General Principles of Costing), The Accountant, Feb. 
28':. 249-256. 
Chandler, A. D. [ 1977], The Visible Hand: 7-he Managerial Revolution in American 
Business, Belknap Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Chandler, PLA., Edwards, J. &, and Anderson, M. [1993], 'Changing Perceptions 
of the Role of the Company Auditor, 1840-1940', Accounting and Business Research, 
23,92 : 443-459. 
Chandler, R and Edwards, J. R. [1996], 'Recurring issues in auditing- back to the 
future?, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Joumaj, . 
9,, 2: 4-29. 
264 
Chandlen, R. A. [1999], 'Critics' use of satire against the auditing profession- a short 
historical note'. Accounting Au&ting andAccountability Journa4 12,1 : 129-133. 
Chatfield, M. [1974], A History ofAccounting Thought, Dryden Press. 
Clarke, J. F. [ 1966], Labour relations in engineering and shipbuilding on the North 
East Coast in the second half of the 19" century, MA Thesis, Newcastle. 
Clarke, J. F. [ 1984], A Century of Service to Engineering wid Shipbuilding, 
Newcastle. 
Clarke, J. F. [ 19971, Building ships on the north east coast 1640-1914, Bewick Press. 
Coleman, D. [ 1973 ], 'Gentlemen and Players', Economic History Review, 26: 92-116. 
Cook, M.. [1961], 'The last days of the unreformed corporation', Archaeologia 
Aeliana 39,4ý 217-232. 
Coombs, H. M. and Edwards, J. R. [1993], 'The Accountability of Municipal 
Corporations', Abacus, 29,, 1-. 26-52. 
Coombs, H. M. and Edwards, J. K [1994], 'Record keeping in municipal 
corporations: a triumph for double entry bookkeeping', Accounting, Business and 
Financial History, Vol. 4, No. 1 : 163-180. 
Coombs, H. M. and Edwards, J. R. [1996], Accounting Innovation, Municipal 
Corporations 1835-1935, [New York: Garland Publishing]. 
Cooper, D. J. and Sherer M. J. [1984], 'The value of corporate accounting reports: 
towards a political economy of accounting', Accounting Organisations and Society, 
9,3/4- 207-32. 
Cottrell, D. L and Aldcrodt, D. H. [ 198 1 ], Shipping, Trade and Commerce, Leicester 
University Press. 
Cousins, J and Sikka, P. [1993], 'Accounting for change: Facilitating power and 
accountability', Critical Perspectives in Accounting, 4- 53-72. 
265 
Craig, PLS. [1971], 'Capitalformation in shipping, in Aspects of Capital Investment 
in Great Britain, 1750-1850, ' Higgins, J. P. P. & Pollard, S, Methuen & Co. Ltd, 
. 
131-157. London. ' 
Craig. ) R. S. [1985], 'The Business Historian and the shipping industry', Busmevs 
Archives, 33- 321-339. 
Crossman, P. [1953] 'The Genesis of Cost Control', Accounting Review, 28,4 : 522- 
527. 
Davis, R. [ 1979] 
-The 
Industrial Revolution and British Overseas Trade, Leicester. 
Daysh, G. H. J, [1935], 'A distressed Industrial Region - Tyneside', Economic 
Geography, XI: 159-166. 
Edey, H. C., and Panitpakdi, P. 11956], British Company Accounting and the Law 
1844-1900, in Littleton,, A. C. and Yamey, B. S. Eds, Studies in the History of 
Accounting. 
Edwards, J. R. [1976], 'The accounting profession and disclosure in published 
reports, 1925-193 5', Accounting and Business Research, Autumn -. 289-3 03. 
Edwards, J. PL [1980], 'British Capital Accounting Practices and Business Finance 
18 5 2-1919 - An Exemplification, Accounting and Business Research, Spring, 241-5 8. 
Edwards, J. R. [ 198 1 ], Company Legislation and Changing Patterns of Disclosure 
in British Company Accounts, 1900-1940, London: ICAEW. 
Edwards, J. R. and Webb, K. M. [19821, 'The influence of company law on 
corporate reporting procedures, 1865-1929: an exemplification', Business History, 
2413 : 259-279. 
Edwards, J. R. and Webb, K. M. [1984], 'The Development of Group Accounting In 
The UK to 193 3'. Accounting Historians Journal, 11,31-6 1. 
Edwards, J. R. [1989], A History ofFinancialAccounting, Routledge, London. 
266 
Edwards, J. k [1991], 'The process of accounting innovation'. the publication of 
consolidated accounts in Britain in 19 10', Ae Accounting Historians Journal, 18,2 - 
113-132. 
Edwards, J. R. and Newell, E. [1991], 'The Development of Industrial Cost and 
Management Accounting before 1850- A survey of the evidence', Business History 
3371: 35-57. 
Edwards, J. R. [1992], 'Companies, Corporations and Accounting Change, 1835- 
193 3 7, A ccounting and Business Research, 23,8 9 -. 5 9- 73. 
Edwards I It and Boyns T. [1994], 'Accounting practice and business finance. 
some case studies from the iron and coal industry 1865-1914', Joumal of Business 
Finance andAccounting, 21: 1151-78. 
Edwards, J. k Boyns, T., and Anderson, M [1995], British Cost Accounting 
Developing Continuity and Change, Accounting Historians Journal, 22,2: 
Edwards, J. kAnderson, M., and Matthews, D. [1997], 'Accountability in a Free- 
Market Economy- The British Company Audit, 1886', Abacus, 33,1.1-25. 
Ezzatnel, M., Hoskin, K, and Macvae, IL [1990], 'Managing it All By Numbers, A 
Review of Johnson and Kaplan's "Relevance Lost"', Accounting Business Research, 
20,78: 153-166. 
Finch, R. [1973], Coalsftom Newcastle, Dalton, Newcastle. 
Fleischman, R. K- and Parker, L. D. [1990], 'Managerial Accounting Early in the 
British Industrial Revolution: The Carron Company, a Case Study', Accounting and 
Business Research, 20,79:. 211-22 1. 
Fleischman, R. K. and Parker, L. D. [1991], 'British Entrepreneurs and Pre- 
Industrial Revolution Evidence of Cost Management, The Accoutifing Rewew, 
66,2, '. 361-375. 
267 
Fleischman, ICK. and Tyson, T. [1993], 'Cost accounting during the industrial 
revolution: the present state of historical knowledge, Economic History Review, 
XLVI, 3: 231-262. 
Fleischman, ILK, Mills, P. A., and Tyson, T. [1996], 'A theoretical primer to 
evaluating and conducting historical research in accounting', Accounting History, I- 
55-75. 
Fleischman, ILK. And Tyson, T. [1997], 'Archival researchers: an endangered 
speciesT, Ihe Accounting Historians Journal, 24: 101-109. 
Fleischman, ILK and Parker, L. D. [1997], What is past is prologue, Cost 
accounting in the British Industrial Revolution, 1760-1850. Garland. 
Fleischman, kK and Oldroyd, D. [2001], 'An Imperial Connection? Contrasting 
the Coal-mining Accounting Practices of the North-east of England and Nova Scotia, 
Canada 1825-1900 7, Accounting Historians Journal 28,2: 31-62. 
Fleischman, R. K. and Radcliffe, V. S. [2003], 'Divergent streams of accounting 
history: A review and call for confluence', In: Fleischman, R. K., Radcliffe, V. S., and 
Shoemaker, P. A. [Eds. ], Doing Accounting History. Elsevler Science Ltd, Oxford, 
pp. 1-29. 
Foster, J. and Sheppard, I[ 1995], British Archives, Macmillan Press, London. 
Francis, J. R. [1990], 'After virtue? Accounting as a moral and Discursive Practice'. 
Accounting Auditing andAccountability Joumal, 3,3: 5-17. 
Fraser, D. [1979], Power and Authority in the Victorian City, [Oxford. Basil 
Blackwell]. 
Freeman, M. J., and Alderoft, D. H. [1988], Transport in Victorian Britain, 
Manchester University Press. 
268 
Funnell, W. [1996], 'Preserving History in Accounting: Seeking Common Ground 
between New and Old Accounting History, Accounting A uditing and Accountability 
Joumal, 9,4: 38-64. 
Funnell, W. [1997], 'Military influences on the evolution of public sector audit 
accounting', Accounting History NS, 2,2: 9-29. 
Gaffikin, M. [1998], 'History is dead, long live history', Critical Perspectives in 
Accounting, 9: 631-639. 
Gallhofer, S., and Haslam, J., [1991] 'The aura of accounting in the context of a 
crisis',, Accounting Organisation and Societies, 16,5/6: 487-520. 
[1993], 'Approaching Corporate Accountability 
Fragments From The Past', Accounting and Business Research, 23,91 a: 320-330. 
[ 1994a], 'Accounting and the Bentharns, accounting as 
negation' Accounting, Business andFinancial History, 4,2: 239-73. 
[1994b] 'Accounting and the Benthams, or accounting's 
potentialities', Accounting, Business andFinancial History, 4,3: 431-60. 
[1995] 'Accounting and modernity', Advances in Public 
Interest Accounting 6- 203 -3 2. 
[1996a] 'Accounting Art and the Emancipatory Project, 
Some Reflections'. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability, 9,5: 23-44. 
[1996b], 'Analysis of Bentham's Chrestomathia: or, 
towards a critique of accounting education', Critical Perspectives in Accounting, 7, 
1/2: 13-3 1. 
[ 1996c], 'No blinkered view: critical reflections on the 
teaching of a compulsory course component on alternative perspectives on finance ') 
AccountingEducation 5,4- 297-319. 
269 
[1997a], 'Beyond accounting, the possibilities of 
accounting and "critical" accounting research', Critical Perspectives in Accounting, 
8,1/2,71-95. 
[1997b],, 'The direction of green accounting policy 
critical reflections', Accounting, Auditing and Accountability, 10,2-148-174. 
[2000a],, 'Bentham on accounting- a summary analysis 
reflecting on the concept of accountability', The Current State of Business 
Disciplines, 1 : 219-236. 
[2001], Mobilising Accounting in labour disputes and 
the strategies of radical political movements: some late nineteenth century episodes. 
Paper presented at Nottingham British Accounting Association Conference. 
[2003], Accounting and Emancipation, Routledge, 
London. 
Galloway, IL [ 1898], Annals of Coal Mining and the Coal Trade, David and Charles, 
Newton Abbot. 
Goss, R. O. [1970], Studies in Maritime Economics, Cambridge University Press. 
Graham, F. [ 1976], Historic Newcastle, Newcastle. 
Graham, G. S. [1955], 'The Ascendancy of the Sailing Ship', Business History, 
IX-74-88. 
Groundwater, K. [1998], Newcastle Railway: a view ftom the past. Ian Allen, 
Newcastle. 
Groundwater, K[ 1998], Newcasile wid the River Tyne, Newcastle. 
Guy, A. [2003], Steam and spee& railways of Tyne and Wearftom the earliest days, 
Newcastle. 
270 
Habakkuk, H. J. [1962], American and British Technologv in the Nineteenth 
Century, Cambridge University Press. 
Halcrow, E. [1953], "Mr. Treasurer - Newcastle upon Tyne before 1835", Local 
Government Finance Journal, July 151-153, September 200-202. 
Harley, C. K. [1970], 'British Shipbuilding and Merchant Shipping, 1850-1990', 
Journal of Economic History, 3 0,1 - 262-266. 
Harley, C. K. [1988], 'Ocean Freight Rates and Productivity, 1740-1913: the Primacy 
of Mechanical Invention Reaffirmed', Journal of Economic History, XLVIII, 4,: 85 I- 
876. 
Harley, C. K [1989], 'Coal Exports and British Shipping, 1850-1913', Explorations 
on Economic History, 26 -3 11-3 3 8. 
Haslam, J. [ 199 1 ], On the Prescribing of Accounting and Accounting Publicity in 
Early to Mid Nineteenth Century Britain, Accounting History as Critique, 
unpublished PhD thesis, University of Essex. 
Hein, L. W. [19781, The British Companies Acts and the Practice of Accountancy 
1844-1962, [New York: Arno Press]. 
Heslop, G. [ 1974] Ihe Railways of Great Britain, David and Charles, London. 
Higgins, J. P. P. and Pollard, S. [1971] Aspects of Capital Investment in Great 
Britain 1750-1850, Methuen, London. 
Hill, N. K [1955], 'Accountancy Development in a Public Utility Company in the 
Nineteenth Century', Accounting Research, VI: 3 82-90. 
Hooper, K. [1995], 'The Cely Shipping Accounts', Accounting Historians Journal, 
22,2- 112-115. 
Hopwood, A. G. [1987], 'The Archaeology of Accounting Systems', Accounting 
Organisations and Society, 12,3 - 207-234. 
271 
Hoskin, KW. and Maeve, kH. [1986], 'Accounting and the Examination- A 
Genealogy of Disciplinary Power', Accounting Organisations and Society, 11,2- 105- 
136 
Hoskin, K. W. and Macve, ILH. [2000] 'Knowing more as knowing less9 
Alternative histories of cost and management accounting in the US and the UK' 
A ccounting Historians Journal, 2 7,1 - 17-42. 
House, J. W. [ 1969], The North East, David and Charles. 
Hyde, F. E. [ 1967], Shipping Enterprise and Management 1830-1939 : Harrisons of 
Liverpool, Liverpool University Press. 
Jackson G. [1983], The History and Archaeology of Ports, BAS. 
Jefferys, J. B. [ 1948] The Story of the Engineers, 1800-1945, Johnson, London. 
Jenkinson, WJ1914], 'Some Principles of Accounting affecting cost accounts, The 
Accountant, April 18': 564-582 
Johnson, H. T. [1972], 'The Organisational Awakening of Management Accounting 
History', Business History Review, XLVI, : 67-77. 
Johnson, H. T. [1981], 'Towards a New Understanding of Nineteenth Century Cost 
Accounting', Accounting Review, LVI, 3 : 510-518. 
Johnson, H. T. [1987], Relevance Lost, Harvard Business School Press, Boston. 
Johnson, R. W. and Aughton, R. [1925], The river Ty-ne, its trade andfacilities, 
[Newcastle- Andrew Reid & Co. Ltd]. 
Joint Committee for the improvement of the Banks of the River Tyne [1974]. 
Eighty years of improvement on the Tyne, Newcastle. 
Jones, D. M. C. [1974], 'Evolution of accounting as management aid, Management 
Accounting, July/August, : 197-200. 
272 
Jones, &H. [1986], The Financial Control Function of local government accounting, 
PhD Thesis, University of Birmingham. 
Jones, R. H. [1989], 'On local government accounting history, the case of central 
establishment charges', Financial Accountability andManagement, 5,2: 59-7 1. 
Jones, R. H. [1992], 'Accounting in English Local Government from the Middle 
Ages to c. 1835', Accounting andBusiness Research, 22,89-197-209. 
Jones, S. [1989], Trade and Shipping Lord Inchape 1852-1932, Manchester 
University Press. 
Jones, S. and Aiken, M. [1995], 'British Companies legislation and social and 
political evolution during the nineteenth century', British Accounting Review, 27,1: 
71-82. 
Jones, S. [1999], 'Laissez-faire, collectivism and 19' century British legislation. A 
response to Walker', British Accounting Review, I: 85-87. 
Kaplan, R. S. [1984], 'The Evolution of Management Accounting', Accounting 
Review,, LIY,,, 3 : 390-418 
Kenwood, A. G. [ 1962], Capital Formation in North East England, 1800-1913, 
University of London. Unpublished PhD Thesis. 
Kenwood, A. G. [1965], 'Port Investment in England and Wales 1851-1913', 
Yorkshire Bulletin ofEconomic and Social Research, 2,17 -. 15 6-167. 
Kenwood, A. G. [1971], 'Capital Investment in Docks, Harbours, and river 
Improvements in north-eastern England 1825-1850', The Journal of Transport 
History, 1.2,,. '69-84. 
Kenwood, A. G. [1985], Capital Formation in North East England 1800-1913, 
Garland, London. 
Keys, R. E. [ 1997], Black diamonds by sea, Newcastle. 
273 
Keys, ILE. [1998], Dictionary of Tyne Sailing Ships, a record of merchant sailing 
ships owned, registered and built in the Port of Tyneftom 1830 to 1930, Newcastle. 
Kirkaldy, A. W. [1914], British Shipping, its history, organisation and importance, 
London, Kegan Paul. 
Kirkley, W. J. [ 1930], Ae Port of Tyne, what it was and is, Newcastle. 
Kitchen, J. and Parker, IL [1980], Accounting Thought and Education, Six 
Pioneers, I. C. A. E. W. 
Larson, M. S. [1977], Ae rise off professionalism: A sociological analysis, 
University of California Press, Berkeley. 
Latour, B. [1986], "The Powers of Association", in J. Law [ed. ] Power Action and 
Belief a New Sociology of Knowledge : 196-233 [London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul]. 
Latour, B. [1987], Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers 
through Society Milton Keynes: Open University Press. 
Lee, T. [1970], 'A brief history of company audits - 1840-1940', Accountant's 
Magazine, LXXIV: 363-368. 
Lee, T. A. [ 1977], Company Financial Statements 
, in 
Business and Businessmen 
Marriner, S, : 15-39 
Lee, T. A. and Parker, XH. [ 1979] , 
Ihe Evolution of Corporate Financial Reporting, 
Nelson. 
Lee, T. [1995], 'The professionalisation of accounting', Accounting Auditing and 
Accountability Journal, 3,4-. 48-69. 
Lee, T. A., Bishop, A., and Parker, R. H. Eds [ 1996], Accounting History ftom the 
Renaissance to the Present, Garland. 
274 
Livock, D. M. [19651, 'The Accounts of the Corporation of Bristol: 1532 to 1835 5 1) 
Journal ofAccounting Research, 3,1-. 86-102 
Littleton, A. C. [ 1933] Accounting evolution to 1900, New York, Russell & Russell,. 
Littleton, A. C. and Yamey, B. S. [1956], Studies in the f1istory of Accounting, 
Sweet and Maxwell,, London. 
Locke, ILPL [ 1984], Ae End of the Practical Man, Jai Press, London. 
Loft, A., [1986], 'Towards a critical understanding of accounting- the case of cost 
accounting in the UK, 1914-1925, Accounting, Orgmisations and Society, 11, 
2.137-169. 
Loft, A. [ 1988], Understanding Accounting in It's Social and Historical Context: The 
Case of Cost Accounting in Britain, 1914-1925, Garland, New York. 
Loft, A. [ 1990] 
, 
Coming into the Lýght: Stu! A of the Development of a Professional 
Association for Cost Accountants in Britain in the Wake of the First World War, 
CIMA. 
McCord, N. [ 1972] 'Some Aspects of North East England in the Nineteenth Century', 
Northern History 7: 241-266. 
McCord, N. [ 1979], North East England. an economic and social history, London: 
Batsford Academic. 
McGaw, J. A. [1985], 'Accounting for Innovation: Technological Change and 
Business Practice in the Berkshire County Paper Industry', TechnolqýT and Culture, 
26,4.703-725. 
McKendrick N. [1970], 'Josiah Wedgwood and Cost Accounting in the Industrial 
Revolution', Economic History Review, 23,1 - 45-67 
McKinstry, S., [1999], 'Engineering culture and accounting development at Albion 
Motors, 1900-c. 1970'Accounting, Business and Financial Hislory, 9,2, -203-223. 
275 
McLean, T. [1995], 'Contract accounting and costing in the Sunderland shipbuilding 
industry 1818-1917', Accounting Business and Financial History, 5,1: 109-145. 
McLean, T. [1996], 'Bureaucratic and craft administration of production process- the 
formation of accounting and non-accounting control arrangements', Management 
Accounting Research, 7,1 -119-134. 
McLean, T. [2006a], 'Accounting, Costing and Trust in Organisational Control 
Structures', Accounting Historians Notebook, 29,2 : 1-8. 
McLean, T. [2006b], 'Continuity and change in British cost accounting development: 
the case of Hawthorn Leslie shipbuilders and engineers 1886-1914', British 
Accounting Review, 3 8,95-12 1. 
McLean, T. and Tyson, T. [2006c], 'Standard Costs, Standard Costing and the 
Introduction of Scientific Management and New Technology into the Post-Second 
World War Sunderland Shipbuilding Industry', Accounting, Business and Financial 
History, 16,3 
. -389-417. 
Macleod, C. [1992], 'Strategies for innovation: the diffusion of new technology in 
nineteenth century British industry', Economic History Review, XLV, 2: 285-307. 
Maltby, J. [1999], 'A sort of guide, philosopher and fiiend-. the rise of the 
professional auditor in Britain, Accounting, Business & Financial History, 9,1: 29- 
50. 
Manders, F and Potts, R. [2001], Crossing the Tyne, Tyne Bridge Publishing. 
Marriner, S., [ 1978], Business and Businessmen : Studies in Business, Economic 
Accounting History, Liverpool University Press. 
Marriner, S. [1980], 'Company Financial statements as source material for business 
historians', Business History, XXII,: 203-235. 
276 
Marshall, A [1973], Industrial England 1776-1851, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
London. 
Marshall., M. W. [ 1992], Tyne waters: a river and its salmon, London. 
Marshall, M. W. [1997], Turning Tides- A history of the Tyne and Wear, Keepdate 
publishing. 
Matthews, D., Anderson, M. and Edwards, J. R. [1997], 'The rise of the 
professional accountant in British management', Economic History Review, L, 
3:. 407-429. 
Matthews, D., Anderson, M, and Edwards, J. R. [1998], Ae Priesthood of 
Industry, Oxford University Press. 
Matthews, A [1998], 'The business doctors: accountants in British management for 
the nineteenth century to the present day. Business History, 40,3: 72-103. 
Mauther, T. [ 19971, Penguin Dictionary ofPhilosophy, Hammondsworth, Penguin. 
Mepham, M. J. [1983], 'Robert Hamilton's Contribution to Accounting', The 
Accounting Review, LVIR, 1 -43-57. 
Merett, A. J. And Sykes, A., [1973], The Financing and Analysis of Capital 
Projects, Longman. 
Merino, B. [ 1998], 'Critical theory and accounting history, challenges and 
opportunities', Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 9, -. 603-616. 
Merino, B. and Mayper, A. G. [1993], 'Accounting History and Empirical Research' 
The Accounting Historians Journal, 20,2,: 211-23 2. 
Miller P. and O'Leary, T. [1987] 'Accounting and the Construction of the 
Governable Person', Accounting Organisations and Society 12,: 23 5-265. 
Miller, P and O'Leary, T. [1989], 'Hierarchies and American Ideals 1900-1940', 
Academy ofManagement Review, 14,2 - 250-265. 
277 
Miller, P and O'Leary, T. [1990], 'Making Accounting Practical', Accounting, 
Organisations and Society, 15,5.479-498. 
Miller, P. [1990], 'On the Interactions between Accounting and the State 7, 
Accounting, Organisations andSociety, 15,4: 315-338. 
Miller, P. [1991], 'Accounting Innovation Beyond the Enterprise- Problematizing 
Investment Decisions and Programming Economic Growth in the U. K. in the 1960s', 
Accounting, Organisations and Society 16,. 8 -. 73 3 -762. 
Miller, P. Hopper, T., and Laughlin, R. [1991], The New Accounting ffistory- An 
Introduction, Accounting Organisations and Society, 16,5/6: 396-403. 
Miller, P. and Napier, C. [1993], 'Genealogies of Calculation', Accounting 
OrganisationsandSociety, 18,7/8-.. 631-647. 
Miller, P., Hopper, T., and Laughlin, R. [1997], 'Beyond Accounting: the 
possibilities of accounting and "critical" research accounting research, Critical 
D- 
, erspectives on Accounting, 8: 71-95. 
Miller S. [ 1980], ne River Wear Commissioners Extracts ftom their papers 1717- 
1846, Durham. 
Miller, S. [ 1982], 'John Murray a bold and skilful engineer, Industrial Archaelogy 
Review,, VI, 2, p. 102. 
Miller, S. [19881, Sunderland, town and people: a history ftom the 1780's, 
Sunderland. 
Mitchell, E. [ 18 82], Engineering education at home and abroad, Cowen Tracts v. 127 
n. 3. 
Moran, D. L. [1936], 'The trend of costing, past, present and future', The Cost 
Accountant, 304-307. 
278 
Morris, R. D. [1986], ýLee vs Neuchatel Asphalte (1889) and depreciation accounting 
: two empirical studies, Accounting andBusiness Research, Winter: 71-81. 
Murray, J. [1847], 'An account of the Progressive Improvement of Sunderland 
Harbour and the River Wear', Transactions in Engineering., 2,1: p. 256. 
Napier, C. [1990], 'Fixed asset accounting in the shipping industry: P&O 1840- 
1914)) Accounting, Business and Financial History, 1: 21-4 8. 
Napier, C. [1991] 'Secret accounting: the P&O Group in the interwar years' 
Accounting, Business andFinancial History, 1: 303-33. 
Napier, C. [1996] 'Academic disdain? Economists and accounting in Britain, 1850- 
19505, Accounting, Business andFinancial History, 6,3 -. 427-450. 
Neimark, M. K., [1994] 'Regicide Revisited- Marx, Foucault and Accounting, ' 
Critical Perspectives in Accounting, 5,87-108. 
Neu, D. [1999], 'Discovering indigenous peoples: Accounting and the machinery of 
Empire', Accounting Historians Journal, 26,1-. 75-101. 
Neu, D., Cooper, D. J., and Everett, J. [2001], 'Critical Accounting Interventions', 
Critical Perspectives onAccounfing, 12: 735-762. 
Newcastle City Libraries, [1969], Looking back at the Ty-ne, Newcastle: Newcastle 
City Libraries. 
Nikitin, M. [200 1] 'The birth of a modem public sector accounting system in France 
and Britain and the influence of Count Mollien', Accounting History, 6,1- 75- 10 1. 
Northway, A. M. [1972], 'The Tyne Steam Shipping Company: a late nineteenth 
century shipping line, Martime History, 2,1. 
Oldroyd, D. [19961, 'The Costing Records of George Bowes and the Grand Allies in 
the North-East Coal Trade in the Eighteenth Centu! j: Their TyLie and Significance' 
A ccounting, Business and Financial History, 6,1: 2-22. 
279 
Oldroyd, D. [2001], 'Historical Trends in the development of accounting practice % 
Newcastle University Discussion Paper in Accounting and Finance, No. 200 1/1. 
Oldroyd, A [1999], Thstoriography, Causality and Positioning- An Unsystematic 
View of Accounting History, Accounting Historians Journal, 26,1 -. 83 -102. 
Owen, D. J. [1939], The Origins and Development of the Ports of the United 
Kingdom, Allman and Son Ltd. 
Parker, kH. [ 1984], Papers on Accounting History, Garland, London. 
Parker, ILH. [1990], 'Regulating British corporate financial reporting in the late 
nineteenth century', Accounting, Business and Financial History, 1,1 -. 51-7 1. 
Parker, PLH. [1991], 'Misleading Accounts? Pit falls for f-Estorians', Business 
History, 33,4- 1-18. 
Parker, R. H. and Yamey, B. S. [1994], Accounting History, Some British 
Contributions', Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
Parker, ILH. and Zeff, S. [1996], Milestones in the British Accounting Literature, 
Garland, London. 
Pitts, M. V. [2001], 'In praise of William Armstrong: a nineteenth century British 
engineer and early management accountant, ' Accounting History NS, -33 -5 8. 
Pollard, S. [1963], 'Capital accounting in the industrial revolution', Yorkshire 
Bulletin ofEconomic and Social Research, 15 -. 75-9 1. 
Pollard, S. [1965], 'The genesis of modern management: a study of the Industrial 
Revolution in Great Britain', Cambridge. 
Port of Tyne Authority [1999], Port of Tyne: Thefirst two thousandyears, British 
Publishing Company Ltd. 
Potts, T. [ 1892], Sunderland, a history of the town, port, trade and commerce, 
Sunderland. Williams. 
280 
Preston, A. M. [1992], 'The Birth of Clinical Accounting- a study of the Emergence 
and Transformation of Discourses on Cost and Practices of Accounting in US 
Hospitals', Accounting, Organisations and Society, . 
17,1 - 63- 100. 
Reader, W. [1966], Professional Men, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London. 
Ren nison, ILW. [ 1987], Me development of the North East Coal Ports, 1815-1914. - 
The contribution of engineering, Newcastle University PhD Thesis. 
Rennison, ILW. [1990], 'The Improvement of the River Tyne, 1815-1914', 
Transactions of the Newcomen Society, 62 -. 113 -142. 
Rivetts, T. [1958] chapter: the building of the Sunderland Docks, in Bowling, H. G., 
The land of three Rivers 
Robb, G. [1992], White-collar crime in modem England, Cambridge University 
Press. 
Roberts, C. B. [1991], 'Environmental Disclosures- a note on reporting practices in 
Europe', Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 4,3 -. 62-7 1. 
Robson, K., [1991], 'On the Arenas of Accounting Change- the Process of 
Translation', Accounting, Organisations and Society, 16,5/6: 547-5 70. 
Rolt L. T. C [1965] 'The History of the History of Engineering', Institute of 
Mechanical Engineers, 357-61. 
Rose, M. [ 1977], 'The Role of the Fan-ffly in Providing Capital and Managerial Talent 
in Samuel Greg and Company 1784-1840', Business History, 19,1 : p. 3 7-54. 
Rose, N. [1991], 'Governing by Numbers- Figuring out Democracy', Accounting, 
Organisations and Society, 16,7: 6 73 -692. 
Roslender, R. [1995], 'Accounting for strategic positioning- responding to the crisis 
in management accounting, British Journal of Management, 5,1 - 45-57. 
281 
Roslender, R. [1996], 'Relevance Lost and Found: Critical Perspectives on the 
Promise of Management Accounting', Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 7- 533- 
561. 
Rowe, D. J. [ 1969] 'The Decline of the Tyneside Keelmen in the nineteenth century', 
Northern History, 4 -111-13 1. 
Rowe, D. J. [1973], The economy of the North East in the nineteenth century, 
Beamish. 
Rowland, T. H. [1991], Waters of Tyne, Abbey Press. 
Roy, S. P. and Spraakman, G., [1996], 'Transaction cost economics and nineteenth 
century fur trade accounting: relevance of contemporary theory', Accounting History, 
NS 11,2: 55-78. 
Savage, M. R [1970], The Tyne 1800-1850, a study of life and work on a great 
northern river, Newcastle. 
Schweiker, W. [1993], 'Accounting for ourselves: accounting practice and the 
discourse of ethics', Accounting Organisations and Society, 18,2/3: 231-252. 
Shaw, H. [1908], The River Tyne : its advantages and possibilities, Andrew Reid, 
Newcastle. 
Shaw, H. [1911], The Newcastle and Gateshead Incorporated Chamber of 
Commerce, Year Book and Commercial Review, Newcastle and Gateshead 
Incorporated Chamber of Commerce. 
Slaven, T. [1980], Shipbuilding, Newcastle. 
Solomons, D. [ 1952], The Historical Development of Costing, London. 
Smith, A. [ 1776], Me Wealth ofNations, Edinburgh, 
Smith, K. [ 1995], Built with pride, Newcastle. 
Solomons, D. [1952], Studies in Costing, Sweet and Maxwell, London. 
282 
Spraakman, G and Davidson, R. [ 1998], 'Transaction cost economics as a predictor 
of management accounting practices at the Hudson's Bay Company, 1860 to 1914', 
Accounting History, 3,2 - 69-101. 
Stacey., N. A. H. [ 1954], English Accountancy, Gee. 
Stopford, M., [1997], Maritime Economics, Routledge. 
Storrar, A. C., and Pratt, KC. [2000], 'Accountability vs privacy, 1844-1907- the 
coming of the private company', Accounting, Business and Financial History, 10,3: 
259-291. 
Sturmey, S. G., [ 1962], British shipping and world competition, London. 
Swain, A., and Newman, 0. [1962], Hydrographical Surveys of the Tyne, Fishery 
Investigation 1,6: 3. 
Tabb, J. B., and Frankharn, C. B. [1986], 'The northern steamship company. the 
depreciation problem in the nineteenth century, ' The Accounting Historians Journal, 
13,2: 37-53. 
Tantrall, P. [1984], Accounting Literature in Non-Accounting Journals, Garland, 
London. 
Thornton, R. H. [1959], British Shipping, Cambridge University Press. 
Tinker, T. [1991], 'The accountant as partisan', Accounting Organisations and 
Society, 16,3: 297-3 10. 
Tinker, T and Puxty, T. [ 1994], Policing accounting knowledge, Chapman. 
Toms, S. [2005] 'Managerial control and accountability: evidence from the British 
Cotton Industry, 1700-2000', Accounting Organisations and Society, 30 - 627-65-3 ). 
Tower, G. [1993], 'A public accountability model of accounting regulation', British 
Accounting Review, 25: 61-85. 
Tyne and Wear County Museums, fhe Maritime Collections. 
283 
Tyne Improvement Commission, [1950], Ae port of Tyne, Buffows & Co. Ltd, 
Newcastle. 
Tyson, T, Oldroyd, D., and Fleischman, PLK. [20051, 'Accounting, Coercion and 
Social Control During Apprenticeship: Converting Slave Workers to wage workers in 
the British West Indies, c. 1834-1838', Accounting Historians Journal 2005,32,2, 
201-231. 
Tyson, T. and Oldroyd, D. [20071, 'Straw men and old saws - an evidence-based 
response to Sy and Tinker's critique of Accounting History', Accounting Historians 
Journal 2007,347 11 173-193. 
Urwick, L. [1959], The Making of Scientific Management Vol. 11, London, Sir Issac 
Pitman &Sons. 
Ville, S. [ 198 1 ], 'James Kirton, Marriners Mirror, 67 - 149-162. 
Ville, S. P. [1984], 'The deployment of English merchant shipping: Micheal and 
Joseph Henley of Wapping shipowners 1775-1830', Journal of Transport History, 16- 
33. 
Ville, S. [1986], 'Total Factor productivity', Economic History Review, xxxix: 355- 
70. 
Ville, S. P. [1988], 'Shipping in the port of Newcastle 1780-1800', Jounial of 
Transport History, 9,3 
.- 
60-77. 
Ville, S. P. [1989] Tatterns of shipping investment', Northern History, XXV- 205- 
221. 
Ville, S. P. [1990] 'Shipping in the port of Sunderland 1815-45', Business History. 
32 : 22-51. 
Walker, I[ 1905], 7-he 7ýtie as a Navigable River, Newcastle: Andrew Reid. 
284 
Walker, S. P. [1996] Taissez Faire, Collectivism and Companies Legislation in 
nineteenth century Britain, ' British Accounting Review, 28,4: 305-24. 
Walton, G. M. [1970], 'Productivity Change in Ocean Shipping After 1870: A 
Comment, Journal ofEconomic History, 3 0,2 - 43 5-411. 
Watts, kL. and Zimmermann, J. L. [1979], 'The demand and supply of accounting 
theories: the markets for excuses', ne Accounting Review, 54,2: 273 -3 05. 
Webb, S and B, [1906,1908], English Local Governmentftom the Revolution to the 
Municipal Corporations Act: the Manor aW the Borough, Parts I& 11, [London-. 
Longman]. 
Welford, IL [ 1894], Men ofMark 'Twixt and Tweed, Newcastle upon Tyne. 
Wells, M. C. [1978], Accountingfor common costs, University of Illinois. 
Wertheim, W. F. [1992], 'Development and Change, the state and the dialects of 
emancipation', World Bank, 23,3 -. 257-28 1. 
West, B. [1996], 'The professionialisation of accounting, Accounting History, NS 
Vol. 1, No. 1. 
White, J. [ 1988], The North East Ports, London. 
Whittle, G. [ 1979], The Newcastle and Carlisle RailgW, David Charles. 
Whittred, G. [1986], 'The Evolution of Consolidated Financial Reporting in 
Australia', Abacus, 1986. 
Williams, R. [1999], 'Boulton and Watt's Soho Foundry', Accounting Historians 
Journal, 26,, 2: 65-87. 
Wood, T. D. and Sylvestre, A. J. [1985], 'The History of Advertising by 
Accountants', Ae Accounting Historians Journal, 12,3. 
Yamey, B. S. [1980], 'Early Views on the Origins and Development of Book-keeping 
and Accounting', Special Accoutititig History Issue, 811-92. 
285 
Yamey, B. S. [1981], 'Some on the Writing of a General History of Accounting', 
Accounting Business Research, Spring- 127-35. 
Yam ey, B. S. [ 1982], Further Essays on the History ofAccounting, Garland. 
Yamey, B. [ 1994], 'Accounting in History', The European Accounting Review, 3,2 - 
375-389. 
Zarach, S. [ 1987], Ed, Debrett's Bibliography ofBusiness History, Macmillan. 
http: //portcities. hartlepool. gov. uk 
http: //www. dover-kent/transport/harbour. history. htm 
286 
